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The enactment of derivative action was expected to be actively used by shareholders 
to protect their interests. In fact, it turned out that this reform effort seemed futile as 
the right to engage in such actions was rarely exercised. This raises a question about 
the role of derivative actions in China; namely, should a derivative action system 
play a key role in protecting shareholder interests? If the answer is positive, the next 
question is how such a system could be improved in order to effectively discipline 
management. The essence of this thesis is to try to address these issues.  
 
This thesis argues that derivative action should and can play a key role in China’s 
corporate governance. First, minority shareholders in China face double agency 
problems within the company and thus protective mechanisms must be put in place. 
Second, this thesis formulates its argument by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of 
market forces and other legal methods. As a consequence, derivative action ought to 
retain a central role in regulating the misbehaviour of controlling shareholders and 
managers. 
 
After demonstrating the need to strengthen and improve derivative actions in China, 
this thesis starts to explore Chinas’ derivative actions system. It first examines 
derivative action cases before Company Law 2005. Despite the absence of a clear 
statutory basis for derivative actions in Company Law 1993, such cases have 
nevertheless appeared in the courts. After almost eight years of implementation, less 
than 80 cases were raised. Whilst this seems a good figure in comparison to other 
jurisdictions, closer examination shows this not to be the case. For example, the 
opacity of the demand requirement constitutes a barrier for shareholders wishing to 
exercise this right. More importantly, the funding rule of derivative actions is treated 
as the same with other forms of litigation. In view of the unique economic nature of 
the derivative action, a new funding rule for derivative action should be established. 
 
After discussing why derivative actions should play a significant role in monitoring 
management and how they should be improved, this thesis argues that shareholders 
are increasingly willing to take this action to protect their rights and interests because 
of the establishment of commercial society and the existence of the traditional 
culture of Legalist School. Also, the courts are more capable of dealing with 
derivative action cases because of the enactment of the Judges Law and the 
increasing recruitment of more qualified people to the judiciary. It is believed that the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The nature of the derivative action 
 
When directors or officers harm a company, the general principle in company law is 
that the company itself must bring any legal action against the wrongdoers. 
Individual shareholders are not entitled to initiate such litigation to redress 
misconduct. This was established in Foss v Harbottle where Foss and other 
shareholders brought a suit against the directors of a company alleging loss of the 
company’s property occasioned by managers engaging in illegal activities. The court 
denied this action, pointing out that the company is the proper plaintiff in an action 




This so-called ‘proper plaintiff’ principle is justified on several grounds. First, the 
corporation itself is a legal entity and has its own property which therefore entitles it 
to enjoy the attendant legal rights and responsibilities. Secondly, any legal remedy 
would go to the company as a whole and thus individual shareholders ultimately 
benefit if the litigation is successful. Last but not least, trivial or even malicious 
actions may be generated if individual shareholders are allowed to bring litigation. 
 
It is true that the proper plaintiff principle recognises the legal entity of the 
corporation and the importance of business judgment. However, without exception, 
the application of this rule would cause unfairness in some circumstances. Injustice 
could arise where the majority of a company’s shares are controlled by the 
                                                             
1
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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company’s directors or managers. Where these individuals are involved in the alleged 
misconduct, it is most unlikely that the company in this situation would bring 
litigation. 
 
In fact, the common law in England and Wales and Scotland, from which the 
derivative action originated, has recognised the limitations of the Foss rule and 
developed several exceptions under which shareholders are entitled to sue in their 
own names. For example, in the case of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries (No 2), the Court indicated that “There is no room for the operation of the 
rule if the alleged wrong is ultra vires the corporation, because the majority of 
members cannot confirm the transaction.”
2
 The court further stated that “there is 
also no room for the operation of the rule if the transaction complained of could be 
validly done or sanctioned only by a special resolution or the like, because a simple 
majority cannot confirm a transaction which requires the concurrence of a greater 
majority”.
3
 Among these exceptions, corporate control by a wrongdoer might be 
seen as typical. This means that courts will allow shareholders to bring the litigation 
when a wrongdoer has sufficient powers to control a company in order to prevent 




As a result, exceptions to the proper plaintiff principle have been developed and 
adopted not just in the UK, but in numerous countries.
5
 Derivative actions are a 
response to the problem of abuse which might be caused by the application of the 
proper plaintiff principle and allow individual shareholders to sue wrongdoers on 
                                                             
2




 See Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93 (PC). 
5
 Many common law jurisdictions have adopted statutory derivative action as an exception to the 
proper plaintiff principle. The Canadians have adopted the statutory derivative action in sections 
238-240 of Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C.1985. c. C-44. Singapore and New Zealand 
have also introduced the statutory derivative action in their respective countries. Eventually Australia 
adopted it in 2000 in part.2F.1A of its Corporations Act 2001. The US and UK, countries 
representative of common law jurisdictions, have also introduced this statutory rule. 
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behalf of the company. As a consequence, the interests of minority shareholders and 
the company would be protected. Many countries have either adopted, or are 
considering the introduction of the statutory derivative action.
6
 Indeed, the 
introduction of statutory derivative actions serves many functions, such as deterring 
mismanagement.
7
 It is also, however, most likely to be abused either in the form of 
strike suits or shifting corporate governance from directors to shareholders owing to 
the excessive use of the derivative litigation. Thus, there is a general recognition of 
the need to balance the interests of minority shareholders and corporate efficiency to 
craft law that permits minority shareholders to raise derivative actions. The solutions 
in this respect are quite different across jurisdictions. 
 
1.2 Derivative Actions versus other Devices Designed to Reduce 
Agency Costs 
 
Since Berle and Means first unveiled the theory of control of the corporate form,
8
 
the economic term ‘agency’ has gradually become utilised in legal scholarship.
9
 Two 
forms of agency costs have been identified: vertical agency costs between 
shareholders and managers, and horizontal agency cost problems between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. In the case of the former, members of a 
company do not generally ‘control’ the company; in its day-to-day operations the 
board of directors is authorised to run the company, thus accruing agency costs.
10
 In 
the case of the latter, this is normally incurred in the jurisdictions with concentrated 
                                                             
6
 Please refer to n5. 
7
 See E. Ferran, ‘Company Law Reform in the UK’ (2001) 5 Singapore Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 516; J. C. Coffee, ‘Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from 
Securities Market Failure’ (1999) 25 The Journal of Corporation Law 1. 
8
 A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (2
nd
 revised edn, 
Transaction Publishers 1991). 
9
 For details of agency costs in China, please see Part 1 of Chapter 2. 
10
 See R. Kraakman, J. Armour, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda 
and E. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 21-23. 
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ownership as majority shareholders in such jurisdictions have both the ability and 
incentive to constrain the directors’ performance. As such, the managerial agency 
problem is not a major issue; rather, conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders are the principal concern. 
 
It is generally thought that shareholder litigation is neither the initial nor the primary 
protection for shareholders to reduce agency costs. Indeed, various mechanisms can 
hold majority shareholders or managers accountable and thus some argue that there 
may be less need to resort to litigation as a means of protecting minority shareholder 
interests in light of the high costs of such recourse.
11
 However, the question emerges 
as to what role the derivative action should play in reducing agency costs. In the 
absence of derivative actions, are mechanisms such as market forces and the 
regulatory authority of governmental agencies strong enough to protect the interests 
of shareholders, especially minority shareholders?  
 
Law has an important role to play in reducing these costs. As Kraakman et al have 
pointed out, carefully designed rules and procedures can enhance disclosure by 
agents or facilitate enforcement actions brought by principals against negligent or 
dishonest agents.
12
 The derivative action, as one of these rules, can reduce agency 
costs operating to deter mismanagement by imposing the threat of liability and 
therefore aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders.
13
 
McDonough also recognises the role of derivative actions and maintains that as one 
way of addressing agency costs, it enables steps to be taken on behalf of shareholders 
in order to redress the imbalance in the modern corporate form between control 
                                                             
11
 S. Deakin, E. Ferran, R. C. Nolan, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies: An Overview’ (1997) 1 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 162- 171. 
12
 See R. Kraakman, J. Armour, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda 
and E. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) Chapter 2. 
13
 A. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance : Theory and Operation (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 23. 
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Some commentators argue that mechanisms other than derivative action are the 
rational choice for corporations to diminish agency costs. Agrawal and Knoeber have 
conducted research into the effects on corporate performance of several alternative 
mechanisms and their results appear to match up with the notion that different 
mechanisms of reducing agency costs can complement and substitute for one 
another.
15
 This is also supported by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia who state that 
“firm[s] choose among alternative mechanisms for minimizing agency costs”.
16
 
Nevertheless, some commentators maintain that derivative actions are a necessary 
means of dealing with agency costs. As Posner asserts “the derivative suit is a 
monument to the problem of agency costs; it would make no sense to allow a 
shareholder to bypass the corporate management in bringing a suit against an officer 
if one could be confident that management always acted in the shareholders’ 
interests”.
17
 The crux of both these arguments is whether other mechanisms are 
strong enough to reduce agency costs and hence protect the interests of minority 
shareholders and the company as a whole. 
 
Considering that many countries have adopted or considered introducing statutory 
derivative actions, it seems clear that other mechanisms alone may not constitute an 
effective functional substitute to litigation. This part will thus place the system of 
derivative actions in the context of market mechanisms and legal mechanisms to 
                                                             
14
 D. D. McDonough, ‘Proposed New Statutory Derivative Action-Does It Go Far Enough?’ (1996) 1 
Bond Law Review 47. 
15
 A. Agrawal and C. R. Knoeber, ‘Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems 
between Managers and Shareholders’ (1996) 31 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 377. 
16
 There are several strategies which a company can choose to reduce agency costs: leverage, 
increased reliance on outside directors, institutional investors, dividend policy and radical changes in 
corporate control. See C. P. Himmelberg, R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia, ‘Understanding the 
Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance’ (1999) 53 
Journal of Financial Economics 353, 382. 
17
 R. A. Posner, ‘Citation Classic - Economic-Analysis of Law’ (1985) 49 Current Contents/Social & 
Behavioral Sciences 389. 
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demonstrate why it has a key role to play in this setting. 
 
1.2.1 Market Mechanisms 
 
There are a number of market mechanisms that operate to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers. These include the product market, the capital market, the 




The product market means that a company’s product should be competitively priced 
so it can gain market share and increase profit. In order to achieve this, a company 
must impose rigid controls on all aspects of production and sale to reduce redundant 
costs which leaves little room for managers to abuse their powers to pursue personal 
interests. The capital market constrains agency costs by lowering a company’s share 
price and making it difficult for the company to raise finance on the capital market. 
In order to avoid that, directors must reduce agency costs, thus disincentivising their 
exploitation of minority shareholder interests. The labour market for managers 
denotes that managers, like other employees, must look for a job when they are 
unemployed. Disloyalty or misconducts harmful to a previous (company) employer 
damages their reputation and thus reduces their ability to obtain a well-paid job. The 
market for corporate control operates through the threat of a bid that provides 
management with an incentive to maximise shareholder returns. If managers 
successfully bring high value to all shareholders, this will make their company 
bid-proof because they have acted in the interests of shareholders and shown them 
loyalty. If they fail to do so, the company may be in danger of being taken over and 
the managers might be replaced. 
 
                                                             
18
 E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press 1999) 118-122. 
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Indeed, these market mechanisms play an important role in enhancing managerial 
efficiency and accountability from the perspective of the modern economic theory of 
the corporation.
19
 The reason why the USA and UK adopt different approaches 
towards derivative actions may be a vivid example to illustrate the role of the market 
mechanism. Miller conducts a comparative study and shows that one reason why the 
USA and UK adopt different attitudes towards derivative actions is that they have 
divergent regulations regarding takeovers.
20
 In the US, where hostile takeovers are 
rigorously limited, the derivative action has attained greater prominence as a 
management control device. In the UK, there is a more vigorous and less regulated 
takeover market than in the US and thus the operation of the derivative action is 
more restricted. This indicates that in the UK, market forces may be a better 
alternative to reduce agency costs and thus the derivative action is less needed.  
 
However, this does not mean that the market mechanism can replace the legal 
method. In fact, such market mechanisms are not without their limits. Recent 
research implies that extra-legal methods designed to control managerial power are 
less effective than one might have expected.
21
 Other studies also cast doubt on the 
mechanism of the market for corporate control and identify several drawbacks. First, 
a takeover can happen to any company regardless of its size, though in the real world, 
it is much easier for larger companies to acquire small companies.
22
 From this 
perspective, takeover regulation is irrelevant to the efficiency of management. 
Secondly, the cost of takeovers as a means of changing management is high.
23
 
                                                             
19
 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate law (Harvard University Press 
Reprint edn 1996); E. F. Fama and M. C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 
Journal of Law & Economics 301. 
20
 G. Miller, ‘Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast between the 
United States and England’ (1998) 1 Columbia Business Law Review 51. 
21
 S. Deakin, E. Ferran, R. C. Nolan, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies: An Overview’ (1997) 1 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 167-169. 
22
 A. Hughes, ‘Merger and Economics Performance in the UK: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence 
1950-1990’ In Fairburn and J. A. Kay (eds.), Mergers and Merger Policy (Oxford University Press 
1991).  
23
 See general: A. T. Peacock and G. Bannock, Corporate Take Overs and the Public Interest: The 
Hume Report on Corporate Takeovers (Elsevier Science Ltd 1991).  
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Prentice has suggested that either mounting, or defending against, a takeover 
involves substantial transaction costs.
24
 Furthermore, there is no evidence to prove 
that firm performance will be improved after a takeover. As Singh and Weisse have 
noted, the acquiring company may be motivated by empire-building considerations 




Other market mechanisms also have their own disadvantages. For example, the 
mechanism of the labour market for managers may be undermined when managers 
are at the end of their careers and thus no longer seek to further their careers. In fact, 
there is already a vast amount of literature questioning the effectiveness of market 
primacy.
26
 The traditional criticism is that such a market may fail to work because of 
inevitable problems such as informational asymmetry, transaction costs and 
collective action problems. However, it is not the intention of this thesis to examine 
all of these problems. The above discussion is simply intended to introduce the limits 
of market mechanisms and underscore the importance of legal methods to reduce 
agency costs. The details of these market mechanisms in the context of China will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
1.2.2 Legal Mechanisms 
 
1.2.2.1 The Strengths of Legal Mechanisms 
 
When the benefits generated by misbehaviour are larger than the costs, a reasonable 
                                                             
24
 D. D. Prentice, ‘Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance Debate’ In D. D. Prentice and P. R. J. 
Holland (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 1993) 37.  
25
 A. Singh and B. Weisse, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition, the New International Financial 
Architecture and large Corporations in Emerging Markets’ ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper No.250, 28. 
26
 For example, see M. A. Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law 




manager may choose to engage in such behaviour where it is monitored simply by 
the market mechanism alone. In this situation, legal mechanisms have to be in place 
in order to impose legal liabilities on the misbehaving managers. The power of the 
State lying behind legal mechanisms has a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force. As such, misbehaving managers can be involuntarily punished; 
market mechanisms have no such role. With legal liability, infringed legal rights can 
be rectified, damaged interests restored, illegitimate gains removed and 
misappropriated properties retrieved.
27
 In addition, legal mechanisms also have the 
effect of punishing corrupt managers through disqualification, fines and incarceration, 
etc. It is these unique features that make legal mechanisms distinct from market 
mechanisms and enable them to deter one-off managerial misappropriation, which is 
fatal to corporate success.
28
 In this sense, it is perhaps not an exaggeration to say 
that legal mechanisms are the foundation of fostering good corporate governance. 
 
1.2.2.2 Defects of Legal Mechanisms 
 
Although it is acknowledged that there is a vital role for legal mechanisms to play in 
deterring managerial misappropriation and ensuring good corporate governance, it is 
also argued that the defects of legal mechanisms may affect their functioning in this 
context. For example, it is said that it can be difficult to achieve legislative purposes 
owing to the limitations of legislation and poor law enforcement. Indeed, it is true 
that this problem exists in every country, particularly in China where the enforcement 
of law is often severely criticised. However, the existence of such a problem does not 
imply that legal mechanisms are less important or are trivial in reducing agency costs. 
Rather, the correct way to overcome this issue is to solve the problem to the best of 
our ability. It is undeniable that the problem of legislation and enforcement cannot be 
                                                             
27
 J. P. Humphrey, ‘On the Definition and Nature of Law’ (1945) 8 Modern Law Review 194. 
28
 For details of one-off misappropriation, please see: Z. Zhang, The Derivative Action and Good 
Corporate Governance in China (Lambert Academic Publishing 2011) 60-66. 
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completely eliminated; nevertheless, it also cannot be denied that such problems can 
be diminished and thus improve corporate governance. In fact, the existence of good 
and poor corporate governance in different countries reflects their different levels of 
sophistication in law enforcement and drawing up legislation.  
 
Some commentators also point out that legal liability is limited by the fact that 
judges are no better qualified than managers to make decisions about commercial 
affairs. Managers, as businessmen, are business professionals and should thus be 
more qualified to decide whether a transaction is in the best interests of a company. It 
is argued that judges, as outsiders, are not capable of making good decisions about 
such issues. However, this argument is groundless as there is a difference between 
deciding and assessing. Although courts may experience difficulties in deciding 
business strategy, they are manifestly capable of assessing the merits of conceivable 
managerial misconducts; much like people with no knowledge of film-making are 
nevertheless able to evaluate films. Furthermore, judges are becoming increasingly 
competent in judging commercial cases. This is especially so in China where there is 
even a specialist adjudication division responsible for dealing with commercial cases. 
 
1.2.2.3 Public or Private Enforcement of Law? 
 
As demonstrated above, legal mechanisms play a vital role in deterring managerial 
misbehaviour and building good corporate governance. Nevertheless, the law 
regulating corporate governance can take different forms and thus result in different 
liabilities. The common explanation for this difference is public and private 
enforcement of law. The former relates to the enforcement of law by public 
authorities, potentially giving rise to criminal or administrative liability. The latter 
involves law enforced by individuals, particularly shareholders in a company, and 
can produce civil liability. This part will demonstrate the necessity of the private 
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enforcement of law by assessing the characteristics of public law enforcement. 
 
Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement has a much more severe 
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers as it not only causes economic consequences 
but may also involve physical confinement. Indeed, criminal liability may not only 
result in criminal fines, but can also result in incarceration for wrongdoers. 
Furthermore, imprisonment itself does not simply mean physical agony, but can also 
affect a manager’s future by rendering them potentially unable to find a job in the 
same profession.
29
 Even administrative liability that does not involve incarceration 
can cause a significant financial loss for a wrongdoer as it normally entails forfeiture, 
confiscation and administrative fines. As a result, it is widely acknowledged that the 
public enforcement of law has a very strong effect of deterrence. 
 
However, a strong deterrent does not necessarily lead to an optimal result as the 
effectiveness of legal sanctions not only depends on the severity of the penalty, but 
also on the probability of subjection to such a penalty.
30
 If the likelihood of 
discovering and convicting wrongdoers is low, the effectiveness of such a legal 
mechanism is affected. Unfortunately, the public enforcement of law suffers from 
this disadvantage and thus is no better than private enforcement. 
 
First, difficulties in proving the guilt of managers makes public enforcement less 
desirable than private enforcement. The general standard of proof to establish guilt in 
criminal proceedings is that all elements of the charge are established “beyond 
reasonable doubt”,
31
 which is much higher than the standard in civil lawsuits. 
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Furthermore, the evidence collected in criminal proceedings is subject to rigorous 
scrutiny and the so-called illegal evidence exclusion rule is also adopted to invalidate 
evidence obtained illegally. In civil suits, the procedure and evidence rules are much 
more relaxed. As those acting criminally in a company are likely to be highly 





In addition to the rigorous evidential requirements and complicated procedure of 
criminal law, there are other drawbacks that make public enforcement impractical in 
exclusively tackling managerial misbehaviour. As Reisberg points out, the funding 
and resources of the public organisations charged with the task of enforcement are 
limited and thus, they cannot pursue all the illegal activities that might arise.
33
 
Moreover, the enforcement priorities established by corporate regulators may not be 
appropriate to address wrongdoing in each and every company; this highlights the 
role of private enforcement.
34
 Lastly, it is also argued that the possibilities for public 
agencies to enforce rights or duties would probably be lower if the private enforcers 




On the other hand, private enforcement does not suffer from the above problems and 
thus enjoys some advantages over public enforcement. For example, the gains from 
private enforcement normally go to the individual, creating a strong financial 
incentive for shareholders. An empirical study in the US also shows that the 
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development of capital markets is highly correlated to private law enforcement.
36
 As 
such, private enforcement is essential to developing good corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, this does not negate the importance of public enforcement. In fact, the 
strong deterrent effect that it generates is essential to protect minority shareholders. 
The above discussion thus highlights the limitations of public enforcement and 
demonstrates the need for private enforcement. Both modes of enforcement can and 
should be used in complement to tackle managerial misbehaviour as neither are 
sufficient means of doing so alone. 
 
1.2.2.4 Private Enforcement of Law: Derivative Actions or other 
Methods? 
 
Law, including securities law, has conferred many rights upon shareholders to protect 
their interests. If other methods are sufficient to hold managers accountable, the 
derivative action may lose its justification. However, other mechanisms also have 
their own disadvantages and thus the derivative action cannot be excluded. For 
example, the right to vote is thought to be a major enforcement mechanism available 
to shareholders that does not involve litigation.
37
 Here, the assumption is that 
managers must act in the interests of shareholders because failure to do so means 
shareholders might vote against and remove them. Indeed, the right to vote allows 
shareholders to influence the behaviour of managers and therefore, agency costs can 
be reduced to some extent. However, this analysis is built on the presupposition that 
shareholders are willing to vote in their own interests. In fact, in many cases 
shareholders are reluctant to participate or vote in general meetings, even where they 
can easily vote by electronic means.
38
 The reason for this may stem from the 
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problem of collective action.
39
 First, the right to vote is a right conferred upon 
shareholders and is not compulsory for shareholders. Secondly, shareholders can 
incur significant costs in seeking to vote wisely because they have to travel to attend 
the meeting
40
 and spend some time reading the related information. More 
importantly, shareholders are likely to think that their votes are not a crucial element 
to decide whether a proposal could pass or not, especially in the UK, where the 
ownership of companies is relatively dispersed.
41
 Faccio and Lang have examined 
the impact of this dispersed ownership in the UK and concluded that this relatively 
dispersed UK capital market leads most ‘small’ shareholders to choose rational 
apathy; thus they do not want to take their time to consider proposals put to a vote by 
shareholders. Instead, they are inclined to vote with management without thinking 
too much.
42
 In addition, research has shown that the operating performance and 
valuations of corporations have not been influenced by shareholder proposals, and 
those proposals did not seem to alter the policy of corporate governance.
43
 Even if a 
shareholder’s proposal changes the corporation’s policy and thus increases its profits, 
he or she would receive only a pro rata share of the benefits whereas other 
shareholders free-ride on his or her efforts. Therefore, the right to vote seems to be 
an ineffective tool to prevent potential misbehaviour. 
 
Another main protection for minority shareholders is the establishment of 
independent directors (more commonly known as non-executive directors (NEDs) in 
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the UK). It is generally thought that the increasing role of NEDs would make 
managers accountable in the following ways: (1) reviewing the performance of the 
board and executive; (2) monitoring a company’s management; (3) taking the lead 
where potential conflicts of interest arise; and (4) expressing views and taking 
decisions in line with shareholder interests.
44
 As such, it is expected that NEDs 
would contribute value to the company and establish good corporate governance. 
 
However, there are mixed views on the effectiveness of NEDs on a board. The first 
concern is that the empirical evidence shows that there is no significant, or at least no, 
straightforward link between board composition and firm performance.
45
 In fact, 
Agrawal and Knoeber found that there is a negative relationship between the 
percentage of outsiders on the board and firm performance, which implied that 
additional outsiders on a board may reduce firm performance.
46
 Secondly, the 
establishment of NEDs would incur additional costs for a company as they may lack 
familiarity with the business.
47
 Third, managers’ innovation may be restricted. As 
NEDs are expected to assume more roles, managers would have less freedom to 
serve their own interests. At the same time, they would also have less freedom to 
make innovative and profit-generating business decisions.
48
 Indeed, the financial 
crisis in 2008 revealed the sad fact that the NED system is only one element in 
improving corporate governance and its role cannot be exaggerated. 
 
On the whole, it is well recognised that no single technique of accountability is likely 
to be most favourable under all conditions. Consequently, as a means of protecting 
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shareholder interests, the derivative action is becoming increasingly important in 





1.3 Debates on Derivative Actions: Justifications and Disadvantages 
 
As demonstrated above, the derivative action has a key role to play in making 
managers accountable. However, there has been a long debate about this system 
since its inception. Both sides have their own justifications. 
 
1.3.1 Justifications for Derivative Actions 
 
The arguments of those who support derivative actions run as follows. The first 
rationale behind the use of derivative actions is said to be the remedy of 
compensation. Successful litigation may confer monetary benefits to the company 
and impose financial penalties on the wrongdoers. However, some argue that this 
compensatory rationale has limitations. For example, changes in the composition of 
shareholders means that shareholders at the time of injury, who subsequently sell 
their shares prior to a court order for recovery, do not gain any compensation while 
incoming shareholders obtain a windfall gain.
50
 In addition, the injury to the 
company is not necessarily the same as the injury suffered by the shareholders.
51
 
This is confirmed by various empirical studies in the USA. Romano concluded, after 
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his empirical research, that while the total amount of recovery may be considerable, 
it is commonly de minimis on a per share basis.
52
 Thus one question emerges: if 
compensation cannot fully justify derivative actions, what else can validate 
shareholder litigation?  
 
Ramsay claims that deterrence, as one of the goals of derivative actions, may be seen 
as a key element in reducing the agency costs inherent in the management of 
companies.
53
 Deterrence generally operates at two levels: The first is that it deters 
misbehaviour on the part of the management of the company that is subject to such 
litigation; secondly, it further deters the management of the ‘family of companies’ as 
a whole. In the former case managers have to weigh up the costs of litigation if they 
do something wrong. In the latter case, a successful derivative action is likely to 
produce a positive externality: it will deter misconduct in other companies.
54
 As 
such, even if litigation brings a net loss to the company in whose name the action is 
initiated, shareholders still benefit if a derivative action deters potential defendants 
who are similarly situated at other companies because shareholders normally do not 
hold shares in a single corporation but own diversified portfolios.
55
 Yet it is wrong to 
think that deterrence provides a sufficient rationale for derivative actions. This is 
because, first, wrongdoers are usually required to make compensatory reparation to 
companies, and this may not always amount to an effective sanction.
56
 Indeed, some 
wrongdoers will not be deterred by derivative actions, though undoubtedly not all 
managers or directors would act as they please without considering the consequences 
of derivative action. Although it is virtually impossible to identify a general deterrent 
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effect, the logic is the same as in the case of criminal enforcement: the conviction of 
a company’s director presumably deters not only other officers of the same company 
but also other directors of other companies.  
 
Another merit of the derivative action is the traditional view that it can ensure that 
directors pay attention to their legal duties.
57
 Although directors’ duties are owed to 
the company and not to individual shareholders, shareholders’ interests would not be 
protected without the imposition of these duties. Thus, the enforcement of directors’ 
duties sets limits to the directors’ exercise of corporate power and attempts to confine 
their behaviour to that which is in the interests of the company as a whole. Since the 
board of directors is normally controlled by directors or managers, duty-based 
controls depend very much on viable shareholder enforcement. For this reason, the 
derivative action can be one of the tools to enforce directors’ duties. 
 
1.3.2 Weaknesses of Derivative Actions 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned cited merits, there are arguments which assert 
that litigation will leave the company worse off than before. First, there is the danger 
that a corporation would be burdened with litigation that it does not want; here, the 
company ‘might be killed by kindness.’
58
 Secondly, there are also some unseen costs 
beyond the direct costs of litigation,
59
 as litigation may disrupt decision-making 
processes and thereby impose hidden and undetected costs. Thirdly, it is 
unpredictable whether the company will successfully recover compensation. The 
litigation could fail owing to the difficulties of proving a breach of duty, or even 
where it is successful in securing a verdict against wrongdoers, the defendants may 
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not be in a position to implement the judgment and pay the compensation.
60
 Fourthly, 
derivative actions may discourage managers from developing high-risk business 
plans and thus may adversely affect profit maximization. Arguably, this is possibly 
the greatest cost of derivative litigation.
61
 Last but not least, the derivative action 
itself generates agency costs. As many commentators point out, the increased risk of 
litigation might deter individuals from becoming directors;
62
 as such, companies 




There appear to be a large number of conflicting views regarding the desirability of 
derivative actions amongst the legal profession. Other mechanisms such as market 
forces, as indicated above, are inadequate in reducing agency costs and so derivative 
actions have been introduced as a supplementary means of curbing the behaviour of 
managers. However, the derivative action itself is not without its disadvantages. For 
example, managers have to spend their precious time defending such litigation. As a 
result, in many jurisdictions, especially in the English courts, judges are generally 
reluctant to accept such claims. The key point of the derivative action is to balance 
the interests of minority shareholders and managers. In general, such an action 
cannot provide overprotection to minority shareholders, though it should not give too 
much freedom to management either. Therefore, striking a balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection for minority shareholders and the company becomes a key 
question when it comes to legislation on derivative actions. Given this, a comparative 
analysis of derivative actions in China, the US and the UK, may prove useful to 
evaluate whether China’s law could be improved by transplanting law from the US 
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1.4. A Comparative Study 
 
This thesis intends to adopt the comparative method as an instrument to analyse what 
can be borrowed from other jurisdictions to improve the derivative action system in 
China. Two jurisdictions are adopted as analysis samples for this thesis: English law 
and US law. This part will thus briefly introduce derivative actions in the three 
countries of China, the UK and the US, and point out why the latter two jurisdictions 
have been chosen as analysis samples. 
 
1.4.1 Derivative Actions in China 
 
The derivative action was introduced into Chinese Company Law for the very first 
time during the 2005 revision process. Some scholars argue that the derivative action 
was actually permitted under Chinese Company Law 1993, article 111 providing that 
shareholders have the right to raise a suit when directors violate the law.
63
 However, 
mainstream scholars object to this view and assert that this article was only intended 




During the period before the 2005 revision, calls to introduce a new statutory 
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derivative action became louder,
65
 though some conservatives strongly opposed this 
proposal preferring to seek alternative mechanisms. This opposition movement 
argued that in many cases the courts would be reluctant to accept derivative litigation 
not only because of a lack of procedural rules but also because of economic 
development in respective local cities. They further argued that if a new statutory 
derivative action were adopted in the new company law, the courts would become 
bewildered by the procedure in the absence of a revision of Chinese Civil Procedural 
Law. Moreover, it was contended that judicial resources were insufficient and that 




The derivative action in China did indeed require revision of not only company law 
but also Civil Procedural Law; however, some argued that we should not waste 
valuable time waiting for change to Chinese Civil Procedural Law, meanwhile 
ignoring the interests of minority shareholders. Further, some derivative suits were 
actually initiated successfully against wrongdoers without the relevant procedures, 
though their application was very limited as the courts failed to identify the exact 
requirements for derivative actions.
67
 Most legal scholars advocated this approach 
and this view prevailed in the end.  
 
The first strong justification for introducing derivative actions was that there were 
too few legal protections for minority shareholders.
68
 It was very common in China 
for the interests of minority shareholders to be infringed by majority shareholders or 
directors before the revision of Chinese Company Law, and, unfortunately, the 
protections that did exist were too weak. On the contrary, common law jurisdictions 
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have systems such as ‘unfair prejudice’, ‘oppressive’ or ‘unfairly discriminatory’ 
rules which provide strong weapons for minority shareholders –concepts that were 
absent in China. Secondly, the opportunities for majority shareholders to abuse their 
powers were much greater owing to the special ownership structure of Chinese 
corporations. The ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is quite 
complicated as over 60% of all outstanding shares in most listed companies are 
represented by non-tradable, state-owned shares.
69
 This provides substantial scope 
for majority shareholders to ignore rather than consider minority shareholders’ 
interests. Thirdly, internal mechanisms failed to effectively monitor corporate 
management. Before the 2005 revision, China had introduced and encouraged 
companies to establish independent directors, and many listed companies had set up 
this system. However, this renovation incurred numerous criticisms owing to its lack 
of effectiveness. Lastly, whilst takeovers might be a strong weapon in protecting 
minority shareholders in western countries, this is certainly not yet the case in China. 
The special ownership structure of Chinese corporations means that it would be very 




Calls for the introduction of the derivative action were finally successful and the 
mechanism was adopted in the recent revision. This is a major development in 
Chinese company law and has been regarded as a milestone in reform.
71
 The 2005 
revision provides a general legal framework for the initiation of derivative actions, 
intended to function so as to control management to some extent. However, there are 
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still problems with this new rule: as Li and Ho argue, its provisions are ‘simple and 
impractical’.
72
 For example, the scope of eligible plaintiffs is not clear and the 
funding of the costs of litigation is not addressed. This lack of guidance on the 
substantive and procedural rules of derivative actions needs to be clarified by future 
judicial interpretation. 
 
1.4.2 Derivative Actions in the UK 
 
Individual shareholders were allowed to bring derivative actions only in some limited 
circumstances under English common law before the enactment of the statutory 
procedure in sections 260 to 269 of the Companies Act 2006. These provisions 
originate from the case of Foss v Harbottle which, interestingly, in principle denies 
an individual shareholder the right to initiate actions on behalf of a company.
73
 Two 
principles must be mentioned in relation to the rationales behind this rule. The first is 
the majority rule, which reflects the English courts’ historical reluctance to involve 
itself in the internal management of companies.
74
 The second is the ‘proper plaintiff’ 
principle, which has been described as ‘the elementary principle’.
75
 This latter 
principle recognises that a company is a separate legal entity and is thus the proper 
party to raise a legal action for recovery when it suffers injury. However, the 
common law also developed some exceptions whereby individual shareholders were 
permitted to commence derivative actions.
76
 These exceptions included ‘fraud on the 
minority’, ‘wrongdoer control’, ‘ultra vires transactions’, ‘breaches of special 
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resolution procedures’ and the ‘interests of justice’. The first exception was regarded 
as the only true exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, while the last was 
controversial.
77
 As Reisberg points out, these exceptions reflected the common law’s 
attitude that the derivative action  
 
is not to be regarded as a normal part of the enforcement apparatus of the law, but as 
a weapon of last resort, carefully controlled, and limited to the case where the 





As such, the common law was criticised for being ineffective and the need for 
revision widely accepted. The Law Commission of England and Wales and the 
Scottish Law Commission undertook an extensive inquiry into the common law 
regime and recommended that the rule in Foss v Harbottle be abolished. It perceived 
four major problems that required to be addressed, concluding that the rule in Foss 
was complicated and unwieldy and therefore, a more ‘modern flexible and accessible 
criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue an action’ should be 




Derivative actions were finally adopted into law in sections 260 to 269 of the 
Companies Act 2006.
80
 In this new procedure the scope of derivative actions was 
broadened, leading to concerns about directors’ responsibilities. The fear was that 
people would be unlikely to take directorships if there was a perception that they 
could be easily sued through derivative claims. Hannigan also emphasised the need 
to maintain a balance between promoting higher standards and not deterring people 
from accepting directorships.
81
 Bainbridge shared Hannigan’s view that ‘the system 
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of corporate governance is designed to function largely without shareholder input’ 
and thus there should be freedom from shareholder interference.
82
 These concerns 
were not only raised by scholars and directors: the UK legislature had the same 
concern. This led Lord Goldsmith to state during the legislative process that the new 
derivative action would be a delicate balancing act that allowed directors to take 
business decisions freely and in good faith whilst also permitting individual 
shareholders to initiate meritorious claims against directors and dismissing malicious 
suits at the earliest possible stage.
83
 As a consequence, the new statutory derivative 
action developed into a two-stage process that aims to balance the interests of 
management and shareholders.  
 
Since the new statutory derivative action has been in effect for over three years, 
several cases have been decided. These cases were examined by Keay and Loughrey, 
who concluded that they have not ‘clarified the operation of the legislation in many 
respects. Rather, they have made the situation somewhat confusing’.
84
 However, 
Keay and Loughrey also note that over time as more judges deal with the new regime 
in cases before them, the law on this subject will develop.
85
 Reisberg also argues 
that it is still too early to predict how derivative actions will develop owing to the 
lack of extensive cases and the unpredictable discretion of the courts.
86
 Indeed, until 
the empirical facts have been investigated extensively, it will remain unclear what the 
impact of statutory derivative actions on directors and society will be. Overall, as 
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1.4.3 Derivative Actions in the US 
 
Although they both belong to the common law tradition, US law has developed a 
system of derivative action different from that of English law. It is generally believed 
that derivative actions in the US play a more important role than in the UK.
88
 
However, this does not mean that it is popular either in the legal profession or in 
judicial practice. Rather, its role as ‘the chief regulator of corporate management’ 
89
 
has been challenged by many scholars. The nature of derivative actions means that it 
is easy for non-meritorious actions to be brought. Perversely, this regime also 
encourages settlement between plaintiff’s lawyers and managerial defendants, thus 
creating strike suits.
90
 In practice, Romano suspects that derivative actions are 
ineffective. Having explored this system, she has concluded that ‘there is a greater 
likelihood that more of these suits are frivolous’.
91
 Romano conducted empirical 
research and found that the rate of settlement in derivative actions was high while the 
amount of compensation paid to corporations was small.
92
 Romano also investigated 
the relationship between the stock price of companies and derivative actions, 
concluding that those changes in stock price ‘do not provide compelling support for 
the propositions that shareholders experience significant wealth effects from 
litigations’.
93
 This was supported by Fischel and Bradley’s research. Fischel and 
Bradley used econometric techniques to study the effect of derivative actions on the 
wealth of a corporation’s stockholders. Their study showed that a successful 
derivative claim has a minor effect on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders, leading 
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Nevertheless, these empirical studies have been doubted and criticized. The 
American Law Institute, for example, have questioned Fischel and Bradley’s 
methodology in conducting their research, pointing out that their data might not be 
reliable owing to the methodology used.
95
 Even if the data were reliable, the 
indifference of the stock market price should not of itself point towards the 
conclusion that derivative actions are ineffective.
96
 Cox argues that the derivative 
action should not be judged simply by its compensatory function, and should be 
judged by its other functions also.
97
 Scott even suggests that the obstacles to 
derivative actions should be removed in order to enable more ready enforcement of 
the duty of loyalty.
98
 Overall, it is widely acknowledged that US law takes a lenient 
approach towards derivative actions despite being challenged by many scholars. 
 
1.4.4 Why Choose the UK and US as the jurisdictions for Comparison? 
 
In this thesis, the UK and US law will be adopted as analysis samples for 
comparative study. This is because, first of all, these two countries are the most 
important commercial law jurisdictions and they have significant influence in the 
world. A comparative reflection on China’s legal systems cannot avoid reviewing the 
relevant rules in these two jurisdictions. Secondly, they have a long history of the 
derivative action, particularly in the UK where the derivative action was originated. 
Thirdly, although both the UK and the US have provided for the derivative action by 
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legislation, they function differently. As Dannemann argues, ‘similarity of the basis 
of comparison is essential for achieving each of the main aims of comparative 
enquiry.’
99
 Thus these two countries make a good reference for China. Fourthly, the 
UK and the US have different attitudes towards the application of the derivative 
action. In the UK, the courts are relatively unwilling to accept the application of 
derivative claims while in the US the courts are more inclined to grant permission. 
This difference undoubtedly provides a rich field of study to be compared and 
explored. Last but not least, the basic legal framework of the new statutory derivative 
action in China was transplanted partly from the US; on the other hand, English and 
Chinese law enacted the derivative action around the same time (2006 in English law 
and 2005 in Chinese law). Therefore, it would be interesting to have a comparative 
analysis of these three countries. 
 
1.5 Legal Transplant 
 
This thesis intends to employ the comparative method as an instrument to analyse 
what can be borrowed from other jurisdictions to improve the derivative actions 
system in China. However, the debate on legal borrowing is a long-standing issue in 
the area of comparative law. As such, it is worth briefly introducing this debate and 
discussing why such a legal transplant is possible in China. 
 
1.5.1 The Debate on Legal Transplants 
 
Although there is a long history of legal borrowing between jurisdictions, the concept 
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of the ‘legal transplant’ was created by Watson only in the 1990s. Watson 
characterises a legal transplant as ‘the moving of a rule or a system from one country 
to another, or from one people to another’.
100
 He suggests that borrowing is ‘the 
most fruitful source of legal change’, because a good knowledge of the law of other 
jurisdictions is helpful for providing legislators and scholars with new insights into 
how to reform their own legal systems.
101
 Watson further argues that the ‘voluntary 
transplant’ can be very effective in accelerating legal reform in receiving 
jurisdictions as the legal transplant of individual rules or part of a legal system is 
largely common.
102
 With these arguments, he attempts to demonstrate that ‘law is 
autonomous’, ‘legal transplant is socially easy’ and ‘the idea of a close relationship 




However, Watson’s analysis of legal transplants has been criticised by many scholars. 
There are generally two schools challenging Watson’s reflection: contextualist and 
culturalist. The contextualist school criticise Watson’s approach for its lack of 
concern for social context. They argue that law is deeply embedded in context and 
thus any legal reform or change has to be pursuant to the demands of external forces. 
Contrary to Watson’s bold argument, they assert that law is not autonomous, but a 
mirror of society. For example, Otto Kahn-Freund, a representative of contextualist 
thought, argues that ‘any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of 
its original country entails a risk of rejection… its use requires a knowledge not only 




Watson’s thoughts on legal transplant are even more vigorously attacked by 
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culturalists, who argue that ‘law is a culturally determined artefact, which cannot be 
transplanted’.
105
 Legrand even asserts that ‘legal transplants are impossible’ because 
what Watson focuses on – statutory rules – are not simply transplantable in the way 
that Watson believes to be the case.
106
 Seidman shares this view, arguing that the 
likelihood that copying any country’s model will ensure development is 
non-existent.
107 
1.5.2 Why Legal Transplants could be Successful in China 
 
The above debate on legal transplants raises two questions. The first one is whether 
legal transplant is possible in China. If the answer to this question is positive, then 
the second question arises: how can this legal transplant be successful or effective? 
 
1.5.2.1 Why a Legal Transplant is Possible and Necessary in China 
 
With regard to the first question, it is recognised that a legal transplant is not only 
possible but also necessary in China. Several reasons justify this argument. 
 
First, borrowing is regarded as an efficient means of legislating. China has witnessed 
rapid economic development for the past thirty years because of its ‘Reform and 
Opening up’ policy. In contrast to this rapid economic development, the law, 
particularly commercial law, is lagging behind. In order to fill this gap and thus 
better regulate emerging economic activities, it is essential to enact and accelerate the 
legislative process. Here, borrowing from foreign law is favourable as it is faster and 
easier than creating new law by itself. 
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Second, internationalisation and globalisation make legal transplant possible and 
easier. Its rapid economic development and its rise as an economic superpower not 
only make China the second largest economic entity in the world, but also integrate it 
into the international background. Its entrance into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) also strengthens this process. In fact, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
has committed itself to the process of globalisation, which obviously requires 
domestic law to be more liberal in order to accommodate international practice. As a 
consequence, borrowing from foreign law, particularly from the law of developed 
countries, becomes necessary or inevitable for China. 
 
Third, legal transplant in the area of commercial law would not generally encounter 
substantial resistance in a receiving country. Public law sectors such as criminal law 
or constitutional law are closely linked to local conditions like the political system, 
ideology and cultural tradition. However, this is not the case for commercial law. 
Whilst every law more or less has its own local supportive resources, commercial 
law relies less on local conditions. The debate on the convergence of corporate 





Last, China has a long history of legal transplant. When the first Opium War broke 
out in 1840, the Qin Dynasty started to borrow laws from foreign countries to 
improve its capacity to compete with Western countries. Thereafter, legal transplants 
continued until the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. When China began to 
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rebuild its legal system in 1978, it had to start afresh as most legislation had been 
abolished during the Cultural Revolution. As such, China had to learn legal rules or 
institutions from other countries so as to match economic development. The current 
Company Law 2005, as the Vice - President of China’s Supreme Court Xi Xiaoming 
admitted, is ‘a mixture of the Western experience and local resource’.
109
 In fact, as 
Cheng argues, the development of Chinese law was a process of learning from, 





1.5.2.2 How Legal Transplants could be Effective in China 
 
As noted above, if legal transplants are necessary or indeed inevitable in China, how 
can its success be ensured? As highlighted by contextualist and culturalist theories, 
legal transplants are not simply about copying the law from one country to another 
country; it has to pay considerable attention to the legal culture and other non-legal 
factors to achieve effectiveness. It is argued that a transplanted legal rule is likely to 
function less effectively than in its original country if it does not accommodate local 




Although the transplantation of commercial laws is generally less difficult than in 
other areas owing to economic globalisation, it should be noted that not every single 
transplant rule in commercial law can function as well as in its home soil.
112
 As a 
                                                             
109
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Gongsifa Sifajieshi Yi Er de Lijie yu Shiyong [Understanding and 
Applying the Supreme Court’s Interpretation Ⅰand Ⅱ on the Company Law ] (Renmin Fayuan 
Chubanshe [The People’s Court Press] 2008) 10. 
110
 J. Cheng, ‘The Transformation of Chinese Law: From Formal to Substantial’ (2007) 37 Hong 
Kong Law Journal 689. 
111
 See D. Nelken, ‘Legal Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors’ In A. Harding and 
E. Orucu (eds.), Comparative law in the 21
st
 Century (Kluwer 2002) 26-27; D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor 
and J-F. Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 163. 
112
 It is argued that the borrowing of independent director in China is regarded as a failure legal 
transplant. For details of this, please see: L. Zhou, ‘The Independent Director System and its Legal 
Transplant into China’ (2011) 6 Journal of Comparative Law 262-291. Also, Clarke argues that the 
proponents of the institution of independent directors misconceive the nature of the corporate 
 
 41 
result, when this thesis conducts a comparative study on derivative actions, it has to 
bear in mind that other factors which may affect the function of this legal institution 
should be paid attention to. In fact, this will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
1.6 Derivative Actions in Public and Private Companies 
 
Companies can generally be divided into two types: public companies (or publicly 
held corporations) or private companies (or close corporations). Although there are 
no precise definitions of these two types of corporation, it is widely accepted that 
they have their own distinctive features. Private corporations generally have a few 
shareholders, their shares cannot be traded on the public market or transferred freely 
and their managers are normally themselves the shareholders of the company. By 
contrast, public companies normally have a vast number of shareholders whose 
shares can be freely traded on public securities exchanges. Moreover, the ownership 
and management of public corporations is normally separate. 
 
Of course these two types of company have both different and shared characteristics. 
Whilst it is not the function of this thesis to explore these differences and similarities, 
one feature is relevant to the context of derivative actions. It might be argued that 
shareholders do not need to use derivative actions in public companies because they 
can simply leave the company by selling their shares. The transferable nature of 
shares in public companies means that there is no restriction on their transferability, 
making them easily sold by shareholders. Here, there is no need for shareholders to 
bring derivative actions to protect the interests of the company as the initiation of 
such litigation would cost time and money. By contrast, shareholders in private 
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companies may have to use derivative actions as their shares cannot be publicly 
transferred. 
 
Whilst transferability of shares in public companies allow shareholders to leave when 
the interests of a company are damaged, this does not mean derivative actions are 
unnecessary for such shareholders. First of all, even where a shareholder chooses to 
sell their shares and leave a company, this does not mean that they are not affected by 
the alleged wrongdoing. In fact, the value of the shares may be affected by the 
wrongdoing and thus the price of those shares reduced. Here, selling the shares 
means that the shareholder would have to bear an immediate loss. Moreover, such a 
sale only resolves the problem of leaving the company, and does not address the 
fundamental issue of how to recover damages and deter managers. If every minority 
shareholder believed that selling their shares could resolve a problem, they may 
encounter the same problem when they buy another company’s shares on the public 
market. Last but not least, some shareholders may just wish to stay as members of 
the company. Indeed, some shareholders can undeniably wish to stay with the 
company in which they hold shares for a number of reasons. For example, they may 
think that the company has excellent prospects in the long run and consider that 
remaining in the company as members would be in their best interests. As such, 
bringing a derivative action against wrongdoers would be the right and natural choice 
since their intention is to stay with the company. 
 
An empirical study in the US has revealed the astonishing fact that derivative actions 
in public companies are more frequent than such actions in closed companies. This 
research, conducted by Thompson and Thomas, collected and studied all the 
derivative actions in Delaware from 1999 to 2000. They found that eighty percent of 
such cases were filed against wrongdoers in public companies while only twenty 
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percent were raised in respect of closed corporations.
113
 This surprising result 
undoubtedly provides strong evidence against the argument that the derivative action 
is not needed in public companies. 
 
1.7 Original Contribution 
Prior to identifying the original contribution made by this thesis, it is necessary to 
clarify how this thesis relates to previous doctoral dissertations on similar subjects. 
As far as this research has been able to gather, there are three dissertations in this 
area: The Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China;
114
 A 
Comparative Study of Shareholder’s Derivative Actions;
115
 and A Study of 
Shareholder’s Derivative Actions (Chinese).
116
 It seems that the topic of this thesis is 
covered by the above doctoral dissertations and that it is thus difficult to make an 
original contribution. However, there are some differential elements in this thesis that 
make it distinctive from these previous studies. Zhang’s study focuses mainly on 
corporate governance and the role of derivative action in establishing good corporate 
governance. Li’s study explores derivative actions by comparing four countries, 
namely the UK, US, Germany and China. Her research was completed before 2006 
and thus an empirical study of derivative actions both in England and China was not 
conducted. Liu’s research was written in Chinese and suffers from the same problem 
as Li’s research in as much as it did not examine cases of derivative actions owing to 
the insufficient time over which Company Law 2005 had been implemented. 
 
As such, the original contributions made by this thesis can found mainly in three 
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aspects: first, it provides a deep theoretical examination to enrich current legal 
scholarship on China’s derivative action system. Second, it conducts a 
comprehensive empirical study of China’s derivative action cases from 1993 to 2013. 
As there are few articles examining these cases, interpretations of and reflections 
upon these cases provide new insight on China’s derivative actions. Lastly, this thesis 




This thesis aims to improve China’s derivative action by making comparative 
reflections. In order to conduct this study, this thesis is structured as follows: chapter 
1 is the introductive part which basically provides some knowledge and identifies the 
main issues to be addressed in this thesis. Chapter 2 attempts to demonstrate why the 
derivative action is necessary in the context of China. As such, this chapter first 
examines the double agency costs in China and the non-legal mechanisms and legal 
protections are also assessed. Chapter 3 starts to examine China’s derivative action. 
Before doing so, the relationship between direct actions and derivative actions is 
discussed. Chapter 4 continues to examine China’s derivative action with a 
comparative view to reform. Chapter 5 principally focuses on the funding issue 
which is significantly important for encouraging shareholders to initiate derivative 
actions. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 The Need of Enhancing Derivative Actions in China 
 
2.1 Double Agency Costs in China 
2.1.1. Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership from management is recognised as one of the core 
structural characteristics of a business corporation.117 This key distinctive feature is 
the necessary consequence of rising capital and economic development as the 
modern economy requires companies to be professionally managed and investors to 
be free to concentrate on expanding their investments rather than participating in 
management. However, this separation also means that those who run companies do 
not own them whilst those who are members of corporations do not control them. 
Here, agency costs, (derived from economic jargon), may arise where the interests of 
shareholders and managers are not aligned. It is thus recognised that the central 
objective of company law is to reduce agency costs; good corporate governance 
would achieve this target. 
 
China has been experiencing unprecedented economic and social development owing 
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to its economic reform and open policy. During this process, the reform of the 
company--the basic component of the business world--has been and remains a key 
issue. The significant economic achievements of the recent past could not have been 
attained without corporation reform, though this also creates a number of difficulties 
that must be addressed. Prevalent reports of exploitation by majority shareholders 
and managers have enhanced the view that agency costs in Chinese companies are 
exceptionally severe. Thus capital market and economic development would be 
negatively affected if agency costs were not properly addressed.  
 
This part does not aim to examine China’s agency costs from an economic 
perspective as there is already a vast amount of literature which does so.
118
 Rather, 
the purpose is to explore the historical causes and development of Chinese agency 
costs. Indeed, unusually, there are currently two forms of agency costs prevalent in 
China: vertical and horizontal. This is a rarity as other countries normally only 
experience one of the major forms of agency cost. As such, it highlights the need for 
and value of this part in exploring the causes and development of these two types of 
agency costs. In discussing this issue, this part will first introduce the theory of and 
background to agency costs. It will then go on to introduce vertical agency costs, 
namely the agency problem between shareholders and managers, exploring 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) reform and the development of insider control. The 
third section will address horizontal agency costs, namely the agency problem 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. This part concludes that 
the severe agency costs in China undoubtedly generate need for the establishment of 
strong protective methods for minority shareholders. Further, mechanisms to reduce 
agency costs cannot be properly established without acknowledging these double 
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agency costs in China. 
2.1.2. Background to Agency Costs 
 
Since Berle and Means first unveiled the theory of control over the corporate form,
119
 
the economic term ‘agency’ has gradually become utilised in legal scholarship. In 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property they highlighted that those who 
control large public companies do not necessarily have substantial ownership 
interests in them, while conversely, those who own such corporations do not manage 
them.
120
 This separation of ownership from management is justified on several 
counts. First, management/control of a company is vested in its board of directors. As 
a corporation itself is a non-natural person, it is incapable of expressing its will and 
conducting business without human mediation. Since it is impossible for all the 
shareholders to run the company, particularly when shares are widely distributed, it 
becomes necessary to delegate management to the board of directors in order to 
make the company work in reality. Secondly, the rapid development of the capital 
market signifies that the profits of a company do not depend on investor energy and 
initiative but on management. Formerly, investment in property tied a person to that 
property. However, the modern capital market renders property less concerned with 
investors, allowing them to invest in various companies without worrying about the 
actual status of their property. In this sense, a shareholder in a listed company has 
now ceased to be a quasi-partner and has become a mere supplier of capital.
121
 
Thirdly, the separation of ownership from management also creates opportunities for 
professional managers to run companies and thus increase their benefits. In the 
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modern economy, a company must respond quickly to market reactions, taking 
decisive measures by which to compete; without professional management a 
company is unlikely to achieve a competitive advantage. The employment of 
professional persons with managerial skills is therefore both important and necessary, 
even if they are not themselves members of the company. Fourthly, this separation 
also benefits investors themselves. Shareholders would barely have the time or 
energy to look for other investments if they had to participate in the management of 
every venture. Indeed, it is almost impossible for an individual shareholder with a 
large portfolio personally to manage every company in which he or she holds shares. 
In allowing investors to focus on investments, separation therefore expands the 
capital market and the economy. 
 
Whilst the separation of ownership from management can ultimately increase 
company benefits and promote the capital market, this separation can also create 
conflicts, referred to by economists as ‘agency problems’, when the interests of 
managers and shareholders are not aligned.
122
 No agency problems arise if an ‘agent’ 
acts in the interests of their ‘principal’, though this is rare without proper legal and 
extra-legal constrain. Crucially, agents normally have better access to information 
than principals, making it difficult for principals to ensure that agents are acting in 
their interests.
123
 Here, agents may be encouraged to pursue their own interests over 
their principals, leading them to act opportunistically by taking advantage of their 
powers. Such abuse of power would undoubtedly affect an agent’s management 
performance, thereby reducing the principal’s confidence. Such divergence of 
interests generates both monitoring cost for principals wishing to police agent 
performance, and bonding costs for agents to assure principals that their interests are 
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 Given the risks borne by principals, it is argued that one of the 
functions of corporate law is to control conflicts between the various interests of 




Three agency problems have been identified in business firms: vertical agency 
problems between shareholders and managers, horizontal agency problems between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and agency problems between a 
firm itself and the other parties with whom that firm contracts.
126
 As the latter 
agency problem does not constitute an agency cost internally within the company 
and is therefore beyond the scope of company law,
127
 it will not be addressed in this 
chapter. Concerning the first two agency problems, various studies have identified a 
relationship between ownership structure and agency cost.
128
 In jurisdictions where 
share ownership is dispersed, such as the UK and the USA, managerial agency costs 
are generally much more serious. That is because managers have much greater power 
to control a company as scattered shareholders mean that no blockholders are able to 
monitor management.
129
 Conversely, for those jurisdictions with concentrated 
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ownership, such as Germany, the managerial agency problem is not a major issue; 
rather, conflicts between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders 
are of principal concern.
130
 In these ownership-concentrated countries, majority 
shareholders have both the ability and incentive to constrain the directors’ 
performance. At the same time, agency problems between majority and minority 
shareholders are created as the former can impose their influence on the company to 
benefit themselves at the expense of the latter. Although these two types of agency 
problems can coexist, they are usually mutually exclusive as countries generally have 
dispersed ownership or concentrated ownership structures. However, this is not the 
case in China owing to its special policy on SOEs, discussed in the next part. 
 
2.1.3. Vertical Agency Costs between Shareholders and Managers  
 
As mentioned above, the agency problem between managers and shareholders is not 
a dominant issue where ownership structure is very concentrated, as blockholders are 
better able to influence management. This might appear to be the position in China as 
many listed companies are still controlled by the government which will be discussed 
below. This perception might be strengthened by the observation that although these 
two forms of agency cost can coexist, they are normally exclusive. Unfortunately, 
however, these suppositions are not applicable to China. Aside from the agency costs 
arising between majority and minority shareholders, managerial agency problem 
remain a crucial issue in today’s China owing to SOE reform and insider control. 
 
2.1.3.1 The SOE Reform 
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Following the opening up policy of 1978, SOE reform was recognised increasingly 
to be extremely important to the Chinese economy. The tax system at that time was 
very simple and financial revenue was limited, as the primary source of public 
revenue was SOE profits.
131
 Unfortunately, SOEs suffered from chronic inefficiency 
and low productivity, incurring numerous debts and losses.
132
 Fears about the 
ever-deteriorating performance of SOEs threatening the nation’s entire economy 
were growing and a consensus reached for reform. Initial reform separated 
ownership and management proclaiming that SOEs should become independent 
entities and thus be responsible for their own profits and losses.
133
 Levels of 
government interference were thereby reduced. However, this reform was not 
implemented effectively owing to the mixed political climate of that time. Fears 
about the peaceful infiltration of Western ideology and structuralism remained 
widespread owing to the cold war. Therefore SOE ownership stayed with 
government, rather than SOEs themselves. In 1988, state administration was spilt 
from SOE management in a bid to improve SOE performance, using a contract 
system. This system required SEO directors to sign contracts with their supervisory 
authorities to set performance targets; this initiative turned out to be another failure. 
 
Concern about the inefficiency of SOEs remained ongoing and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union intensified the anxiety that economic failure would lead to a 
breakdown of the political system. Therefore, following Deng Xiaoping’s southern 
tour speech, the socialist market economy was established and SOE-oriented reform 
was launched. The target for SOEs was to establish a modern enterprise system; that, 
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according to the 1993 Decision, would “clarify property rights, designate authorities 
and responsibilities, separate government and enterprise functions and establish 
scientific management”.
134
 The principal approach in achieving this objective was to 
sever government intervention from company management by corporatising SOEs, 
thus releasing the government from its unlimited responsibility. It anticipated SOEs 
could thereby plan their own productivity in line with market demand and raise funds 
through capital markets to expand their business. Indeed, corporatisation did improve 




While the separation of ownership and management was a solution to prevalent 
problems, it also raised fundamental issues where discretion and power could be 
abused by managers, incurring managerial agency costs. This was particularly so in 
China, which then lacked an efficient system to supervise management conduct and 
protect the interests of shareholders, and indeed still does. In recent years, news of 
SOEs losses occasioned by mismanagement has been widely reported. A notorious 
example was the China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corporation (CAO) scandal. CAO 
announced a US$ 550 million loss in oil derivatives trading, exceeding the 
company’s registered capital of US$ 549 million, owing to poor management. This 
scandal, as Jackson highlights, revealed internal control failures at virtually every 
level of management.
136
 Moreover, CEO, Chen Jiulin, who was subsequently 
imprisoned, had been receiving the highest salary of any chief executive in the 
country.
137
 Another example was the scandal of the China National Cotton Reserves 
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Corporation (CNCRC), which is also a state-owned enterprise. It was reported that 
CNCRC had lost almost 1000 million yuan making false bets on prices after failing 
to sell its expensive cotton stocks when prices plunged. Reports also indicated that 
the cotton speculative trading decisions were being made by only a few executives 
rather than a formal decision-making procedure.
138
 Investigations conducted by the 
Key Laboratory for Management, the Decision and Information Centre and the 
Virtual Economy and Finance Research Centre have found that lack of accountability 
of managers to shareholders (namely the government), poor corporate governance 
and the ineffectiveness of binding mechanisms, led to this tragic loss.
139
 The above 
facts, which are only a part of the whole picture, vividly illustrate the negative 
implications of SOE reform, despite its improvement of SOE performance in general. 
Furthermore, SOE reform in the absence of a legal system and other binding 
mechanisms inevitably induces insider control problems in China. 
 
2.1.3.2 Insider Control 
 
The insider control problem accompanies the evolution of SOE reform in China. 
Before exploring this problem, some conceptual issues should be clarified. Owing to 
the socialist nature of the market, SOEs are managed or controlled by different levels 
of organ. At least six strata can be identified in practice: central government 
leadership, local state government,
140
 relevant central ministries, local organs 
supervising SOEs, managers and workers.
141
 Within this framework, SOE insiders 
are managers and workers while all other organs are outsiders. Although workers are 
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regarded as insiders, their ability to participate in the management of SOEs is strictly 
limited. This seems absurd given the Chinese government’s declaration that the 
People’s Republic of China was established under the leadership of the working class, 
whilst trade unions now serve a mere decorative function within SOEs without any 
practical input. From this perspective, there is in fact only one effective insider organ 
within an SOE: management. For outsiders, some government agency reform has 
taken place. During the planned economy era, SOEs were controlled by central 
government, or local governments delegated or authorized by the central state. With 
the initiation of the market economy, control rights were first transferred from central 
government to the Commission for Managing State Properties, and then to the 
Ministry of Personnel. The most recent supervising agency is the State-owned Assets 




Having clarified the concepts of insider and outsider in China, the notion of insider 
controls must now be addressed. “Control” in corporations means the right and 
power to make decisions about important issues like business strategy, dividend 
distribution and personnel arrangements. According to Aoki’s theories of the firm,
143
 
the concept of insider control in China is quite different from other jurisdictions. In 
Japan, insider control normally refers to controlling shareholders and affiliated 
companies in a business group (keiretsu), with the labour unions taking second place. 
Under an Anglo-Saxon company model, the power of labour unions is relatively 
weak compared to workers in Japan and thus controlling shareholders and their 
representatives on the board are the only predominant insiders.
144
 However, insider 
control in China’s firms was varied at different stages. The evolution of insider 
                                                             
142
 The SASAC has central and local agencies which supervises central SOEs and local SOEs 
respectively. 
143
 M. Aoki, ‘The Japanese Firms in Transition’ In K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuda (eds.), The Political 
Economy of Japan (Stanford University Press 1987) 263-88; M. Aoki, ‘Towards an Economic Model 
of the Japanese Firms’ (1990) 28 Journal of Economic Literature 1-27. 
144




control in Chinese SOEs can be classified into four periods, as table 1 below shows. 
Table 1 
The Evolution of Insider Control in Chinese SOEs 
 1978-1984 1985-1993 1994-1999 2000- 













The first phase covers the initiation of economic reform promoted by Deng Xiaoping 
after the Cultural Revolution. However, economic reform during this period was not 
expanded to SOEs. Instead, the regulations governing SOEs stipulated that all 
important decisions such as production quotas and business operations should be 
conducted under the leadership of government agencies.
145
 In addition, the CEO or 
managers of SOEs were appointed and dismissed by those outsiders and any decision 
made by managers could not be contradicted by outsiders. In return, SOE managers 
were entitled to privileged political and economic treatment as if they were serving in 
the government or the Party.
146
 The result of this bizarre management system was a 
huge inefficiency problem incurring substantial deficit. 
 
The second period denotes the beginning of the separation of ownership from 
management. A proposal was made that managers be given powers and rights to run 
SOEs, legally safeguarded by a law prohibiting any state organ from encroaching 
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 However, this reform was not thorough and many 
powers were retained by the government agencies leaving room for outsider 
interference in order to achieve “appropriate” rather than “complete” reform.
148
 This 
stage was therefore characterised by outsider domination while the tendency towards 
insider control was crystallising. In consequence, SOE inefficiency remained 
ongoing owing to government agency intervention though the expropriation of 




The third stage was marked by the enactment of the Company Law 1993. This 
remarkable legislation recognised for the first time that all Chinese companies had 
full entitlement to the “property right of a legal person”,
150
 paving the way for 
insider control. Practical research conducted by China Entrepreneurs Survey System 




Table 2  
The Managerial Autonomy After the Company Law 1993 
Items 1993 1994 1995 1997 
Production decisions 88.7 94 97.3 98.3 
Pricing of products 75.9 73.6 85.4 92 
Sale of products 88.5 90.5 95.9 96.8 
Procurement 90.9 95 97.8 98.8 
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Foreign trade 15.3 25.8 41.3 54 
Investment decisions 38.9 61.2 72.8 82.5 
Use of retained profits 63.7 73.8 88.3 90.6 
Asset disposal 29.4 46.6 68.2 76.5 
Mergers and acquisitions 23.3 39.7 59.7 61.4 
Hiring 43.5 61 74.8 84.3 
Personnel management 53.7 73.3 83.5 90.3 
Wages and bonuses 70.2 86 931 96 
Organizational changes 79.3 90.5 94.4 97.3 
 
Increasing managerial autonomy did not however mean that outsiders no longer cast 
shadows over SOEs as the property of a company is still not separate from the 
State.
152
 In order to secure dominant ownership in SOEs, some SOE shares were 
designed to be non-tradable, as discussed in the next section. Despite this, it is 
apparent that insider control occupied the predominant position at this stage. The 
phenomenon of profit expropriation and state asset diversion became more serious 





The fourth stage was occasioned by a resolution emphasising that SOE ownership 
should be diversified with a view to improving corporate governance.
154
 
Privatisation in favour of insiders through management buyouts (MBOs) was 
adopted as one of the main policies to achieve this target. This reform, as Lee and 
Hahn argued, constituted the transformation of insiders from being in de facto to de 
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 Lack of external checks and balances in this reform resulted in many 
negative consequences including the undervaluation of enterprise assets, which 





It is undeniable that the direction of this reform was the proper course to take as 
separation of corporate ownership from management seemed to be the only solution 
to address SOE inefficiency at that time. At the same time, expanding enterprise 
autonomy also created the agency costs outlined above, particularly managerial 
agency costs, creating enormous opportunities for managers to expropriate assets and 
infringed the interests of shareholders.
157
 Two factors account for this consequence. 
The first and primary factor is owner absence. The State, as the delegation of the 
Whole People, is expected to play a monitoring role over SOEs. However, in practice, 
several agencies (outsiders) were delegated shareholder’s rights, as mentioned above. 
This led these agencies, on the one hand, into a race to maximise their own 
department’s interests, and on the other hand, to evade their supervision 
responsibilities concerning the internal governance of SOEs.
158
 In addition, officials 
within government agencies generally lacked the necessary skills and information to 
keep an eye on the performance of managers. Furthermore, the politically-oriented 
bureaucratic system provided few incentives for agencies to fulfil their duties to 
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The second factor identified by Xi, is that personnel arrangements are still tightly 
controlled by the Party.
160
 Indeed, the authority of the Party could counterbalance 
managerial discretion which may therefore constrain misbehaviour. However, the 
benefits of this arrangement are outweighed by its disadvantages when considering 
the value of SOEs. This is because the Party system for the appointment or 
promotion of managers is not entirely based on their performance. Other political 
elements such as an individual’s connections (Guanxi) with the higher authorities 
have a significant role to play in appointment and promotion. As such, even if a 
manager’s performance is poor, he may still be promoted or rewarded because of 
other political factors. Under this selective system, it is little wonder that autonomy 
and discretion are abused, thus generating managerial agency costs. 
 
In light of the failures of various levels of government agency SOE supervision, a 
new agency was established in 2002 aimed exclusively at monitoring SOEs: the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This 
establishment, authorised by central and local government, was created to address the 
problem of owner absence, though it remains unclear whether it will be able to 
monitor SOE managers effectively. What is certain is that the Party’s selection 
system remains unchanged, which means that even if this establishment works, 
success is still a long way off. 
 
2.1.4 Horizontal Agency Costs between Majority Shareholders and 
Minority Shareholders 
The second form of agency cost in China is the conflict between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. It is widely accepted that this kind of agency 
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cost is very common in concentrated ownership jurisdictions. This is particularly so 
in China as SOEs are widespread. According to research conducted by the Chinese 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), by the 
end of 2008 almost 900 listed companies were controlled by the government, of 1600 
companies on the Chinese stock exchange. Further, these state-owned enterprises 




However, it is argued that because the state, rather than other investors, is the sole 
controlling shareholder in listed SOEs, it is unlikely that the government will act 
against the interests of minority shareholders. Generally, it is true that the 
government has a legitimate concern to protect the interests of the company as a 
whole, including those of minority shareholders. However, this might not always be 
the case as government interests may not always align with the interests of minority 
shareholders or even the company itself.
162
 Therefore, agency costs arise when the 
state, as a controlling shareholder, attempts to maximise its own benefits to the 
detriment of the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Three major forms of tunnelling activity engaged in by controlling shareholders have 
been identified in China.
163
 The first is where listed companies are forced to provide 
soft loans or guarantees to controlling shareholders.
164
 The second is where the 
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assets of listed companies are transferred at an under-value or unfair price to a third 
party who is involved with a controlling shareholder.
165
 The last is where the assets 
of listed companies are appropriated or misused directly by the controlling 
shareholders.
166
 Although new ways of tunnelling have been found,
167
 the above 
three activities remain the main popular methods. In light of the deteriorating 
situation, many measures have been adopted to tackle these problems though they 
have generally proved futile in the face of the expanding scale of tunnelling. 
Practical research conducted by Li has found out that RMB 96.7 billion was 
appropriated by controlling shareholders in 2002,
168
 with this figure doubling in 
2003.
169
 Another study has also revealed that 37 percent of the 173 listed companies 
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local government has been expanded significantly in the past few decades.
171
 A 
majority of SOEs are now controlled and monitored by local government, save some 
extremely important SOEs.
172
 The local authority therefore plays a key role in 
protecting or exploiting the interests of the SOEs. First, in promoting the listing of 
local SOEs, local governments want their “best” corporations for consideration, 
though the “best” standard is determined not just by profitability but social or 
political importance. Thus, the most profitable SOEs may not be selected by local 
governments for listing, while less profitable or even profit losing but socially or 
politically important companies may be listed. Here, false listing documents may be 
produced. Secondly, the quality or core assets of a parent SOE may be injected to its 
subsidiary so as to list it, with non-core or bad assets and redundant employees being 
left with the parent company. This sacrifice on the part of parent companies 
obviously ignores and hampers the interests of small shareholders and the company 
itself. Indeed, as Tang and Wang point out: “many SOEs are debt-ridden enterprises 
'repackaged' for listing and continue to be controlled by their parent companies who, 
having successfully seen to their IPO, look towards them as cash cows for ready 
milking.”
173
 Thirdly, as China’s current top priority is to maintain stability, SOEs are 
obliged to bear part of this responsibility. For example, unemployment must be kept 
low, even if the redundant employees have affected the performance of a company; 
the decision to fire employees is therefore strictly limited by local government. 
Furthermore, SOEs are sometimes forced to rescue other local SOEs when they are 
in financial crisis in order to stabilise local society and economy.
174
 Such attempts 
may be motivated by the theory that the stock market would “localise the benefits 
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and socialise the risks”;
175
 although apparently it is minority shareholders who must 
ultimately pay for this. 
 
For private listed companies,
176
 agency costs normally arise among corporate or 
business groups. Private enterprises have developed significantly in the past decades 
under the policy that “non-public economy will be encouraged, supported and 
guided”.
177
 In order to improve competitiveness and achieve greater profits, many 
enterprises are inclined to expand their business empires by establishing more 
companies or other entities to form corporate groups. This can indeed enhance their 
benefits by increasing their bargaining power and allowing them to occupy a greater 
market share, though it may also bring more troubles and burdens, as larger 
corporations do not always generate more profits. Indeed, it is highly possible that 
the failure of one corporation may put the whole group at risk. This is particularly 
true in China as related-party transactions, illegal guarantees and other kinds of 
financial manipulations are widespread within the groups. Nearly 40 corporate 
groups relating to more than 200 listed companies have been investigated by market 
regulators; most have been found to be involved in illegal loans and/or undisclosed 
related party-transactions between members of the corporate group.
178
 These 
manipulations within a group may help some members overcome their difficulties 
though it is not the best means of solving problems. On the contrary, it may worsen a 
situation bringing more risks to the group and causing more losses to other members 
as the failure of one member may jeopardise the lenders (other members of the 
group). Obviously, this problematic phenomenon makes minority shareholders more 
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Agency costs, created by the separation of ownership and management, are 
recognised as a key issue to be addressed in China. It is even acknowledged that the 
main objective of company law is to reduce agency costs through the establishment 
of various mechanisms and the development of good corporate governance. Indeed, a 
company could barely be profitable if its agency costs were too high; ultimately, 
negatively affecting and seriously hindering the economy. This is particularly true in 
China. Unlike other countries with only one principal form of agency cost, China 
suffers both vertical agency costs between shareholders and managers and horizontal 
agency costs between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. This 
particular phenomenon is mainly owing to SOE reform, which led to the emergence 
of insider control. The absence of an owner makes it more convenient for directors or 
managers to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the company. The 
concentrated ownership structure also makes minority shareholders vulnerable to 
exploitation from blockholders. In consequence, minority shareholders in China face 
double agency problems within the company and thus protective mechanisms should 
be in place. 
 





Legal protection focuses on how law and regulations organise the internal structure 
of the company and coordinate the relationship among the constituencies. If legal 
mechanisms are able to constrain agency costs and provide strong protection for 
minority shareholders, it seems unnecessary to explore non-legal measures. On the 
other hand, if market forces can be demonstrated to be an effective way to reduce 
agency costs and protect minority shareholders, then the necessity to reform the 
statutory derivative action would be weakened as both of these legal and non-legal 
mechanisms have a similar function in protecting the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Although it is controversial whether market forces can substitute for 
derivative actions,
179
 it is recognised that there would be less need for costly 
litigations if market forces align the interests of managers or majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders.
180
 As a consequence, the question arises whether these 
market forces can effectively play their role in protecting the interests of shareholders 
in the context of contemporary Chinese society. This part will discuss the market 
mechanisms in China and demonstrate that these mechanisms are ineffective owing 
to many factors and thus legal methods are needed in order to protect minority 
shareholders. Four types of market forces have been identified in this regard: the 
product market, the labour market for managers, the capital market and the market 
for corporate control. 
 
2.2.2 The Product Market 
 
The principal market for a company is that in which it sells its products or services. 
To compete in today’s fiercely competitive market, it is extremely important for 
companies to provide high quality products. To achieve that goal, a company must 
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impose rigid controls on all aspects of production and sale to reduce redundant costs. 
If a company’s products cannot be competitively priced, then it can lose its market 
share and induce the negative consequence that managers are likely to be dismissed. 
In this respect, there is little room for managers to abuse their powers to pursue 
personal interests by exploiting the company. For example, self-dealing directors 
would have greater concern in keeping the company’s products competitive. Legal 
remedies are thereby less important as directors have restricted space to manipulate 
their positions. 
 
In China, the economic miracle has undoubtedly demonstrated the success of the 
market economy. The transformation from a planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy has seen markets becoming increasingly competitive. This is also enhanced 
by rapid globalisation. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that in practice product 
markets in China have prevented directors from misusing their powers to some 
extent and in this sense the interests of minority shareholders might be safeguarded. 
This assertion is supported by some practical research. Huang has examined the 
relationship between product markets and corporate governance among 807 listed 
companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. He concluded that a 
competitive product market can improve resource allocation and enhance supervision 
within the company, which together constrain the behaviour of directors, and thus 
improve corporate governance.
181
 Another practical study led by Xiao and Xia 
investigated the relationship between the product market and Board of Directors 
using evidence from listed manufacturing corporations in China from 2003 to 2005. 
This study found that product market competition can effectively increase the 
efficiency of the company and improve the functions of the corporate governance.
182
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Nevertheless, the above studies neglect to address the political factors behind the 
listed companies under examination. As a Communist country, the Chinese 
government must own or control some listed companies and these state-owned 
enterprises or state-controlled corporations might differ in their effectiveness 
vis-à-vis the product market. Research conducted by Fisman and Faccin shows that 
state-controlled corporations can significantly increase their value because of special 
political connections
184
 while this is not the case in China. SOEs in China have to 
fulfil a number of functions assumed by the government, such as providing 
employment, taxation and social stability to build a harmonious society. This policy 
burden not only hampers the corporation’s value, but also affects the efficiency of 
investment.
185
 In return, SOEs receive financial subsidies from the government 
when their products are not competitive. Here, the product market seems to be less 
important for some SOEs. Empirical research on China also supports the assertion 
that government-controlled enterprises are less sensitive to product market 
competition.
186
 Even in some private sectors, local companies do not need to worry 
about their products because of local protections. The obvious example is the beer 
industry where many local authorities wish to protect their own beer companies and 
thus restrict the beer products of other areas. Last, even the product market is 
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effective in constraining managers’ misconduct; it only reduces the vertical agency 
costs while the horizontal agency costs remain unaddressed. 
 
2.2.3 The Labour Market for Managers 
 
Reference to the “labour market for managers” denotes the employment marketplace 
for managerial and director services. Managers and directors, like other employees, 
must look for work when they are unemployed. Disloyalty or conducts harmful to a 
previous employer, damages their reputation and reduces their ability to obtain a 
well-paid job.
187
 In this regard, the labour market for managers could act as a 
mechanism to constrain agency costs and protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. 
 
Theoretically it does indeed provide a strong disincentive to incompetence or 
disloyalty where managers wish to pursue their careers. However, this function might 
be undermined by real world factors. First, where managers are at the end of their 
careers, the market for managerial and director services may not operate well to 
constrain misbehaviour, as senior officers no longer seek to further their careers and 
their performance may not to some extent matter to them. This is particularly so in 
China where many senior SOE officers exploit their personal interests through 
self-dealing or embezzlement when they are close to retirement. This so-called “59 
phenomenon”
188
 is not uncommon in China because retirement pensions for SEO 
officers are considerably lower than for government officials operating at the same 
level. Secondly, where managers have sufficient personal wealth, the labour market 
might not be an effective method of curbing misbehaviour. Thirdly, even if managers 
                                                             
187
 D. Kershaw, Company law in Context: Text and materials (Oxford University Press 2009) Web 
Chapter A. 2. 
188
 The “59 phenomenon” is described for those persons who are going to retire soon as the retirement 
age for male is 60 in China. 
 
 69 
are sacked for disloyalty or incompetence, the marketplace may not be informed of 
this as the company may be concerned about damaging its reputation in disclosing 
this information: thus those managers may continue to serve in other companies as 
prestigious as in previous employment. Furthermore, in the context of China’s Party 
State, senior SOE managers are unlikely to lose their jobs merely because they are 
not competent or loyal to their companies. Many SOEs are controlled by the 
so-called Taizidang or offspring of party leaders.
189
 Their removal is highly unlikely 
unless they commit some serious crime that might put the whole company at risk. 
This can be illustrated by the case of Chen Jiulin, a former head of China Aviation 
Oil (Singapore) Corp, imprisoned for more than four years for his role in a scandal 
that drove the company to the brink of bankruptcy. His poor governance led to a 
significant loss and failure to disclose a $550 million trading loss. He was also 
charged with deceiving an adviser, Deutsche Bank AG. That sentence seemed to 
mark the end of his career as Chen was no longer eligible to work in SOEs under 
China’s Company Law and Enterprise State-owned Assets Law.
190
 However, Chen 
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was nevertheless appointed vice president of CGGC International Ltd (zhongguo 
Gezhouba Jituan Guoji Youxiangongsi) after his release from prison.
191
 It is 
therefore conceivable that such a person could be reappointed as vice president of an 
SOE after causing a loss of state assets; the function of labour market for managers is 
consequently highly questionable in this Party-State. Last, the labour market for 
managers aims to constrain managers’ misbehaviours and thus the potential 
exploitation by majority shareholders is not addressed by this market mechanism. 
This means vertical agency costs cannot be reduced even if this market force is 
effective. 
 
2.2.4 The Capital Market 
 
Another non-legal protection for minority shareholders is the capital market. This 
mechanism operates on the principle that high agency costs will lower a company’s 
share price as shareholders will exercise their exit rights by selling their shares. A 
lower share price has the following minimum consequences: first, it makes it difficult 
for a company to raise finance on the capital market. Secondly, it can be easily 
acquired by other companies. In order to avoid this, directors and managers must 
reduce agency costs, thus disincentivising their exploitation of minority shareholder 
interests. Nonetheless, the key question is how the capital market reflects the share 
price. 
 
The rationale behind this assertion is the ‘semi-strong efficiency’ hypothesis, known 
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as the ‘efficient capital markets hypotheses.
192
 This theory holds that capital markets 
are efficient and can incorporate all publicly available information into the price of a 
company’s shares. It does not presume that everyone is aware of the information 
available to the public and makes their decisions according to a proper analysis of 
this information as it is obviously impossible for every investor to investigate 
relevant information before buying or selling shares. Instead, it assumes that there 
are some market participants who are strong and smart enough to alter share prices in 
the right direction.
193
 Such participants might be the highly informed and skilled 
investors investing their own or other people’s money, or those investors who 
themselves are not very informed but rely on market professionals such as research 
analysts or securities.  
 
In theory, it may be correct that publicly available information could inform capital 
markets which are efficient enough to reflect this information in share prices. 
However, the extent to which this hypothesis is merely an attractive theoretical idea 
or empirical reality has been a subject of intense debate. It would take a whole book 
to discuss this issue which therefore is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
recent events in capital markets indicate that this hypothesis has increasingly less 
support. For example, the technology bubble in the late nineties and the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis appear to indicate that the market was pricing available 
information inaccurately. The counter-argument is that this hypothesis has weathered 
previous crisis such as the 1987 stock market crash.
194
 Moreover, some studies 
demonstrated that investors are paying more attention to the internal regulations of 
companies, indicating the effectiveness of the capital market hypothesis.
195
 This 
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controversial debate is still ongoing and divides economists. As Lo observes, even 
after several decades of research and study, the question whether markets are 





If we assume that the capital market is efficient and the hypothesis of semi-strong 
efficient is correct, we must acknowledge that information publicly available to the 
market should also be accurate. Three types of information have been categorized by 
Kershaw.
197
 The first category concerns the company’s financial position and 
includes financial statements; the second is the regulations or legal rules set out in 
the corporate statute or constitution. The last category encompasses any information 
about managerial misbehaviour or incompetence. These categories of information 
must be made accessible to the public to properly reflect a company’s share price. 
However, given the widespread financial fraud occurring in today’s China, the price 
of shares does not actually reflect the value of a company.
198
 In addition, it is 
generally believed that the Chinese capital market is a policy market rather than a 
real capital market. This so-called policy market has two implications: first, the 
market is extremely vulnerable to variation in the government’s policy; secondly, 
policies regulating the capital market are changeable.
199
 This capital market, which 
is so characteristic of the market in China, is relevant to the background of the 
economic reforms started in 1978. The ‘cross the river by feeling its stones’ paradigm 
was promoted by Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of China, in order to implement 
the reform policy and break down resistance to it.
200
 This paradigm had a positive 
influence on almost every aspect of China – a state with little experience and 
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knowledge of market economics at that time. However, the paradigm has now 
become an obstacle for the development of the capital market as the price of shares 
does not mirror the value of a company owing to unpredictable policies.
201
 Wang 
and Ye have also concluded that the ‘cross the river by feeling its stones’ paradigm 





In light of the above discussion, the capital market could to some extent effectively 
constrain managerial misbehaviour in general. However, it is strongly doubted that it 
could minimise agency costs in the context of modern China owing to the prevalence 
of financial fault and the uncertain policy market.  
 
2.2.5 The Market for Corporate Control 
 
The market for corporate control has been regarded as a central mechanism to 
constrain the misbehaviour of managers and directors since it was first unveiled by 
Henry Manne.
203
 The basic idea behind this theory is that self-dealing or inefficient 
management may induce a low company share price, resulting in a corporate 
takeover threat. If a company is successfully acquired, those self-serving managers 
may be removed. In light of the risk of being sacked, managers have to try their best 
to increase company profits and act in the best interests of the company as a whole 
rather than pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the company. In this sense, 
the market for corporate control could reduce agency costs and constrain managerial 
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 Apparently, this theory is based on the assumption that the market 
is efficient or at least relatively efficient: incompetence or the abuse of managerial 
discretion for self-benefit would be reflected in the capital market by lowering the 
value and share price of the company. Accordingly, an acquirer can seize this 
opportunity to acquire the company and remove bad managers. 
 
However, several factors need to be considered to assess how this mechanism 
operates in practice. First, it should be noted that takeovers are not easy to execute. 
Indeed, they are a very expensive way of changing the management of a company as 
they involve substantial transaction costs.
205
 Accordingly, a prudent bidder must 
consider the current value of a company and the agency costs incurred by its 
managers as well as the costs of acquiring the company before making a takeover 
decision. Generally, only when there is a profit-making opportunity in the value 
delta,
206
 will a bidder offer to buy controlling company shares. Nevertheless, as 
Kershaw points out, agency costs alone are not normally large enough to activate a 
bid.
207
 Even if they cause a significant reduction in a company’s shares, Coffee 
considers that internal corporate governance mechanisms would be instigated before 
a bidder arrives on the scene.
208
 Moreover, the evidence that corporate governance 
could be improved or agency costs reduced after takeovers remains ambiguous. 
Singh and Weisse have found that the main motivation behind a corporate takeover is 
not to improve an acquired company’s competence but to build the business 
empire.
209
 Also, the empirical evidence in the UK has shown that takeover markets 
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are not notably related to poor performance.
210
 Furthermore, Kouloridas argues that 
the threat posed by the market for corporate control could fuel managerial incentives 
for self-interested acquisitions.
211
 Some managers may not wait to become targets if 
they know they will be ousted following a takeover. Consequently, they may attempt 
a defensive takeover to protect their own personal interests as the threat of replacing 
them is enough to make them act in their own interests. In this sense, the market for 
corporate control may increase agency costs and harm the interests of the minority 
shareholders. 
 
When it comes to China, the effectiveness of the market for corporate control faces 
greater challenges. Empirical research conducted by Zhang has found that the extent 
to which the transfer of corporate control improves a company’s performance 
depends on the status of ownership concentration and its variation during the process 
of transformation.
212
 Here, the function of the market for corporate control in China 
is not as useful as other countries’ might be. Indeed, several factors contribute to this: 
first, the ongoing reform of share trading has not proved unproblematic. This reform 
seeks to change split shareholding structures into one single form that could be freely 
transferred to the general public in order to implement the principle that the same 
shareholding should have the same right. It was expected that most non-tradable 
shares owned by central or local governments in listed companies would be reduced 
to an acceptable level and the modern corporate governance of SOEs could be 
established. However, the basic ownership structure of companies remains 
unchanged even after several years’ reform,
213
 and State investment companies are 
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still the blockholders of those listed companies. This makes it more difficult for the 
market for corporate control to function. Second, the visible hand of government 
prevails almost everywhere in the market despite the demise of the planned-economy. 
It is fair to say that the history of the market for corporate control is the history of 
government intervention, as the government remains continuously concerned with 
enterprise ownership partly because the traditional concept that the Communist state 
should control companies and markets has not completely vanished. In light of 
government intervention, accurate predictions of whether a takeover would be 
successful are extremely difficult because decision making power is in the hands of 
the government. Therefore, the market for corporate control’s disciplinary function in 
deterring bad managers is weakened. Third, the incomplete legal system of mergers 
and takeovers in China also casts doubt over the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control. Although several laws and regulations have been published to 
regulate mergers and takeovers, including the Measures for the Administration of the 
Takeover of Listed Companies
214
 and the Administration of Disclosure of 
Information on the Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies,
215
 many 
problems persist because of flaws in these regulations and an absence of other 
relevant laws. For instance, some of the regulations which were drafted under 
reforms concerning split shareholding structures are not suitable for addressing 
problems in capital markets after the reform of share-trading while the corresponding 
laws and regulations are still deficient. Fourth, it is also argued that the history of 
capital and stock markets in China is far too short, which inevitably creates some 
problems. Only in 1990, were two national stock exchanges authorised to be 
established: the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
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in 1991. It is widely recognised that China’s economic miracle could not have been 
achieved without the establishment of these stock markets, though many problems 
have emerged over the last twenty years. One of these problems is the extremely 
strict regulation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO).
216
 This means that the motives for 
acquiring a company do not necessarily include improvement of its performance in 
corporate governance but can sometimes be merely to obtain listed status. These 
numerous limitations in China would undoubtedly weaken the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control. 
 
2.2.6 Summary  
 
Unlike other countries which have either vertical or horizontal agency cost problems, 
China has both. This is the result of China’s SOE reform and its concentrated 
ownership structure as discussed in the previous part. In order to reduce these agency 
costs, legal and non-legal mechanisms must be put in place to constrain the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers and controlling shareholders. This part 
examined the non-legal mechanisms and four market methods were identified. 
Although these market forces may be effective in some other countries, their 
functions are hampered in the context of modern China owing to the aforementioned 
reasons discussed above. As a result, it is essential to examine legal methods in order 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders and company. 
 
2.3 Legal Protections for Minority Shareholders in China 
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As demonstrated above, there are currently two agency costs in China: vertical 
agency costs between minority shareholders and managers; horizontal agency costs 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In order to constrain the 
misbehaviour of managers and controlling shareholders and reduce these agency 
costs, various mechanisms have been adopted to protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Several defects have been found in non-legal protections in China and 
it is argued above that these non-legal mechanisms of themselves do not have the 
capacity to provide a strong shield for minority shareholders. In this regard, the law 
has a key role to play. This is particularly so when the rule of law has been advocated 
during the past fifteen years and awareness of safeguarding individual’s rights has 
been strengthened. If the legal protections for minority shareholders and the means 
for their enforcement are strong enough, then the importance of derivative actions 
would be weakened and the necessity to reform and rely on this direct form of 
litigation could be diminished. Otherwise, this protective measure will retain a 
central role in regulating the misbehaviour of controlling shareholders and managers 
and deterring them from abusing the powers. 
 
2.3.2 The Sources of Legal Protections Conferred in favour of Minority 
Shareholders 
 
There are three main legal sources of protection that are available for minority 
shareholders. The first and most important is statutory law, including the Company 
Law and the Securities Law. The Company Law basically deals with corporate 
governance issues and provides protection for shareholders in general. The Securities 
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law, however, focuses principally on stock companies or listed companies by 
stipulating provisions for disclosure of information, market transparency and listing 
qualifications, etc. The two laws were adopted and passed by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC), which has an enhanced 
degree of legal force than other regulations. Anything that contradicts these laws in 
judicial decisions or administrative regulations is treated as invalid. 
 
The second source of minority shareholder protection is judicial interpretation. 
Judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) can generally be 
divided into two components. The first one is the explanation of a specific law such 
as Decisions on Issues Regarding Application of the PRC Company Law. In practice, 
judicial explanations are treated as having statutory authority that is binding on all 
courts in China.
217
 It is recognised that some provisions in law are ambiguous. 
However, it is impractical to revise them once the defects are found since the 
amendment of those provisions by formal legislative process would take a long time. 
The second component is guiding cases. On 26 November 2010, the SPC made a 
significant change to the Chinese legal system by adopting a rule creating a 
procedure to recognise a batch of “guiding cases.”
218
 Although the new rule states 
only that courts at all levels should “refer to” guiding cases issued by the SPC, it is 
expected that these cases should be followed, otherwise there may be serious 
consequences. 
 
The third source of legal protection for shareholders can be found in administrative 
regulations. While there are numerous administrative regulations governing various 
matters in China, regulations on legal protection for minority shareholders are 
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predominantly issued by the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).
219
 
Regulations issued by the CSRC play a key role in constraining controlling 
shareholders and managers of listed companies because the Company Law and 
Securities Law are ineffective and insufficient to offer redress for minority 
shareholders. The Company Law 1993 was enacted primarily to regulate state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which accounted for the majority of corporations in China at that 
time. It basically provided little protection for minority shareholders because the 
principal purpose of the law was in favour of majority shareholders. Furthermore, 
there were few provisions policing the conduct of controlling shareholders and 
directors in listed companies since the securities market was newly established. The 
Securities Law was first enacted in 1999, which means most of the regulations 
pertaining to listed companies were largely provided by the CSRC from 1993 to 
1999. Even after the enactment of the Securities Law, the CSRC still plays a key role 




2.3.3 Developments of Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders Prior 
to the Chinese Company Law 2005 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the main purpose of commercial law was considered 
as reforming and serving SOEs. From this perspective, the first enactment of the 
Company Law in 1993 provided a legal basis for SOEs reform, and therefore only a 
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few provisions were designed for the protection of minority shareholders. However, 
with the rapid development of the capital market in China and increasing occurrences 
of exploitation of shareholders, interests of minority shareholders received increasing 
attention in China. The attention to minority shareholders was strengthened by the 
argument that legal protection of minority shareholders indicated success of a capital 
market because a country with inadequate protection for minority shareholders 
would be less attractive to investors and would have significantly smaller debt and 
equity markets.
221
 The research conducted by Johnson et al. also revealed that there 
was a link between legal protection for minority shareholders and conditions of a 
financial market with the argument that legal mechanisms to constrain controlling 
shareholders and reduce “tunnelling” activities were vital in furthering capital market 
development.
222
 Acknowledging the insufficient protection provided by the 
Company Law 1993, CSRC issued many regulations and guidelines to prevent 
majority shareholders and managers from exploiting the interests of minority 
shareholders and companies and to discipline those who violate these regulations and 
rules. Nonetheless, it is argued that these regulations and guidelines are unsystematic 
and only provide limited and low-level protection.
223
 In addition, it seems that the 
reluctance of courts to hear civil cases involving protection for minority shareholders 
exacerbated the situation, although this was to change years later. 
 
2.3.3.1 Company Law 1993 
 
The enactment of the Company Law 1993 was regarded as a milestone in Chinese 
economic reform for the reason that, prior to the date of its adoption, China 
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ostensibly did not need a Company Law since it was deemed to be capitalist branch 
of the law. Someone even suggested that the name of Company Law should be 
State-Owned Enterprise Law because that Law was intended to serve the formation 
and management of SOEs.
224
 Fortunately, the name was not changed, although the 
basic structure and the main content of the law was indeed primarily related to 





Shareholders were given some basic and general rights under the Company Law 
(1993). Article 4 stated that shareholders “have the right to enjoy the benefits of the 
assets of the company, make major decisions, choose managers etc., in accordance 
with the amount of capital they have invested in the company.”
226
 In particular, 
shareholders were given the right to attend and vote at the shareholders’ general 
meeting,
227





 seek remedies when their interests were infringed
230
 and enjoy priority 
in subscription of newly issued shares.
231
 However, some of these rights were 
ambiguous and limited, and therefore it was reasonable to say that these rights were 
on the books only without any practical application. For example, the priority in 
subscription for new shares in the Company Law seems to be a strong protection for 
minority shareholders, while actually it lacks any specific means of being applied. 
There is only one sentence stating that “[the] existing shareholders may have priority 
in subscription for new shares where a company increases its capital.”
232
 However, it 
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provides no procedure for such a shareholder to subscribe. 
 
Besides general rights as above, specific and carefully tailored protection for 
minority shareholders were scarcely included in the Company Law (1993). MacNeil 
examined the legal protection for minority shareholders by employing LLSV’s 
“anti-director rights index” and concluded that minority shareholders protection in 
China’s Company Law (1993) was much weaker than those of other countries.
233
 
Six protective components are identified in LLSV’s index and are calculated by 
adding 1 point when each of them occurs. MacNeil discovered that the total score for 
China was 2 with a world average of sample countries there of 3 and an average of 
common law jurisdictions of 4 (see Table 3). 
Table 3   
Index of Protective Components in Chinese Company Law 
(1993) 
Protection Score 
Shareholders can mail their vote to the company. 0 
Shareholders are not required to deposit their share prior to 
the Annual Shareholders’ General Meeting. 
1 
Cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed. 
0 
An oppressed minorities mechanism is in place. 0 
The minimum percentage of capital that is necessary for 
shareholders to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting 
is less than or equal to ten percent. 
1 
Shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can only be 
waived by a shareholder vote. 
0 
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It is no surprise that the Company Law 1993 failed to provide specific protective 
rights to minority shareholders since the primary intention to introduce this law was 
to reform governance of SOEs and to protect state assets. However, the potential for 
directors to abuse their powers was recognised by the drafters of the Company Law 
and several modest measures were adopted, such as a supervisory board to supervise 
acts of the directors
234
 and administrative and criminal liabilities they should bear 
when violating certain laws and regulations.
235
 Nevertheless, experience 
demonstrates that directors were rarely disciplined for their wrongdoings owing to 
the ineffective and impractical mechanisms of enforcement. For example, as Li 
pointed out, the supervisory board did not perform the supervising function as 




2.3.3.2 Administrative Regulations 
 
The administrative regulations issued by the CSRC took a more robust and 
progressive approach to protect the interests of minority shareholders. Among many 
regulations issued by the CSRC, Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies (hereinafter, the “Guidelines 1997”) and Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Companies (hereinafter, the “Code 2002”) are the most fundamental ones, 
and their provisions seemed to be effective in constraining controlling shareholders 
and directors. 
 
Prior to the Guidelines 1997, the articles of association of many listed companies 
were chaotic and controlled by the majority shareholders. In order to prevent 
majority shareholders from using the articles of association to deprive minority 
shareholders and the company of interests, CSRC issued the Guidelines 1997 with 
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which all companies that demand to become listed should comply or provide 
reasonable grounds for non-compliance, and failure to do so would result in rejection 
of its listing application. Under the Guidelines 1997, shareholders enjoy certain 
rights that did not exist in the Company Law 1993. For example, shareholders with 
5% of the voting shares in the company have the right to raise proposals to the 
company.
237
 Secondly, the Guidelines 1997 also addressed problems resulting from 
when the board of directors disapprove to convene an interim shareholders’ assembly 
meeting requested by eligible shareholders. Guidelines 1997 specified that such a 
meeting should be convened despite the board of directors’ disapproval.
238
 







 made substantial improvements to the protection for minority 
shareholders and achieved an average level of 3 under the LLSV’s index owing to 
the first adoption of cumulative voting right.
241
 The Code 2002 provides that listed 
companies that are owned more than 30% by controlling shareholders shall adopt a 
cumulative voting system which is expected to provide a strong mechanism for 
minority shareholders to have a voice in the company by electing their favoured 
directors.  
 
Besides the two foregoing important Codes, several other regulations issued by the 
CSRC also deal with particular problems in this field. For example, the Interim 
Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks (1993) and 
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 Code 2002 is issued based on a previous Guidelines for Corporate Governance 2000. Guidelines 
2000 with only 55 articles, however, was not mandatory for listed companies; while Code 2002 with 
95 articles, is mandatory for all listed companies. 
241
 A precise explanation of the cumulative voting system is as shown in Chapter III B (2). 
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the Implementation Rules on Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Public 
Stocks (1993) were issued to improve shareholders’ access to company information. 
Also, the Provisional Measures on Prohibition of Securities Fraud (1993) was issued 
to target emerging securities fraudulent activities in the capital market. In 
collaboration with the CSRC, the Ministry of Finance issued the Accounting 
Standards for Disclosure of Related Parties and Affiliate Transactions (1997), which 
sought to enhance the transparency of transactions by disclosing relative information. 
Although these regulations have been repealed, many rules in these regulations have 
been incorporated into the Company Law 2005. 
 
2.3.3.3 Judicial Interpretation 
 
The SPC has played a key role in the legal protection of the interests of minority 
shareholders. On the one hand, the SPC can encourage individual shareholders to 
bring lawsuits against wrongdoers, on the other it can also limit these lawsuits by 
issuing judicial interpretations. Specifically, the SPC circulated a notice stating that 
the high people’s courts should not accept civil compensation cases arising from 
insider trading, securities fraud and market manipulation because the causes of action 
in these types of cases could not be clearly demonstrated.
242
 The SPC later explained 
that several factors were considered in making this decision. First, the absence of 
judicial consistency would produce different results to plaintiff-investors with similar 
facts and causes of actions. Secondly, it was expected that the acceptance of civil 
compensation arising from securities would encourage more cases and the caseload 
of courts might exceed what is reasonable, especially given that the exploitation of 
shareholders in the capital market had been increasing. Thirdly, the professional 
knowledge and expertise of judges in the securities area is a major concern. At that 
time, the reality was that many judges were retired military officers during the 
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military reform. They did not have the professional legal experience to handle these 
cases. Fourthly, the lack of a standardised rule of evidence was also an obstacle for 
the acceptance of civil compensation cases involving securities. Lastly, since a 
majority of listed companies were SOEs at that time, there was concern that some 




However, this notice provoked a debate about China’s commitment to the rule of law 
and the role of the SPC in the legal protection of shareholders’ rights.
244
 Many 
scholars and investors harshly criticised that the functioning of capital markets would 
be prejudiced by the refusal to accept civil compensation cases involving securities. 
Facing this intense pressure, the SPC changed its decision several months later by 
issuing another notice. The second notice provided that investors could assert claims 
against anyone for losses caused by false representation made by information 
disclosure in violation of law.
245
 However, there was a prerequisite that had to be 
fulfilled before such a case was filed. A case must be investigated and penalised by 
the CSRC or its dispatched institutions before it is accepted by a court and the 
investigation result should be used as basis by the investor in filing.
246
 The provision 
actually means shareholders cannot initiate a lawsuit unless it has been investigated 
by the CSRC and the violator of the information disclosure obligations has been 
punished by an administrative decision or/and the criminal law. Although this 
provision was criticised for its limitations on access to justice, there is no doubt that 
the SPC did make some progress in protecting minority shareholders with it. 
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2.3.4 General Protections for Minority Shareholders under the Company 
Law 2005 
 
Since the SPC started to embrace the significance of private securities litigation, the 
recognition that legal protections for minority shareholders are insufficient has also 
increased. Along with the continual issuance of regulations by the CSRC, support has 
been growing for a revision of China’s Company Law to strengthen minority 
shareholders’ rights. Widely reported cases concerning the exploitation of 
shareholders in capital markets also pushed legislators into reforming the Company 
Law. As a key piece of legislation regulating commercial business and capital 
markets, it was recognised that Company Law should not fall behind other 
regulations and interpretations in terms of protection for minority shareholders. 
Instead, the Company Law legislation should have been in a leading position in 
providing an investor-friendly environment. Based on this recognition and common 
view, the Company Law was revised in 2005. The revision was considered the most 
comprehensive and significant reform in the legislative history of Chinese company 
law. One of the distinctive characteristics of this revision was to meet the increasing 
demands for rules that provide better protection for minority shareholders. 
 
2.3.4.1 Improvements in Protection for Minority Shareholders 
 
First of all, shareholders are given more rights to protect themselves and are 
encouraged to participate in the management of the company. For example, 
shareholders have the right to examine and view corporate documents such as the 
stubs of corporate bonds and the minutes of shareholders’ general meetings.
247
 
Besides, directors and senior managers are subject to questions from the shareholders 
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during the shareholders’ general meeting.
248
 Furthermore, in order to encourage 
shareholders to engage in management, the Company Law 2005 provides that in a 
limited liability company, shareholders representing 10% or more of the voting rights 
may convene and preside over the shareholders’ meeting where the executives and 
the board of supervisors both fail to do so.
249
 In a company limited by shares (i.e., 
stock company), shareholders who individually or jointly hold more than 3% of the 
shares of the company may also submit proposals to the shareholders’ general 
meeting.
250
 Additionally, shareholders representing more than one-tenth of the 
voting rights may propose to convene an interim meeting of the board of directors.
251
 
Last but not least, given the fact that the “one share one vote’ doctrine may 
undermine the willingness of minority shareholders to exercise their rights in 
company management, the Company Law 2005 for the first time allows shareholders 
in a limited liability company not to exercise their voting rights in proportion to their 
respective capital contributions where the articles of association provides another 
approach.
252
 In a stock company, the cumulative voting system was introduced
253
 
for the minority shareholders to have a louder voice in the election of directors and 




Where the interests of minority shareholders are infringed, shareholders can be 
awarded a wider range of remedies under the Company Law 2005. First, individual 
shareholders may bring a derivative action against the wrongdoers for compensatory 
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damages in the interests of the company.
255
 Secondly, a shareholder may request the 
company to buy his shares at a reasonable price under certain circumstances.
256
 
Thirdly, when a company is facing serious difficulties confronted in its operation and 
management, and its continued existence may cause grievous losses and the 
difficulties cannot be surmounted by other channels, the minority shareholders may 




Owing to the emerging ‘insider controls’ problem and the increasing vertical agency 
costs, duties of loyalty and diligence are imposed upon directors and senior managers 
(including supervisors) under the Company Law 2005 while the Company Law 1993 
only provided that directors should perform their duties faithfully.
258
 Article 148 of 
the Company law 2005 requires directors, supervisors and senior managers to 
assume the duties of loyalty and diligence to the company,
259
 and they will be liable 
for any breach of duties that causes loss to the company or shareholders. For instance, 
directors are liable for resolutions of the board of directors. Where a resolution of the 
board violates laws, administrative regulations, or the company’s articles of 
association and thus causes serious losses to the company, the directors who 
participate in adoption of such a resolution may be liable for compensation to the 
company.
260
 Furthermore, the Company Law 2005 itemized several activities that 
directors and senior managers should not commit, such as misappropriating the 





A great emphasis on the functions of the supervisory board in a company is another 
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approach resorted to in the Company Law 2005 to constrain directors and senior 
managers. The supervisory board was criticised for its inability to perform task of 
holding directors to account, and for its excessive dependence to exercise its 
monitoring function.
262
 The first argument is that the Company Law 1993 did not 
confer sufficient power to the supervisory board to supervise the internal 
management, correct managerial misconduct and discipline the wrongdoers. The 
second argument is that supervisors were not independent enough to exercise their 
rights. Supervisors elected by shareholders were normally controlled by the majority 
shareholders and supervisors elected by employees were reluctant to challenge the 
directors and senior managers for fear of being dismissed. The Company Law 2005 
responds to these criticisms by conferring more powers and functions on the 
supervisory board, including the powers to remove directors and senior managers 
who violate laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the 
company, or the resolutions adopted by the shareholders’ meetings.
263
 The 
supervisory board even may take legal proceedings against the directors or senior 
managers under certain circumstances.
264
 Besides the additional supervisory board’s 
functions, independent director system is also adopted to reduce vertical agency costs 
of companies. However, the Company Law 2005 does not provide specific rules 
regarding responsibilities of independent directors in corporate governance. Instead, 
it simply states that a listed company should have independent directors and the 




The prevalence of horizontal agency costs between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders is also addressed. As a result, certain duties are imposed on the 
controlling shareholders and de facto controllers of a company under the Company 
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Law 2005 to prevent them from taking advantages from the company.
266
 Article 21 
states that controlling shareholders or de facto controllers of a company should not 
take advantage of their affiliated relations to damage the interests of the company. A 
person who violates this rule and causes losses to the company should be liable in 
compensation.
267
 The new Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies which have been revised in accordance with the Company Law 2005 and 
the Securities Law goes further. The new Guidelines provide that controlling 
shareholders and de facto controllers of the company owe a duty to act bona fide to 
the company and other shareholders. Controlling shareholders should not impair the 
legal rights of the company and other shareholders by profits distribution, assets 
reorganization, external investments, appropriation of funds, borrowing and loan 
guarantee, nor should they use their controlling status to damage the interests of the 
company and individual shareholder.
268
 It is expected that these legal duties will 
effectively reduce horizontal agency costs of corporate governance. 
 
2.3.4.2 Deficiencies of the Protection 
 
Notwithstanding that protection for minority shareholders has been improved 
significantly and substantially by the Company Law 2005, these mechanisms do 
have some drawbacks and some of them even do not have sufficient and effective 
implementing details. This part is dedicated to explore defects of these general 
protections and demonstrates why the derivative action is necessary in China. 
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2.3.4.2.1 Rights Conferred on Shareholders 
 
2.3.4.2.1.1 Right to know 
 
It can be presumed that shareholders will be unable to protect their rights and 
interests without information about the company in which they invests Therefore, the 
‘right to know’ is a fundamental and extremely important right which is restated and 
improved under the Company Law 2005. Article 34 states that shareholders have the 
right to consult the articles of association, the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings, 
the resolutions of the board of directors and the board of supervisors, and the 
financial and accounting reports of the company. However, if a shareholder asks to 
consult accounting books of the company, he will need to submit a written request 
with an explanation of his purpose. The request may be refused by the company in a 
written reply where the company reasonably deems the request is for an illegitimate 
purpose that may damage the lawful interests of the company. Shareholders with the 





There is no doubt that the right to know provides fundamental protection for minority 
shareholders by furnishing information such as whether the interests of the company, 
especially interests of minority shareholders, have been damaged. However, in order 
to prevent abuse of this right, the company can refuse the request if it has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the subjective purpose behind the request is illegitimate or 
may harm the interests of the company. Whilst it might seem that this provision 
strikes the balance between protection of the minority shareholders and trade secrets 
of the company, several problems have arisen. The first seemingly obvious issue is 
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who can enjoy the right to know. According to the legislation, the answer should be 
very straightforward: the shareholders. However, the next question would be whether 
former shareholders, dormant partners and shareholders who have defective capital 
subscription should also enjoy the right. Although it is extensively recognised in the 
legal profession that former shareholders can also exercise the right to know,
270
 
companies or the courts are very likely to refuse their requests if the law is strictly 
interpreted. The second issue is that there is no prerequisite for shareholders to 
exercise this right in either a limited liability company or a stock company.
271
 In a 
limited liability company, owing to its private nature, it is certain that every 
shareholder can exercise the right to know and consult the company documents. 
However, in a stock company, the rules should be adjusted because of its different 
nature. Because stock companies are companies that offer shares to the public, they 
should be kept under more strict supervision than a private company, and therefore, 
the rules applied to it should not be identical. Since shares of a stock company can be 
purchased by anyone on stock exchange markets, a person with a malicious purpose 
can easily become a shareholder holding a small amount of shares and request to 
consult information of the company, which may damage the interests of the company. 
Although the company can refuse his request with reasonable ground that to fulfil his 
demand may harm the interests of the company, it is unrealistic for the company to 
discover the true motivation of each request and to screen the background of each 
applicant. Hence, certain restrictions should be placed. For instance, shareholders of 
a stock company cannot enjoy the right to know without holding a certain percentage 
of shares of the company.  
 
Another vexed issue is how to evaluate the existence of an “illegitimate purpose”. 
Given that the company can refuse to meet the request on the ground of illegitimate 
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purpose, it is essential to give a clear definition of such a purpose. However, such a 
definition is absent from the current Company Law. Additionally, it is unclear that 
who should bear the burden of proof. Article 34 provides clearly the company should 
state the reasons why the request is refused. However, it remains unclear that 
whether it is the shareholder who should show the reasonableness of the request. 
Another question up in the air is whether the shareholders can consult the original 
accounting books, such as the company’s invoices. It is argued that shareholders do 
not have right to examine the original accounting books and reports because the 
Company Law does not states so. However, it is too difficult for shareholders to 
inspect the accuracy of accounting books without comparing to the original records. 
Therefore, it should be clarified in the future revisions. 
 
2.3.4.2.1.2 Cumulative Voting System 
 
One of the strongest protections for the minority shareholders is the right to 
participate in the management of the company by electing directors and supervisors. 
Under the traditional “one-share, one-vote” doctrine,
272
 majority shareholders can 
control the company by electing their favourite directors and it is highly unlikely for 
the minority shareholders to elect their directors because they represent minority 
shares of the company. However, the situation might be changed after the system of 
cumulative voting introduced to the current Company Law.
273
 This system will give 
all shareholders the opportunity to have a voice in corporate governance and protect 
their own interests to some extent. It is widely accepted that this voting system has 
several advantages. It encourages minority shareholders to participate in 
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management of the company and contribute their perspectives to maximize the 
company’s interests.
274
 It is a true reflection of the inherent concept of “check and 
balance” in corporate governance to prevent directors from abusing powers.
275
 It can 
reduce conflicts of interests and moral risks and minimize the risk of investments.
276
 
In a word, the system of cumulative voting can effectively protect minority 
shareholders and improve the structure of the corporate governance system. 
 
Although the adoption of the cumulative voting system received a warm welcome, 
some doubts have been raised about the design of this rule and its functions. First of 
all, this voting system is not mandatory and it is ultimately decided by the company’s 
articles of association. In other words, shareholders that come in after the company is 
incorporated will not be able to use this voting system unless it is stipulated in the 
company’s articles of association. Although it is true that the articles of association 
can provides the system of cumulative voting by a later amendment, it will be 
impractical to be achieved since requirements for an amendment of the articles of 
association are much higher and the minority shareholders alone will generally be 
unable to meet the requirements.
277
 Secondly, the success of this system depends on 
the agreements between the minority shareholders. The cumulative voting system 
requires minority shareholders to vote unanimously. However, it is hard to ask 
minority shareholders to align with each other and vote for the same directors or 
supervisors, especially in a stock company where minority shareholders normally 
have diverse interests. Thirdly, minority shareholders may be reluctant to vote and 
elect their directors because they may believe that their votes are of little influence 
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under the special ownership structure in China. As is well known, China is one of the 
few communist countries with many SOEs. Therefore, many listed companies are 
solely or particularly controlled by the government. Additionally, many institutional 
investors prefer to hold shares of these SOEs because of their economic privileges. 
Hence, even in a case where the minority shareholders vote for the same director or 
supervisor, it is highly likely that their efforts turn out to be in vain. The directors 
who are preferred by the minority shareholders and successfully get elected still are 
subject to removal by the controlling shareholders or marginalised through other 
legal channels. In practice, there is evidence to show that the shareholders’ general 
meeting is often simply a “rubber stamp” for the controlling shareholders’ wishes in 
China and thus the attendance and voting level of minority shareholders is 
considerably low.
278
 As a result, the cumulative voting system cannot be expected to 
be a practical means of monitoring the management of a company. 
 
2.3.4.2.1.3 Restriction and Proxy Voting System 
 
In terms of the voting rights, there are some other systems under the Company Law 
2005 that provide protection for minority shareholders besides the system of 
cumulative voting. The current Company Law provides two more instruments to 
improve the corporate governance of companies. The first one is a restriction of 
shareholders’ voting rights on matters that they are involved in and subject to a 
resolution adopted by the shareholders’ meetings.
279
 The other one is the proxy 
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voting system, which creates a user-friendly environment for shareholders to 
participate in the management of the company.
280
 The restriction on voting 
precluding shareholders from voting for matters they are involved in, which is 
designed to resolve conflicts of interests between the company and its controlling 
shareholders, and the company’s interests should be prioritized when such conflict 
occurs. It is argued that the best protection for interests of the minority shareholders 
is to restrict or invalidate voting rights of the controlling shareholders.
281
 Indeed, if 
the majority shareholders can vote without any restriction, the interests of minority 
shareholders or even the company will be under potential expropriation, according to 
the fundamental presumption of rational-economic man (homo economicus). The 
presumption reveals that any person who is rational will act in a self-interested way 
to maximise his own benefits. This presumption justifies the introduction of the 
voting restriction and has been heavily relied upon in the revision of Chinese 
Company Law. 
 
Another reform of voting rights that aims to protect minority shareholders is the 
proxy voting system. Along with the exponential development of capital markets in 
China, investments are getting more diversified. As a result, shareholders may need 
to put additional time and energy to learn about and follow up each company he 
invests in and personally attend each general meeting of shareholders to exercise his 
voting rights. Ideally, shareholders should be able to do so and his interests would be 
protected adequately, but in the real business world, it is very impractical. This is one 
of the reasons why the system of proxy voting was designed and adopted under 
Chinese Company Law. Second, according to the Company Law or the company’s 
articles of association, some resolutions have to be adopted by a certain number of 
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attending shareholders or percentage of representing voting rights to become 
effective.
282
 This means some of the resolutions cannot be made without adequate 
number of attending shareholders, where proxy may be an efficient solution to the 
problem. Last but not least, proxy voting provides a platform for every shareholder to 





Meanwhile, there are some arguments over effectiveness of these two methods under 
current Company Law. Three issues have been brought up regarding the voting 
restriction. First, the scope of application of the restrictions is too narrow. The 
Company Law 2005 suspends a shareholder’s voting rights only where the company 
intends to provide a guarantee to him.
284
 Other related-party transactions are not 
mentioned under the current Law. Therefore, it is obvious that the scope of 
applicable transactions is extremely narrow, which needs to be extended. The second 
issue is the definition of voting restriction is ambiguous. Under the current Company 
Law, only the shareholders dominated by the actual controller are subject to the 
restriction. However, it remains unclear if these mentioned shareholders should be 
excluded from voting when they represent other shareholders as well. Additionally, it 
is ambiguous whether the proxy should be subject to the voting restrict if he is a 
related party to the voting matters while his principal-shareholder is not. Another 
loophole is the legal consequences of the violation of this rule need improvements. 
The Law should identify means that can be resorted to by the minority shareholders 
to protect their rights where the voting restriction is not being followed. The current 
Law stipulates that shareholders can take legal proceedings and request rescission of 
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a violating resolution where the resolution in its content or its voting formula is 
against laws, administrative regulations or the articles of association of the 
company.
285
 Apparently, the Law provides that shareholders can request the court to 
rescind the resolution, but it is unclear whether shareholders related to the voting 
matters are still qualified to be plaintiffs. Further, it is argued that legal consequences 
of violation here is not reasonably severe, which may result in insufficient 
deterrence.
286
 As to the system of proxy voting, current Company Law only spares 
one basic provision providing a shareholder may entrust a proxy to attend a 
shareholders’ general meeting without any detailed implementing rules.
287
 Second, it 
can be hard for a shareholder to find a reliable proxy, especially when the 
shareholder lives far away from headquarter of the company. Third, there is no 
specific restriction imposed on the proxy’s exercising of the voting rights under the 
current Law. Under the theory of agency, the agent should act for the interests of and 
instructions from his principal. Therefore, under the Company Law, some 
mechanism should be provided to make sure the proxy would vote based upon the 
true intents of his principal. Nevertheless, the current Law does not contain such 
provisions and therefore several questions are still up in air. For instance, is it 
necessary for the principal-shareholder to state clearly in the power of lawyer 
whether he would vote for or against a certain resolution? What if the proxy votes 
against the true intents of his principal-shareholder? These questions need to be 
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answered eventually to provide more effective protection to the minority 
shareholders. 
 
2.3.4.2.2 Measures to Constrain Directors and Controlling Shareholders.  
 
2.3.4.2.2.1 The Supervisory Board (“SB”)  
 
The supervisory board (the Aufsichtsrat) was adopted in the early version of Chinese 
Company Law to supervise the internal management of company; however, it was 
regarded as a complete failure due to its dysfunction in practice. The revised 
company law acknowledged the problem and under the new law, the SB may 
exercise more rights, including: (i) to put forward proposals for removal of the 
directors or senior managers who violates laws, the company’s article of association, 
or the resolutions adopted by the shareholders’ meeting; (ii) to propose, convene and 
preside over shareholders’ interim meeting as provided for by the Law when the 
board of directors fails to perform the duty of convening; (iii) to put for the motions 





Although the SB was given more rights to strengthen its supervising function, its 
inefficiency is still criticised on several grounds.  
 
First, the SB’s rights are still not strong enough for it to play the role under the new 
Company Law. The SB system was transplanted from Germany with fundamental 
alterations. In Germany, a SB enjoys much stronger powers, including appointing 
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and removing directors. Additionally, important business decisions are subject to 
advice or/and consent of the SB.
289
 However, SBs in China have no right to appoint 
or remove directors, nor the authority to control the process of business 
decision-making in the company. Absence of the right and power will inevitably 
impair a SB’s deterrence and make it impossible for a SB to act as a supervisory 
organ.  
 
Second, the composition of the SB further undermines its function. According to the 
Company Law 2005, a SB should be composed by three types of supervisors: (i) 
representatives of the shareholders, (ii) representatives of the staff and workers of the 
company, and (iii) external supervisors.
290
 It seems such a composition of 
supervisors will ensure the independence of a SB to supervise the directors, however, 
the evidence shows to the contrary. Supervisors who are democratically elected by 
the shareholders normally only represent the preference of the controlling 
shareholders instead of the minority shareholders. The practical research conducted 
by Xu and Wang confirmed that among all Chinese listed companies’ supervisors 
that examined in their research, very few of them were representing individual 
shareholders.
291
 Leaders of the dysfunctional labour union are always also the 
supervisors representing employees. 
292
 In fear of being fired by the directors, these 
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types of supervisors are little more than puppets of the directors or senior managers 
and are extremely reluctant to challenge the directors. The external supervisors are 
expected to be more efficient in exercising their powers and rights since they have 
fewer conflicts of interests within the company. Indeed, Tam and Hu discovered that 
performance of external supervisors are more effective than internal supervisors, 
although generally the latter actually dominant the SB.
293
 However, some research 
shows that many external supervisors are close friends or acquaintances of the senior 
managers, which significantly limits their role in supervising the board of directors 
and senior managers.
294
 Besides the forgoing arguments, two more factors may also 
affect the independence of the SB. The first one is that the remuneration of the 
supervisors is decided by the executives of the company. The second one is the level 
of education of the supervisors. Research on education backgrounds among 
supervisors in companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange reveals that the average 




Overall, it is commonly accepted that the SB is unlikely to be effective in supervising 
the board of directors and the senior managers. A senior official from the CSRC even 
candidly admitted that the system of supervisory board failed to provide checks and 
balances into the managements of companies.
296
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2.3.4.2.2.2 Independent Directors.  
 
By acknowledging the ineffectiveness of the supervisory boards supervise the acts of 
the directors and senior managers, the independent director system was borrowed 
from common law jurisdictions, particularly from the U.S. law, to improve the 
corporate governance and protects the interests of individual shareholders. The 
system was first introduced by the Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of 
Independent Director System in Listed Companies in 2001
297
 and later confirmed by 
the Company Law in 2006 stating that a listed company should have independent 
directors and the specific measures in this regard should be formulated by the State 
Council.
298
 The detailed rules are known as Independent Director Guidelines.  
 
The independent director system was designed to supplement the supervising 
function of the SB and was expected to be more effective than the SB in providing 
checks and balances into the management of listed companied. However, research 
indicates that the effects of this system on the corporate governance are disappointing. 
Ma and Gao conducted empirical research on effectiveness of the independent 
director system selected by the listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange from 
2006 to 2008. Their research discovered that independent directors were having very 




Although this research may not necessarily tell the whole story, there is no doubt that 
to date, the independent director system has not being performed as effective as 
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expected. The outcome may be explained by several reasons as follows. 
 
First of all, it is argued that independent directors are reluctant to challenge decisions 
made by the board of directors or senior managers.
300
 In a survey conducted by 
China Securities Daily, sixty five percent of the independent directors admitted they 
never raised a challenge when attending meetings of the board of directors and all of 
them did, at least “occasionally,” vote for a proposal where they should not based on 
its content.
301
 This problem was brought up by various reasons. First, the 
independent director’s remuneration is not competitive and thus the economic 
motivation for them to exercise their rights is not strong enough.
302
 However, even 
independent directors can receive much higher annual compensation may lose their 
independence if their remuneration is decided by the senior managers or controlling 
shareholders. Second, the supervising function of independent directors may be 
further undermined by the traditional Chinese business culture of guanxi (关系). 
Guanxi signifies the inclination to compromise one’s own interests in order to show 
respect to others, particularly to friends. In this sense, independent directors would be 
reluctant to offend their friends, for example, the CEO or senior managers the 
company, even where the latter have committed some misconduct to the company.
303
 
Third, the absence of legal liability also contributes to the ineffectiveness of this 
system. The Guidelines did not specify any legal consequence that independent 
directors may bear if they fail to perform their duties, with one exception that if an 
independent director fails to attend in person three consecutive meetings of the board 
of directors, he may be replaced upon request of the board of directors.
304
 Without 
                                                             
300
 D. C. Clarke, ‘The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance’ (2006) 31 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 125. 
301
 Zhongguo Dudong Diaocha ji Zhidu Fansi [Survey and Reflections on China’s Independent 
Directors] Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [China Securities Daily], July 28, 2005. 
302
 Recent empirical research based on annual reports from 81 listed companies in 2002 reveals that 
independent director’s average annual remuneration is less than RMB 30,000. See Luo, fn. 112 at 22. 
303
 C. Xie, Duli Dongshi Falv Zhidu yanjiu [Study on the Independent Director System] (Falv 
Chubanshe [Law Press] 2002) 320. 
304
 Guiding Opinions on the Establishing Independent Director System in Listed Companies, article 
 
 106 
actual legal consequences, independent directors will act little more than “ornamental 




Limitation to access of company information is another obstacle for independent 
directors. According to the Independent Director Guidelines, a listed company should 
provide sufficient materials and working conditions to the independent directors.
306
 
Furthermore, when an independent director exercises his powers, the relevant 
personnel of the listed company should actively co-operate with him, and may not 
refuse to do so.
307
 However, to exercise these rights mainly relies on the 
management of the company. In other words, the executive directors or senior 
managers control the access to corporate information and limit the independent 
director to get access to relevant information. A survey regarding this issue 
demonstrates by that ninety percent of independent directors, to a great extent, have 
to reply upon the management of the company to get necessary information. The key 
point here is that the rights to knowledge of independent directors are almost 
unenforceable since there is no provision providing legal consequences where the 
management of the listed company fails to provide such information. As a result of 
the absence of legal enforcement, it can be imagined that the effectiveness of 
independent director system in supervising the controlling shareholders and the 
senior management is diminished. 
 
2.3.4.2.2.3 Duties of the directors  
 
The Company Law 2005 provides, first, that directors assume the duties of loyalty 
and diligence to the company, it also itemised that the following conduct should not 
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be committed:     
(i) misappropriating the funds of the company;  
(ii) opening an account in his own name or in the name of another person to 
deposit the funds of the company;  
(iii) in violation of the stipulations of the company’s articles of association or 
without the consent of the shareholder’s meeting or general meeting, lending the 
funds of the company to another person or using the property of the company to 
provide guarantee for another person;  
(iv) in violation of the stipulations of the company’s articles of association or 
without the consent of the shareholders’ meeting or general meeting, entering into a 
contract or conducting transactions with the company;  
(v) without consent of the shareholders’ meeting or general meeting, taking 
advantage of his position to seek commercial opportunities, which belong to the 
company, for himself or for another person, or operating for himself or for another 
person the same kind of business as that of the company where he is holding a post; 
(vi) taking into his own possession the commissions from transactions conducted by 
another person with the company;  
(vii) disclosing secrets of the company without authorization; or
  




It is also provided that all earnings derived by the director or senior managers in 
violation of the restrictions above should be returned to the company. It was expected 
that these duties of directors and senior managers would incentivise them to act in 
compliance with the duties for the interests of the company, and would prevent them 
from pursuing their own benefits. However, several problems have emerged in the 
meantime. 
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First, the scope of directors’ duties is narrow. It is recognised that the duty of loyalty 
in China is similar to the fiduciary duty in the United Kingdom since both are mainly 
aim to eliminate the potential conflicts of interests. However, the ambit of the 
fiduciary duties of directors in the UK is much wider. There are three types of duties 
under UK law, however, is absent from China law. The first type is that directors 
must exercise their power within the scope of authorisation. The second one is the 
good faith requirement, which requires directors to act in good faith for the 
commercial success of the company. The last one is that the directors should use 
independent judgment during exercising their powers and right.
309
 Among these 
three types of duty, the good faith requirement is regarded as the important tool for 
preventing management misconducts. Therefore, it is argued that the scope of 
directors’ duties in China should be extended and the good faith requirement should 
be adopted. One reason for such an extension is that the duty of loyalty and diligence 
cannot prevent all types of misconducts that may be committed by the management, 
and thus the good faith requirement will be a necessary complement based on 
research conducted by Eisenberg. The research reveals that the good faith 





Another defect is that shareholders can only bring a derivative action to the court 
against a director who fails to perform his duties and cause losses to the company. 
Under the current Company Law, shareholders cannot bring lawsuits against the 
wrongdoers unless the board of directors or supervisors fails or refuses to take legal 
proceedings.
311
 This means that the derivative action is still needed even if the 
directors’ duties per se are effectively designed by the legislators. 
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2.3.4.2.2.4 Duties of the Controlling Shareholders 
 
Although the new Company Law does not state explicitly that the duties of 
controlling shareholders to the company and other shareholders, it is widely accepted 
that the duties were imposed upon the controlling shareholders based on two 
provisions in the new Company Law requires controlling shareholders not to abuse 
their rights and should be held liable for damages caused by their violations. Article 
20 provides a general rule by stating that the shareholders of a company shall 
observe laws, administrative regulations and the company’s articles of association, 
exercise the rights of a shareholder according to the law, and shall not abuse his right 
to damage the interests of the company and other shareholders.”
312
 Article 21 
focuses on the controlling shareholders or de facto controllers of a company, stating 
that they should not take advantage of their affiliated relations to damage the 




However, it is argued that the duties of controlling shareholders may not effectively 
constrain their conducts and thus are only “paper tigers.”
314
 First of all, provisions 
regarding duties of the controlling shareholders are unsystematic and therefore, it 
more like a scattergun approach. As discussed before, there are couples of provisions 
regarding the duties of the controlling shareholder under the Company Law and 
some other relative rules can be found occasionally in regulations issued by the 
CSRC, such as Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies. 
These dispersed provisions are obviously not conducive to either the minority 
shareholders or the controlling shareholders. Second, these provisions are criticized 
for being too general to claim in practice without details of content or applicable 
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 It can be revealed by the fact that to date, there has been no case filed 
to court claiming the controlling shareholders breach their duties. Third, there is no 
provision explicit stating a shareholder can bring lawsuits against controlling 
shareholders where they fail to perform their duties and cause damages to other 
shareholders. This is different from the situation covered under the current Company 
Law where directors fail to fulfil their duties since the Law clearly provides that 
shareholders, whose interest is damaged when a director violates his duties to 
shareholders, may bring a lawsuit to the court.
316
 This may further prove that the 
duties of controlling shareholders are potentially ineffective in constraining their 
conducts. Fourth, remedies for shareholder are very limited. According to the 
Company Law 2005, the controlling shareholders should be liable in compensation 
to the company or other shareholders for their breach of duties. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the only available remedy for the injured shareholders is compensatory 
damages. For a listed company, this seems to be no problem since a shareholder can 
leave the company by selling out his shares after receiving the compensation. 
However, for the shareholders of a limited liability company, it is not easy for the 
injured shareholders to leave the company. For example, they may want to leave the 
company after its controlling shareholders fail to perform their duties, while the only 
available remedy is pecuniary compensation. Therefore, it is suggested that a right to 





It cannot be denied that the Company Law 2005 made significant progress in 
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constraining misconducts of majority shareholders and management in several ways. 
Nevertheless, there still exist many defects and thus, functions of these 
improvements are inevitably affected in protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders. In view of the growing severe exploitation of minority shareholders 
and the deteriorative double agency costs in Chinese companies, it is essential and 
significant that the interests of minority shareholders should be well protected. 
Without an investor-friendly legal system, the interests of shareholders and the 
companies would ultimately be injured and the development of capital markets 
would be severely impeded. As a consequence, in the future many protection 
mechanisms, such as derivative actions, should be further improved and clarified to 










Chapter 3 Derivative Actions in China 
 




In China, when the interests of a company are prejudiced by the decisions or actions 
of directors or senior managers, in certain circumstances, an individual shareholder 
will be entitled to bring a derivative action against the wrongdoers for the benefit of 
the company. However, if a shareholder’s personal rights are breached by a director 
or senior manager - that shareholder will be entitled to bring a direct action to the 
People’s Court. This is because the infringed rights are not vested in the company 
and therefore a derivative action would be an inappropriate means of enforcement for 
personal claims. Here, an individual shareholder can bring a direct action without 
abiding by the special requirements of derivative actions and such a case would 
naturally be treated as a normal litigation. Direct action was formally established in 
Chinese Company Law 2005 by article 153 which provides as follows: 
 
If any director or senior manager damages the shareholders’ interests by violating 
any law, administrative regulation or articles of association, the shareholders may 




As such, shareholders are allowed to bring direct actions against directors or seniors 
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managers if their rights and interests are violated. However, this article does not 
specify the circumstances in which shareholders are entitled to do so. Unlike 
common law jurisdictions where it is possible to classify the grounds for raising 
personal claims by reference to a series of cases, the basis for a Chinese 
shareholder’s personal action can only be found in statute. Since the above provision 
does not offer a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a shareholder’s 
interests or rights, it is necessary and important to classify the precise basis upon 
which such an individual may initiate a direct suit by examining company law. 
 
3.1.2 The Grounds for Raising Direct Actions 
 
3.1.2.1 Defects in Resolutions 
 
Irrespective of whether a resolution is passed by a general meeting or the board of 
directors, such a resolution has a direct and strong effect on the interests of individual 
shareholders, particularly when it is passed to the prejudice of minority shareholders. 
Company Law recognises this danger and thus grants shareholders the right to bring 
a direct suit if a resolution is defective in some way. There are two types of defects 




3.1.2.1.1 Illegal Content 
 
If the contents of a resolution adopted by a shareholders meeting, a general meeting 
or the board of directors of a company is in violation of any law or administrative 
regulation, then such a resolution is null and void. This is because such a resolution 
normally infringes upon the interests of shareholders. As Company Law and other 
                                                             
318
 Article 22. 
 
 114 
relevant laws and regulations are principally designed to protect the interests of 
shareholders and the company as a whole, a breach of these laws and regulations 
would put individual shareholders at risk and must therefore be treated as null and 
void. 
 
In practice, this type of resolution is not uncommon and can be easily determined. 
For example, in Shumin Zhou v Chongqing Jinhong Company, the shareholders 
meeting of the Jinhong Company passed a resolution that forty percent of the 
company’s assets would be distributed according to the shareholdings, and the 
remaining assets would be distributed equally among the employees. However, 
Shumin Zhou was dissatisfied with this resolution and so brought a direct action 
claiming that the contents of this resolution violated the law. The Court agreed with 
this claim and decided that the resolution was null and void for the reason that legal 
liquidation procedures should be required in advance of distribution.
319
 In the case 
of Hong Zhang v Shanghai Shenhua Company, the court ruled that a resolution 
appointing directors to the board of directors was null and void as the company law 





3.1.2.1.2 Illegal Procedures 
 
Even if the content of a resolution does not violate laws and regulations, the 
resolution may be revocable where the convening of a shareholders’ meeting, the 
board of directors of a company or the voting method used violates laws, 
administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company.
321
 The 
rationale behind this rule is to protect shareholders’ interests to some extent by 
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ensuring that the laws regarding the procedure for passing resolutions are fully 
complied with. One can imagine that the value of the general meeting or the board of 
directors would be weakened or even diminished if the procedure for calling such a 
meeting violated relevant laws and regulations, and shareholders could not obtain a 
remedy. In order to address this problem, the Company Law stipulates that 
shareholders are entitled to apply to the court for revocation within sixty days of the 
date when the resolution is passed. 
 
In reality, the above two types of defect in resolutions can cover most cases. In fact, 
if the interests of shareholders are infringed by a resolution, this is normally because 
either the content or procedures behind the resolution violate relevant laws and 
regulations. It is thus obvious that an application for null and void or revocation of a 
resolution should be founded on the precondition that the resolution has not been 
passed or adopted in accordance with the company’s constitution. However, one 
situation is neglected by the law. When a resolution does not actually exist or is 
passed only by the controlling shareholders, other shareholders cannot apply to the 
court for it to be declared null and void or revoked as this kind of “resolution” is not 
actually passed or adopted by the general meeting or the board of directors. This is 
not rare in practice in light of increasing reports of rights abuses by controlling 
shareholders. Indeed, various courts have different ways of dealing with such cases 




3.1.2.2 Infringement of the Right to Know 
 
Access to information is recognised as a basic condition for shareholders to 
participate in the management of a company. The Company Law provides that a 
shareholder shall have the right to view the articles of association, the minutes of 
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shareholders meetings, resolutions of the board of directors and board of supervisors 
and the financial and accounting reports of the company.
323
 Beside the above 
information, shareholders are also entitled to view the accounting books and reports 
of the company. However, considering the importance of these accounting books and 
reports, the company could refuse such a request if it has reason to believe that the 
shareholders has an unjust purpose. Here, shareholders are allowed to apply to the 





After such personal rights were conferred onto individual shareholders, many actions 
were initiated in the following few years. According to incomplete statistics in 
Jiangsu province, 1,060 cases of corporate litigation took place during the first year 
and a half after the new Company Law entered into force. Among these were 137 
cases relating to the infringement of the right to know, which was ranked first of a 
dozen of types of corporate actions.
325
 The defects of this right have been examined 
in the previous chapter. However, two more points regarding the procedural aspect of 
this right need to be clarified. First, it is not clear whether a common or summary 
procedure should be applied to litigation on the right to know according to this 
provision.
326
 In practice, such litigation is generally commenced as a common 
procedure, which has been criticised by many scholars.
327
 They argue that it would 
take at least nine months to conclude a case if it is conducted as a common procedure. 
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This is obviously not favoured by shareholders as justice delayed is justice denied. 
Therefore, it is strongly urged that litigation regarding infringement of the right to 
know should be conducted as a summary procedure where the action could be 
completed within three months of after placing the case on the docket. Second, it is 
also argued that shareholders should provide relevant security if they wish to bring a 
suit to protect their right to know.
328
 This is intended to balance the interests of the 
company with that of the shareholders as they could abuse their rights. However, Li 
believes that the requirement of providing security would put more burdens on 
vulnerable shareholders and thus hinder shareholders from exercising their rights.
329
 
In light of the adverse circumstances in which minority shareholders can find 
themselves, it would be sensible that shareholders are not required to provide 
security. 
 
3.1.2.3 Actions to Withdraw from the Company 
 
In listed companies, shareholders are free to buy and sell shares in the capital market 
and thus conferring a legal right in favour of shareholders of public stock companies 
to be bought out would seem to be pointless.
330
 For limited liability companies, there 
are some restrictions which shareholders have to comply with if they want to leave a 
company.
331
 Shareholders in limited liability companies cannot sell their shares and 
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leave the company without restriction. Furthermore, it would be difficult for a 
shareholder to transfer their shares when their interests are damaged by the acts of 
the company as no one would buy such shares. Therefore, the new Company Law 
confers certain rights on shareholders entitling them to force the company to buy 
them out in any one of the following situations:
332
 (1) where the company fails to 
distribute dividends for five consecutive years notwithstanding that the company has 
generated profits over these years and has satisfied the distribution requirements 
prescribed by law; (2) in the event of a merger, division or assignment of the 
company’s major assets; (3) when the business term as specified in the bylaw expires 
or other reasons for dissolution as prescribed in the bylaw occur, and the 
shareholders’ meeting makes the company exist continuously by adopting a 
resolution to modify the bylaw. Dissident shareholders may raise proceedings in the 




Any one of the above three circumstances could be cause for a shareholder to bring a 
direct action to withdraw from the company. However, the first situation is the most 
common as shareholders can fall into dispute with the company if each has different 
ideas about how to manage profits.
334
 Under the new statutory rules, if a company 
does not distribute its profits when it meets the compulsory requirements, dissident 
shareholders are given the right to raise proceedings forcing the company to buy out 
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their shares. This undoubtedly provides a precious opportunity for shareholders to 
exit the company if they are not satisfied with its decisions regarding distribution. 
However, if a shareholder wishes to continue to be a member of the company, he 
would not be willing to exercise this right as it would result in his loss of status as a 
shareholder. For that reason, it is strongly recommended that the right of a 
shareholder to bring an action to compel distribution of dividends should be 
introduced.
335
 With this right, shareholders could receive distributable dividends as 
well as continuing to be members of the company. In addition, this right could also 
produce another benefit in preventing controlling shareholders from using the failure 
to distribute dividends as a means of forcing other shareholders out of the company. 
 
3.1.2.4 Actions to Dissolve a Company 
 
If a company encounters serious difficulties and continuing to operate will definitely 
cause heavy losses to shareholder interests, shareholders representing 10% or more 
of all votes may request a court to dissolve the company if such difficulties cannot be 
solved by any other means.
336
 According to the legislation, four requirements must 
be met in order to commence such litigation: (1) a company must face serious 
difficulties during the operation of the business; (2) its continuance must inevitably 
bring considerable damage to the interests of the shareholders; (3) there must be no 
alternative method of resolving these difficulties and the dissolution of the company 
must be the only way to protect the shareholders; and (4) not every individual 
shareholder is entitled to bring such litigation as only shareholders who hold ten 
percent or more of the voting rights of all the shareholders of the company may do 
so.  
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Generally, there are two circumstances in which eligible shareholders are allowed to 
bring direct actions to dissolve a company. First, where a company is in a deadlock 
situation, shareholders may apply to the court to dissolve the company. During the 
operation of a business, a company may face numerous difficult situations. Some of 
these situations can be resolved while others cannot be dealt with owing to dissent 
among shareholders. If the dissension leads to the dysfunctioning of directors or 
officers, the company may fall into a deadlock situation. Here, its continuance would 
more or less damage the shareholders and dissolution of the company would be a 
preferable choice. Second, a direct action to dissolve a company can be brought if the 
interests of the company or its shareholders have been significantly damaged and its 
continuance has become unnecessary. If controlling shareholders or directors have 
done something harmful to a company and their behaviour has threatened the 
fundamental interests of other shareholders, then eligible shareholders can bring an 
action to dissolve the company. In practice, however, courts are not willing to 
support plaintiff shareholders’ claims for the following reasons: firstly, the 
dissolution of a company signifies that the life of a company expires and its 
termination would inevitably affect not only shareholders but also other stakeholders, 
like employees, suppliers, customers and others. These stakeholders’ interests cannot 
be neglected or at least cannot be the cost for protecting shareholders. Second, one of 
the purposes of the Company Law is to encourage business: article 1 of the Company 
Law 2005 points out that the law is enacted in order to promote the development of 
the socialist economy.
337
 The decision to dissolve a company is obviously not an 
appropriate way of promoting the economic development and thus courts are not 
inclined to accept a plaintiff’s request unless it is necessary to do so. Third, even if 
the application for dissolving a company fully meets the aforementioned four 
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requirements, courts would normally attempt to mediate such a case initially and try 
to encourage the parties to reach a settlement avoiding dissolution. On the whole, as 
Shu maintains, the institution of dissolving a company is not the best way to tackle 
deadlock problems because it challenges the principle of corporate autonomy, 
creating new unfairness to other stakeholders and generating a high cost in its 
implementation.
338
 Thus, courts should be extremely cautious in deciding whether a 
company should be dissolved. 
 
3.1.2.5 False Statements in Listed Companies 
 
If shareholders suffer losses owing to false statements made in securities trading, 
they are allowed to bring a direct action to compensate any damage. Thus, where a 
prospectus, measures for financing through issuance of corporate bonds, financial 
statement, listing report, annual report, midterm report, temporary report or any other 
information disclosed by an issuer or a listed company has any false record, 
misleading statement or major omission, creating losses for investors, the issuer or 
the listed company shall be liable to pay compensation. Any director, supervisor, 
senior manager or any other person of the issuer or the listed company directly 
responsible is subject to joint and several liability, unless they are able to prove 
exemption from any fault. Where any shareholder or actual controller of an issuer or 
a listed company is at fault, they are subject to joint and several liability for 




It should be noted that the above subjects with potential liability for investors’ losses 
have different ways of assuming their liabilities. Issuers or listed companies assume 
no-fault liability which means that they have to compensate the investors’ losses 
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regardless of whether they are at fault as long as the losses are incurred by false 
statements. Directors, supervisors and senior managers of a company assume 
presumed-fault liability which means that they are presumed to be at fault unless they 
can prove otherwise; they are thus liable for losses. Third, shareholders or actual 
controllers of the issuer or listed company are not considered to be liable for 
compensating investors unless they can be proven to be at fault for the losses. 
 
3.1.3 Distinctions between Direct Actions and Derivative Actions 
 
Direct actions have some features or forms in common with derivative actions: first, 
plaintiffs are shareholders and defendants are normally directors or senior managers; 
second, directors or senior managers have done something wrong during the 
operation of the business; third, the interests of individual shareholders are damaged 
by these wrongful acts directly or indirectly. In spite of these common features, the 
differences between these two actions are considerable and it is of great significance 
to understand these distinctions. First, Direct actions and derivative actions have their 
own respective distinctive features. This means that the fact that derivative actions 
cannot be replaced by direct actions even if the latter could provide a strong 
protective mechanism for shareholders. Second, it is helpful for shareholders to 
protect their interests in a better way by choosing the correct form of action. 
 
3.1.3.1 Different Purpose 
 
The purpose of a direct action is to safeguard an individual shareholder’s interests 
while the intention of a derivative action is to protect the interests of a company. This 
is a fundamental distinction between these two actions as a direct action is designed 
to protect the particular interests of a particular shareholder while a derivative action 
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is enacted to provide a fair opportunity for minority shareholders to protect the 
company as a whole. Although the side effect of a derivative action produces benefits 
for shareholders, its direct target is not to safeguard the shareholders themselves but 
the company. 
 
3.1.3.2 Different Qualifications of Plaintiffs 
 
Any shareholder is entitled to bring a direct action against wrongdoers as a result of 
the infringement of his personal interests. On the other hand, not every individual 
shareholder is allowed to raise a derivative action because of the duality of the right 
to bring such action. The first aspect is that shareholders are the members of the 
company and the second aspect is that they raise the proceedings on behalf of the 
company. From this point of the view, it is reasonable that not every individual 
shareholder can commence litigation as all can act on behalf of the company. 





3.1.3.3 Different Beneficiaries 
 
For a direct action, any damages recovered will go to a plaintiff shareholder instead 
of the company as it is the plaintiff shareholder himself who suffered the damage. By 
contrast, the benefits from a derivative action will accrue to a company if the 
litigation is successful. A plaintiff shareholder can only receive a pro rata share of 
the gains achieved by this action. The rationale behind this is that the right of an 
individual shareholder to bring a derivative action is derived from the company as it 
is the company itself who suffers the damage rather than the shareholders. 
Theoretically or practically, the company is the real claimant in interest while the 
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plaintiff shareholder is only the nominal claimant and thus any compensation or 
relief obtained will flow directly to the company. 
 
3.1.3.4 Different Requirements for Raising Proceedings 
 
In order to prevent shareholders from abusing their right to commence derivative 
actions, the Company Law has set out some preconditions for exercising this right. 
Without meeting these requirements, a shareholder’s application would not be 
accepted by the courts. For example, In China eligible shareholders have to make a 
request in writing to the board of supervisors to initiate a lawsuit if a director or 
senior manager has done something wrong to the company. Alternatively, the 
shareholders can demand that the board of directors raise such lawsuit if a 
supervisor’s behaviour is harmful to the company. If the request or demand is refused 
or they fail to commence such a lawsuit, shareholders are then entitled to exercise 
this right.
341
 This demand requirement is designed to balance the interests of the 
company and the shareholders. It is expected that shareholders should first make 
every effort to resolve the issues at hand within the company. By contrast, there is 
basically no precondition before an individual shareholder can bring a direct action 
against wrongdoers. As long as the personal interests of the shareholder are infringed, 
they are entitled to bring direct actions without meeting any special requirements. 
 
3.1.3.5 Different Requirements of Settlement 
 
It is not unusually for plaintiffs and defendants to reach a settlement during litigation. 
Under the background policy of maintaining a harmonised society in China, 
settlement is strongly encouraged, particularly in commercial and marital cases. In 
direct actions, both parties are free to make a settlement and courts will not interfere 
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with such a settlement as it is treated as a contract. However, settlements in 
derivative actions are not that simple. Generally, their effectiveness needs to be 
approved by the court because an action is brought by the shareholder acting on 
behalf of the company. The settlement, if reached, would affect not only the plaintiff 
shareholder himself but also other shareholders in the company. Therefore, the court 
has to step in to have a say on the settlement in order to protect other shareholders 
and the company as a whole. It is also argued that the contents of the settlement 
should be disclosed to other shareholders so that the court can hear more views 
before making any decision. 
 
3.1.3.6 Different Scope of Claim Preclusion 
 
Claim preclusion, also known as res judicata, means that a case which has been 
judged as a final decision cannot be appealed or raised again, either in the same court 
or in a different court. This legal concept is mostly intended to avoid the unnecessary 
waste of court resources and ensure an efficient judicial system.
342
 In a direct action, 
neither the plaintiff not the defendant can raise the proceeding again on the basis of 
the same facts and causes because of the res judicata principle. However, other 
shareholders whose interests have been damaged by the same defendant can 
disregard this principle and bring a direct action against that defendant without 
violating this principle. On the other hand, the res judicata in a derivative action 
could be extended to other shareholders who have not participated in the litigation. 
Here, other shareholders are not allowed to bring another derivative action if that 
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action had been previously raised regardless of the result of the suit. The reason 
behind this is that a derivative action is brought on behalf of the company and thus 
other members of the company cannot initiate such proceedings again even if the 
litigation is unsuccessful. For a direct action, the principle of res judicata is only 
confined to the parties themselves and thus it will not affect other shareholders’ 
rights to bring a personal action. 
 
3.1.4 The Connection between Direct Actions and Derivative Actions 
 
It is not difficult to conclude from the above that the most fundamental distinction 
between direct actions and derivative actions is the difference in their purpose. The 
derivative action aims to protect the interests of the company while the direct action 
is intended to safeguard the personal interests of individual shareholders. This 
difference results from the issue of who got hurt first. The consideration is that if the 
company suffers the injury first, then shareholders have to use a derivative action in 
order to protect the company. They are not entitled to bring direct actions because the 
shareholders’ loss in value is a consequence of a prior injury sustained by the 
company, regardless of how real and substantial the loss is.  
 
Normally the line between these two actions is not difficult to draw, but sometimes 
they can be mingled in practice. Consider the following example: Company A was 
planning to sell a property below the market price to its controlling shareholder and 
has signed the contract. According to the Company Law 2005, this transaction has to 
be approved in the general meeting in order to be effective. Thus the company 
convenes a general meeting and passes a resolution to authorise that transaction. 
However, the controlling shareholder also participated in the meeting and voted in 
this matter which violates the articles of association. Under this circumstance, 
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shareholders are entitled to bring a derivative action as the transaction apparently 
injures the interests of the company. At the same time, shareholders are also allowed 
to bring a direct action because the procedure for convening the general meeting has 
violated the articles of association. In such a situation, the Company Law does not 
provide a solution. Theoretically, shareholders might choose either a direct action or 
a derivative action to safeguard their interests while in practice they would prefer 
direct actions considering the unfeasibility of rules regarding derivative actions in 
China. 
 
In the US, direct actions and derivative actions can also overlap. A typical example is 
where a plaintiff shareholder alleges that his voting rights were contravened and that 
the underlying transaction on which the shareholder voted was harmful to the 
company. Here, the shareholder is allowed to seek an injunction in a direct action or 
raise a derivative suit for seeking monetary recovery. The American Law Institute 
adopted the majority rule that a shareholder can commence and maintain both actions 
simultaneously.
343
 This means that a shareholder is not forced to choose either action 
and the dismissal of the derivative action would therefore not bar the continued direct 
action. Unfortunately, the issue of whether compensation in one action should be 
offset in any way against the other is not addressed by the ALI.  
 
A derivative action could also be characterised as a direct action in closely held 
corporations in the US. This policy originated from the Donahue case in which the 
court decided that a closely held corporation can be treated as essentially an 
incorporated partnership and thus a minority shareholder could sue individually even 
when the action alleges a corporate injury.
344
 The rationale behind this is that both 
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closely held corporations and partnerships are virtually interchangeable business 
forms which make the difference of their legal treatment unnecessary. Furthermore, 
the procedural requirements of derivative actions, such as the demand requirement, 
are pointless for the persons who are effectively incorporated partners. Last but not 
least, injury to the corporation cannot be distinguished from injury to the 
shareholders in the context of a closely held corporation with only a handful of 
shareholders. On the other hand, there is a counter-argument that the consequence of 
characterizing an action as direct will be unfair to corporate creditors as the 
compensation recovered from the derivative action goes to the company which 
would benefit the creditors. The ALI recognized these two arguments and thus took a 
compromise position that the court has discretion to treat a derivative action as a 
direct action if it finds that to do so will not (1) unfairly expose the corporation or the 
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (2) materially prejudice the interests of 
creditors of the corporation, or (3) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery 
among all interested persons. Although this approach is criticized for not providing 
sufficient guidance for the courts about when to override the direct/derivative 
distinction and not being sufficiently sensitive to the way the distinction protects the 
deal among shareholders,
345
 it is widely accepted that the ALI approach is a better 
way to deal with the relation between derivative and direct actions in the context of 
the closely held corporations. 
 
In the UK, a personal claim can be joined in the same proceedings as a derivative 
claim.
346
 The CPR 7.3 permits that a claimant to use a single form to start all claims 
which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings.
347
 However, 
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plaintiff shareholder damages cannot be recovered from the defendants if such losses 
merely reflect losses suffered by the company. This so-called no reflective loss is 
exemplified by the case of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No 2) in which the Court of Appeal stated:  
 
[A Shareholder] cannot . . . recover damages merely because the company in which 
he is interested has suffered damages. He cannot recover a sum equal to the 
diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to the likely diminution in 
dividend, because such a ‘loss’ is merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the 
company. The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. His only loss is through 
the company, in the diminution in the value of the net assets of the company, in which 




A shareholder cannot recover a loss which is simply a reflection of the company’s 
loss even if the shareholder’s cause of action is independent of the company’s.
349
 
This principle is justified for several reasons. First, it can prevent the defendant from 
paying double compensation. It would be unfair for the defendant to pay both the 
company and the plaintiff if he fails to win the litigation without this principle. 
Secondly, the compensation that must go to the company first would not prejudice 
the interests of the company’s creditors. Thirdly, the right to distribute a company’s 
assets is normally entrusted by the articles to the board and not to individual 
shareholders. This principle can be supported by the no reflective loss principle as 
both of these principles reflect the centralised management of the company through 
the board.
350
 On the other hand, some argue that preventing double pay could be 
avoided simply by paying the shareholder first instead of the company. The 
company’s creditors would not be prejudiced if the company has distributable assets. 
Furthermore, it is not fair for shareholders if the company may not recover its loss 
and thus their own loss is not made good through the company.
351
 It is highly unfair 
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350
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for individual shareholders if the defendant’s act rendered the company incapable of 
enforcing its claim. This point has been recognized in Giles v Rhind in which the 
Court of Appeal refused to apply the no reflective loss principle because the 





From the above discussion, it seems that China’s rule in addressing the relation 
between direct action and derivative action is similar to the no reflective loss 
principle in the UK. As mentioned above, a Chinese shareholder has to choose either 
a direct action or a derivative action in the situation where both of these actions are 
mingled. In this sense, the law supports the idea that defendants do not need to make 
double compensation as a result of their wrongful acts. In view of the current 
unfeasible rules of derivative action system, shareholders would prefer to bring direct 
actions to safeguard their interests. However, this might harm a company’s creditors 
as the recovery could go to a company if a derivative action is initiated by 
shareholders. This is particularly so when a company is in financial difficulty and its 
asset may not sufficient enough to pay creditors. As a consequence, the compromised 
approach which ALI adopted in treating a derivative action as a direct action can be 
borrowed. For example, the law can stipulates that the court has discretion to treat a 
direct action as a derivative action if it finds that not to do so will (1) unfairly expose 
the company or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (2) materially prejudice 
the interests of creditors of the company, or (3) interfere with a fair distribution of the 
recovery among all interested persons. However, this rule undoubtedly needs to be 
examined in practice and the detailed guidance of this rule could be provided during 
the application of this rule. 
 
                                                             
352





An individual shareholder is entitled to bring a direct action under certain 
circumstances, for example, when there are some defects in resolution. This right 
vested in shareholders is one of the means to safeguard the interests of minority 
shareholders. From this perspective, it seems that derivative action may play a less 
important role in protecting minority shareholders if a direct action system is 
effective. However, these two mechanisms have their own distinctive aspects. For 
example, the purpose is different as a direct action aims to safeguard individual 
shareholders’ interests while the intention of a derivative action is to protect the 
interests of a company. As such, even if direct action institution is effective in 
protecting shareholders’ interests, it does not mean that derivative action could be 
replaced as it still has a key role to play. Last, although direct action and derivative 
action have differences in many aspects, they may be mingled in certain situations.  
 
3.2 Derivative Actions in China Ⅰ 
 
3.2.1 The Background to the Chinese Company Law 
 
Before examining the detailed rule of derivative action, it is necessary to briefly 
introduce the background of the Chinese company law. The current incarnation of 
China’s Company Law was first enacted in 1993 and revised in 2005. The history of 
China’s Company Law is much shorter than the history of China as a country and it 
is therefore unavoidable that this legislation has many drawbacks. However, the first 
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company law to be introduced in China traces its origins back to the Qing 
government (the Qing Dynasty). Although these old company laws were completely 
abolished after the Communist Party took power and established a new China (the 
People’s Republic of China), they are nonetheless useful in considering the 
background to China’s legislation as the past might tell the future. 
 
3.2.1.1 The History of Chinese Company Law before the Establishment 
of the PRC 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Qing Dynasty faced many pressures 
from within and without China: the people under the Dynasty’s rule demanded rights 
and opportunities to forge a better life and western countries were demanding that the 
government open up the market. Within this context, the first Company Law (Gongsi 
Lv) was drafted by the Imperial Law Codification Commission in 1904 and entered 
into force the same year. This legislation aimed to create a better environment for 
businesses to flourish and was based on Japanese and English company law, though 
in much abbreviated form.
353
 The rationales behind this legislation were various but 
three main objectives have been identified. The first is that the Qing Dynasty wanted 
to use commercial law, particularly company law, as a tool to promote the 
competitive edge of its domestic enterprises and economic development.
354
 The 
second objective was to cater for the needs of the western countries as China’s lack 
of commercial law had become a concern and even an obstacle for westerners 
seeking to conduct business in China.
355
 The third aim was to strengthen the power 
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of central government to control local authorities. These three objectives were never 
achieved as the new law was not given enough time to be implemented owing to the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. 
 
The fall of the Qing and the rise of the early-republic (Beiyang) government afforded 
a great opportunity to revise China’s company law substantially and significantly. 
However, its company law was only partly revised, and entered into force in 1914. 
This so-called Ordinance Concerning Commercial Associations (Gongsi Tiaoli) has 
more articles than the first Law and has thus been regarded as laying the foundations 




In 1927, the central government of the Republic of China was established and the 
legislative process was accelerated in order to control the whole country effectively. 
Under this background, the codification of previous legislation was promoted and 
promulgated. The Company Law, as one of the particularly important commercial 
laws, was included in this process and codified in 1929. Although this new Company 
Law (Gongsi Fa) was also based on the previous Ordinance Concerning Commercial 
Associations (Gongsi Tiaoli), 90 of its 233 provisions were modified from its 
predecessor and the concept of ‘restricting private capital’ (Jiezhi Ziben) so as to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders was introduced for the first time.
357
 
This new Company Law was widely accepted as a true modern form of company law 
in Chinese history. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
relinquish its extraterritorial privileges “when she is satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the 
arrangement for their administration, warrant her doing so’ ( T. Chien, The Government and Politics of 
China (Harvard University Press 1950); See also W. C. Kirby, ‘China Unincorporated: Company Law 
and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China’ (1995) 54 The Journal of Asian Studies 43-63. 
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Company Law’ (2005) 2 Huadong Zhengfa Xueyuan Xuebao [The Journal of Southeast University of 
Political Science and Law] 72-78. 
357
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After the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), China witnessed a significant 
change not only politically but also in its economic structure. Accordingly, many 
laws had to be amended or abolished to serve the government of these times. The 
Company Law (Gongsi Fa) was substantially revised in 1946 in order to encourage 
private corporations and attract foreign investments. It was in this Company Law that 
limited liability companies (Youxian Zeren Gongsi) were introduced for the first time 
and foreign companies were regulated and legislated for in a separate chapter. It was 
perceived that this Company Law was influenced significantly by the United States 
and thus many rules and regulations were borrowed from the US partly owing to the 
close relationship between the Chinese government (Nanjing Guomin Zhengfu) and 
the US. 
 
3.2.1.2 The Absence of Chinese Company Law before 1993 
 
The victory of the Communist Party and the new establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China led to the declaration that all laws be eliminated because “the 
legal premise of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China is that all the 
laws which were enacted by the Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang) should be smashed 
completely without any hesitation”.
358
 As a consequence, the Company Law was 
entirely abolished and other forms of regulation were formulated in order to fill the 
gap, as many private companies were still registered at that time.
359
 The Interim 
Regulations on Private Enterprises (Siying qiye zhanxing tiaoli) were formulated and 
implemented to nationalize those private enterprises. After the socialist 
transformation, the economy was mainly occupied by national and collective 
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companies which left no room for private enterprise. Thereafter, the planned 
economy was established and private enterprises or foreign companies were basically 
eliminated. The death of Chairman Mao, however, caused a significant change in 
China’s political and economic system. The economic reform and open policy were 
initiated leading to many private and foreign companies being revived and gradually 
established which called for regulation and legislation. The absence of commercial 
law in China obviously constituted a significant obstacle to promoting economic 
development and therefore efforts were made to put trade and commercial 
transactions within the framework of legislation. The first attempt in this regard was 
to regulate foreign companies owing to increasing foreign investment. The Law of 
the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo zhongwai hezi jingying qiyefa) was first enacted in 1979 and the process 
to regulate Chinese private companies was followed by the General Principles of 
Civil Law (Minfa tongze). Another two important legislative documents regarding 
foreign investment were published, occasioning the establishment of new types of 
company: the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises 
(zhonghuarenmingongheguo Waizi Qiyefa) in 1986 and the Sino-foreign Cooperative 
Joint Venture Law (zhongwai hezuojingying qiyefa) in 1988, respectively. These 
three laws, which generally governed foreign companies, laid the essential 
foundations for the enactment of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsifa) in 1993.  
 
3.2.1.3 The Adoption of the Chinese Company Law 
 
A decade after the implementation of the reform and opening policy, the disparate 
documents, designed to regulate business and companies could not meet the new 
requirements of economic and social development.
360
 Therefore, the Company Law 
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was adopted on 29 December 1993 and entered into force on 1 July 1994 for the first 
time since the establishment of People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as 
the Company Law 1993). However, the primary purpose of the Company law 1993 
was to serve the reform of SOEs, not to promote all the different types of 
Company.
361
 Many articles were enacted embodying the characteristics of a socialist 
economy, which today seem absurd.
362
 Although it cannot be denied that the law 
played an important role in reforming SOEs,
363
 the Company Law 1993 has been 
criticised for becoming an obstacle to accelerating economic development. This is for 
the following reasons: first of all, it was criticised that many provisions were 
outdated and thus fell behind practice as private companies were increasingly 
emerging and the path of SOE reform was changed.
364
 Furthermore, the provisions 
stipulated in the Company Law 1993 barely provided protections for minority 
shareholders and thus the majority shareholders and directors had strong incentives 
and the ability to abuse their powers. Third, it was very difficult to establish and 
operate a company as there were many restrictions under this law.
365
 It is argued 
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regulations. For example, “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Siying Qiye Zanxing Tiaoli” [The PRC’s 
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2007) 244. 
364
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factors such as insufficient experience and changeable circumstances during the 




Recognising that the law was poorly drafted, the Company Law 1993 was revised in 
1999 and 2004, respectively. However, these two amendments were very minor and 
thus some major issues were left unresolved. In 2005, the Company Law was again 
amended, and this time its contents were significantly and substantially changed 
(hereinafter referred to as the Company Law 2005). Although there are still many 
defects in this legislation, it is generally believed that Company Law 2005 has made 
some progress in the following respects: first, it makes it much easier and more 
convenient to set up a company as the requirements of establishing a company are 
much relaxed.
367
 Secondly, it provides stronger protections for minority shareholders 
as the rights conferred onto shareholders have been strengthened and made more 
actionable and the duties directors owe to the company are also established.
368
 
Thirdly, it reduces government intervention and encourages a company’s 
autonomy.
369
 Fourthly, it stipulates for the very first time that a company should bear 
some social responsibility during business operations.
370
 Fifth, the interests of 
creditors or third parties with whom a company contracts are also emphasized and 
the corporate veil can now be pierced under given conditions.
371
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percent of the total registered capital. See article 24. 
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 edn, Hong kong University Press 2010) 3. 
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3.2.1.4 Implications of the legislative process of Chinese Company Law 
 
It may initially seem useless to give an introduction about the history of Chinese 
Company Law since such outdated legislation has no impact on modern society. 
However, there are some implications associated with this legislative process, which 
are still valuable for corporate law reformers.  
 
3.2.1.4.1 How Company Law Lies at the Frontier of Reforms at Different 
Stages 
 
The substantial alteration of the legal system in the late Qing Dynasty began after the 
enactment of the Company Law (Gongsi Lv) in order to accommodate the increasing 
pressures of that time. The establishment of company law made the Qing Dynasty 
aware that the only way to save and revive the nation was to develop the economy 
and enter the path of industrialization. Company law, as one of the main commercial 
laws regulating various transactions, is extremely important in promoting economic 
development and thus ought to be at the frontline of reforms. Even after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, company law still played a key role 
in enhancing economic reform. For instance, the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (Zhonghuarenmingongheguo 
Zhongwaihezijingying Qiyefa) was enacted to attract foreign investment, introduce 
foreign advanced technology and attempted to break the ice of the planned-market. 
After the Tiananmen Square, the left wing in the Communist Party was strongly 
against the economic reform and declared that the planned-market should be 
maintained and private enterprises be controlled by the government. It was against 
                                                                                                                                                                            
debts by abusing the independent status of legal person or the shareholder’s limited liabilities, if it 
seriously injures the interests of any creditor, it shall bear several and joint liabilities for the debts of 
the company.(translated from Beida Fabao Website with minor amendments) 
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this background that the real sense of Company Law 1993 was endowed to 
encourage private enterprises and boost the confidence of those doubtful about the 
market economy. Furthermore, China’s entry into WTO in 2001 also required 
significant legal alteration in almost every aspect of economics and Company Law 
2005 was thus necessary in order to cater for this reform. 
 
3.2.1.4.2 Most Rules of Chinese Company Law Transplanted from 
Western Countries 
 
It is widely accepted that the traditional China did not have a mature commercial law 
until the late Qing Dynasty. The collapse of the old legal system and the 
establishment of brand new legal institutions undoubtedly required transplants from 
other jurisdictions. The first Company Law (Gongsi Lv) was basically borrowed 
from English and Japanese law as noted above, though its implementation was not 
successful partly owing to the deteriorating social and economic environment. 
Subsequent company laws were revised on the basis of this document and thus many 
rules have western characteristics, particularly from the US, UK and Germany. It is 
argued that the reason behind the failure of the old company laws (1904-1946) could 
be that China has blindly adopted many rules from western countries without paying 
attention to Chinese traditional culture.
372
 It is undeniable that the implementation of 
those old company laws was unsatisfactory. However, one cannot expect that the 
company law would have a great positive impact on economic development in light 
of the changeable social conditions during that period. Many reasons, such as the 
social instability, corruption, the privilege of bureaucratic corporations and war 
might well account for this unsatisfactory development.
373
 Even when it was 
possible for China to create its own systems by using local resources during the 
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revision of Chinese Company Law in 2005, this did not mean that it was unnecessary 
to introduce and adopt rules and institutions from other countries.
 374
 In fact, legal 
transplant remains necessary and inevitable in China. One of the rationales for this is 
that it is much easier to borrow rules that have been used for a long time in other 
countries than create rules without having tested them first. The increasing 
development of globalisation which requires the convergence of corporate law also 




3.2.1.4.3 Innovation was never absent 
 
Admittedly, most of the rules in the different stages of China’s company law were 
transplanted from other jurisdictions because of a lack of mature commercial law and 
transaction practices in China. However, innovation was never absent each time 
company law was amended. The fist Company Law (Gongsi Lv 1904) mixed 
Japanese and English law, though this was not as successful as expected. The 
Company Law in 1929 (Gongsi Fa) entered into force as a slip law rather than as 
part of commercial law.
376
 The subsequent Company Law (Gongsi Fa 1946), based 
on the previous law, made several innovations: the terms company and foreign 
company were clearly defined for the first time; penal provisions were classified into 
related provisions so that the consequences of violation could be clearly understood; 
and the direct intervention of government in corporations was decreased and thus 
companies had more power to conduct business. Although this kind of innovation 
was quite common in western countries, it marked significant progress for China 
considering the historical limitations during that period. Even now, innovation on the 
basis of transplantations continues. 
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3.2.2 The Development of Derivative Actions in China 
 
Having introduced the historical development of Chinese company law, it is now 
necessary to examine derivative actions in China. As mentioned above, the first 
Chinese Company Law was enacted in 1904; though derivative actions were not 
introduced at that time. This is understandable considering China’s insufficient 
experience of legislating company law and the changeable social environment. The 
absence of derivative actions continued as all laws and regulations were completely 
eradicated after the establishment of People’s Republic of China. The Communist 
government did not enact any commercial law to fill the gap as the target of the 
economy was to eliminate private ownership and implement the policy of state 
ownership. The market-oriented economy was deemed to be a capitalist economy 
and should thus be replaced by the planned economy. In light of this, it was 
impossible to confer upon shareholders the right to bring derivative actions against 
directors as there was only one shareholder in the company (the State). Although the 
implementation of the reform and opening policy in 1978 revived the private 
economy, derivative actions remained beyond the sight of legislators. Only after the 
enactment of Company Law 1993 did derivative actions and relevant cases in 
practice attract the attention of legislators and scholars. Hereafter, the development 
of derivative action in China can be divided into two stages: development prior to 
Company Law 2005 and development after this legislation. 
 
3.2.2.1 The Development of Derivative Actions prior to Company Law 
2005 
 




Company Law 1993 contained several protective mechanisms for shareholders.
377
 
For example, Article 63 stipulates that directors, supervisors or managers are liable to 
pay compensation for damage resulting from their violation of provisions under the 
law, administrative regulations and the company’s articles of association. Although 
these provisions provided a legal basis for shareholders to commence litigation 
against wrongdoers, it failed to clearly establish whether shareholders are allowed to 
bring derivative actions if a company is not willing to sue or is prevented from 
bringing such litigation. It is even argued that these mechanisms have never been 




In addition to the above, one article is regarded as the “single most important” legal 
provision for shareholders in the Company Law 1993.
379
 Thus, article 111 provides: 
     
If the resolutions of a meeting of shareholders or the board of directors have violated 
the law, administrative regulations or infringed shareholders’ legal rights and 
interests, the shareholders concerned have the right to sue at the people’s courts, to 




Although this article clearly establishes that an individual shareholder has the right to 
bring an action against wrongdoers in certain circumstances, it does not indicate that 
these actions could be brought as derivative actions. This has created contention. 
Some maintain that this article provides a legal basis for shareholders to bring a 
derivative action. Kong, presently a senior judge of the Supreme People’s Court, 
argues that article 111 confers upon shareholders a right to bring a derivative action, 
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stating that this was the intention of this article when it was enacted.
381
 Zhao shares 
this view, though justifies is using the different reasoning that this provision can be 




However, these arguments cannot be sustained for the following reasons: 
 
First, according to the strict meaning of this article, shareholders can only raise an 
action when resolutions infringe upon their legal rights and interests. This is clearly 
different from derivative action which is founded on an infringement of company 
interests. A broad interpretation is not consistent with the spirit and the principle of 
Company Law 1993 and it would also cause confusion as derivative suits are still in 
the embryonic stages in China. 
 
Secondly, the remedy available to shareholders under this article is to stop such acts, 
similar in western systems to an injunction. It thus seems that plaintiff shareholders 
could not be compensated even if they are successful in the litigation. Without such 
proper incentive, shareholders would be strongly discouraged to bring such actions 




Third, it is not clear whether the action brought under this provision should be based 
on the conditions of both a violation of laws or regulations and an infringement upon 
shareholders’ right. Zhang suggests that two meanings could be possible and 
reasonable as these two phrases (violation and infringement) are separated only by a 
comma: violation and infringement are two requirements that need to be satisfied at 
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the same time to justify a shareholder’s action; or they are two independent and 
separate conditions of which each one may be sufficient to bring such an action.
384
 
The prevailing view, however, is that both requirements should be met. According to 
this view, shareholders are not entitled to bring an action if their interests are not 
harmed while the resolutions violate the laws or regulations. For the same reason, 
they are still not allowed to apply for injunctions even if their rights are infringed by 





Last, even if this article did provide a legal basis for derivative action, it does not 
specify any detailed procedure or guidance for how to bring such an action. For 
example, it fails to set out the rules of locus standi, demand requirement or security 
for expenses. Even if article 111 could be interpreted in a variety of ways – one of 
them being that it confers the right to raise derivative actions on shareholders - it is 
rendered impractical and meaningless in its failure to provide clear guidance and 
procedures. Consequently, it can only be characterized as “a cryptic and potentially 




3.2.2.1.2 Rules and Judicial Interpretation 
 
A lack of clear legislation on shareholder derivative actions obviously failed to 
accommodate practical needs as cases of derivative actions occurred from time to 
time in practice. In consequence, various departments and the courts have had to 
issue relevant regulations or judicial interpretations in order to resolve resultant 
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 X. Zhang, ‘Practical Demands to Update the Company Law’ (1998) 28 Hong Kong Law Review 
252. 
385
 The US adopted a different rule under this situation. It has been long established that an 
inequitable action infringing upon shareholder franchises, though legally permissible, will not be 
tolerated by the Courts. See Schnell v Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437. (Del.1971) 
386
 L. S. Liu, ‘Chinese Characteristics Compared: A Legal and Policy Perspective of Corporate 
Finance and Governance in Taiwan and China’ Working Paper 2001, available at 





The first document of this kind was issued by the Supreme People’s Court (hereafter 
SPC) on 4 November 1994. In the judicial interpretation relating to the Reply of the 
Supreme People’s Court concerning in whose name the Chinese party of a 
Sino-Foreign equity joint-venture company should file a suit with the People’s court 
where the joint-venture company has external economic contract disputes, and the 
controlling foreign party of the joint-venture company has interests with the seller,
387
 
the SPC for the first time recognised that shareholders were entitled to bring an 
action where a company was not able to do so. Although the terminology of 
“derivative action” was not used in that document, it can be inferred from this 
judicial interpretation that the SPC accepted the idea of derivative actions.
388
  
Unfortunately, this judicial interpretation had only a limited impact on legislation and 
practice owing to the following factors: first, it was regarded that the right conferred 
on shareholders to file a suit only applied to the same situation as the above case, 
namely, those situations where the interests of Sino-foreign joint-venture enterprise 
and the Chinese Party had been injured.
389
 In other situations, shareholders were 
prevented from bringing such litigations.
390
 Secondly, it failed to specify the 
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 This judicial interpretation was based on a case heard by the High People’s Court of Jiangsu 
province. In this case, Zhangjiagang Dacron Factory (the Chinese Party) and Hong Kong jixiong Co., 
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derivatively as there was no rule or case of derivative actions at that time. Therefore, the High 
People’s Court of Jiangsu reported this case to the SPC. 
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 In its reply, the SPC acknowledged that the Chinese Party would have been entitled to bring an 
action when the board of the JVC was not able to do so and the court should have accepted it where 
there had been no arbitration clauses in the joint-venture contract and the sales contract. 
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 X. Li, A Comparative Study of Shareholders’ Derivative Actions (Kluwer Law International 2007) 
269. 
390
 That can explain why the case of Zhongtian v. Bichun, which happened after the Zhangjiagang 
case, was rejected as it was the interests of the joint-venture enterprise and the foreign party rather 
than the Chinese party that had been injured in this case. See X. Li, A Comparative Study of 
Shareholders’ Derivative Actions (Kluwer Law International 2007) 269. 
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necessary substantive and procedural requirements or conditions of such an action.
391
 
Without the detailed rules, it was no wonder that the subsequent cases were dealt 
with in various ways. Thirdly, this case was not actually resolved within the court 
due to the existence of arbitrary clauses in the contract as the Reply clearly pointed 
out that the dispute should be submitted to the arbitrators rather than the court. 
 
The next step attempting to furnish shareholders with the ability to bring a derivative 
action was article 4 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Corporations 
(the “Code”), promulgated in January 2002.
392
 This article states that shareholders 
have the right to protect their interests by means of litigation and are also entitled to 
demand a company to bring an action for damages occasioned by directors, or 
supervisors if they have violated laws, administrative regulations or company’s 
articles of association. Some therefore argue that article 4 expressly confers on 
shareholders the right to initiate derivative actions for the first time in China.
393
 
Nevertheless, the Code has weak authority and its enforcement was limited as it was 
neither a formal law nor a judicial interpretation.
394
 In addition, the Code failed to 
provide details pursuant to which individual shareholders could enforce their rights 
to file suits in the courts. This lack of detailed rules, as Xuan and Li indicate, may 
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 S. Zhao, ‘Zhongri Gongsifa Shang Gudong Susong Zhidu Bijiao Yanjiu’ [ A Comparative Study of 
Shareholder Suits in Chinese and Japanese Corporate laws] In L. Li (eds.), Zhongri Qiye Falu Zhidu 
Bijiao [The Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Enterprise Legal Systems] (China Law Press 1998)  
253. 
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 The full text of article 4 reads: Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights 
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company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law.(translated from Beida Fabao Website 
with minor amendments) 
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 W. Xuan and C. Li, ‘Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze Ruogan Wenti Pingxi' [Comments on Several 
Issues in the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Corporations] (2002) 7 Shangshi Gongsi 
[Listed Company]. 
394
 Clarke concluded in his article that the Code is not mandatory for listed companies in China. See 
D. C. Clarke, ‘Duli Dongshi yu Zhongguo Gongsi Zhili’ [The Independent Director and Chinese 
Corporate Governance] (2003) 2 Fada Pinglun [Chinese University of Politics and law Review] 110 
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result in the courts’ reluctance or even hostility to accept shareholder derivative 




During the National Court’s Civil and Commercial Trials Working Conference held 
in Shanghai in 2002, Guoguang Li, the vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court, 
stated that derivative actions should be accepted and that a draft judicial 
interpretation of Company Law 1993 would confer such a right on shareholders to 
bring actions against managers or controlling shareholders on behalf of the company. 
Nevertheless, the courts have found that these remarks were inadequate in providing 
a legal basis for accepting derivative action as they were called only “for 
references”.
396
 In light of this, several high-level People’s Courts issued their 
respective opinions describing the detailed implementation of derivative actions 









 Of these opinions, the Shanghai Opinion was regarded as a very specific 
and operational one. For example, it confirms that controlling shareholders and third 
parties could be potential defendants as well as the directors and managers; it 
authorises the courts to determine whether a company has been harmed or whether 
any good faith is available to the defendants; the settlement would be prohibited if it 
is against the interests of minority shareholders in the company; it also empowers the 
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Yijian(Yi)[Opinions on Adjudicating Cases Regarding Company Suits(No.1)] (June 2003), art5. 
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 Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan (the High People’s Court of Beijing), guanyu Shenli Gongsi 
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courts to annul offending transactions.
401
 These various opinions undoubtedly 
demonstrated the fact that the local-level courts were willing to accept, or were at 




In November 2003, the SPC published the Draft Regulations on Certain Issues 
Relating to Trial of Corporate Dispute Cases (PartⅠ) to solicit public comments.403 
There were five articles in this Draft which are relevant to derivative actions. Article 
43 clearly states the nature of derivative actions and two types of defendants have 
also been identified. Article 44 sets out some standing requirements for commencing 
derivative actions. Article 45 provides that the demand requirements should be 
satisfied before initiating the lawsuits. Article 46 outlines the role of other 
participants in derivative actions, such as the injured company and other shareholders 
who also filed the suits. Article 47 touched upon the possibility of abusing this 
litigation right. However, as it was expected that Chinese Company Law would soon 




The absent legislation of derivative actions before the Company Law 2005 indicated 
that the protective mechanisms for shareholders were very weak. Hence, 
shareholders would encounter many difficulties in pursuing to safeguard their rights 
and interests. Nevertheless, this phenomenon may be explained if we trace back to 
the purpose of the enactment of the Company Law 1993. It was recognised that the 
Company Law 1993 was adopted to advance the reform of SOEs instead of 
providing better environment for the investors. Therefore, the protections for the 
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shareholders have to be subordinated to this purpose, and the absence of many 
effective measures - including derivative actions, were not a surprise. The latter 
legislation of Securities Law 1998 also had a similar purpose and thus it has 
insufficient protective measures for the shareholders, too. Besides these two statutory 
rules, some other rules and judicial interpretations still did not provide legal basis for 
derivative actions, partly due to their restrictive applications, and partly owing to 
their weak enforcements or non-compulsory legal force. Although derivative actions 
were clearly expressed in the Opinions published by various High-Level People’s 
Courts, they were somewhat the causes of different results of the similar derivative 
actions cases because of their inconsistent and unsystematic rules. 
 
3.2.2.2 Judicial Application of Derivative Actions in Practice: Case 
Studies 
 
3.2.2.2.1 Research Methodology 
 
It is essential to explain how the cases that form the basis for this study were 
collected. This is because it is not a mandatory requirement for Chinese courts to 
publish all the cases they regularly handle. However, in order to ensure accurate and 
uniform implementation, judges must check online case summaries or news reports. 
As such, a court may select and publish some of its decisions. 
 
This research was conducted using an authoritative electronic database of Chinese 
law, namely Beida Fabao, which provides published verdicts. In order to collect all 
possible cases, this research also located derivative actions on some other websites, 
for example, news websites reporting derivative actions that were not included in the 
database (Beida Fabao). The cases that this research has collected may not represent 
all the cases that have arisen in the past years. This is owing to the following reasons: 
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first, some cases may never be publicly reported in newspapers or included in the 
database for a variety of reasons. They are therefore impossible to collect. Second, 
although this database is the best available database to conduct this empirical 
research, it cannot be denied its accuracy is affected by the fact that some cases are 
not included and others are slow to be updated. Third, many cases may be resolved 
privately without going to the courts and thus such cases would not be known to 
others. 
 
3.2.2.2.2 Overview of Derivative Actions Cases prior to the Company 
Law 2005 
 
Despite the absence of a clear statutory basis for derivative actions, such cases have 
nevertheless proceeded in the courts from time to time before the entry into force of 
Company Law 2005. Some of these cases were accepted; some were refused. This 
part aims to summarise and evaluate these cases. After a comprehensive search of the 
available websites on which cases and news reports of derivative actions are 
published, 23 cases were collected. Of these, 4 cases were not accepted by the courts 
for the reason that the plaintiff shareholders were not eligible to bring an action 
against the wrongdoers on behalf of the companies; 16 cases were accepted with 
various different reasons for their acceptance; 2 cases were finally settled and at the 
time of writing it is unclear whether one case will be accepted or rejected as the 




Derivative action cases prior to Company Law 2005 
Results Number  Percentage 
Refuse 4 17% 
Accept 16 70% 
                                                             
404
 The result of this case has not yet been published online. This is not unusual as the publication of 
court judgements is not compulsory in China. 
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Settle 2 9% 
Unknown  1 4% 
 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Analysis of the Refused Cases 
 
Considering the absence of a legal basis for derivative actions, it seems surprising at 
first glance that only 4 cases were refused, compared to 16 accepted cases. Several 
factors might account for this phenomenon: first, shareholders were not familiar with 
the protective mechanism of derivative action at the beginning of 1990s, and thus 
they would not attempt to use it to protect their interests. Second, even if they had 
gained some knowledge of derivative actions owing to the increasing awareness of 
rights and protection, they would be advised not to bring such litigation because of 
the unclear result and the absence of statutory derivative actions. Third, many 
shareholders would prefer to bring direct actions rather than derivative actions where 
the interests of individual shareholders and the corporations are both infringed. 
Fourth, those cases accepted by the courts mostly occurred after the issuance of 
various high-level People’s Court’ Opinions. Lastly, it is believed that many 
unaccepted cases were not posted online by the courts partly because the publication 
of those cases might embarrass the courts. That this latter point is true is indicated by 
the fact that four denied cases were found in news reports rather than on the judicial 
authority’s website. However, it is both unnecessary and impossible for news 
agencies to report every unaccepted derivative action. On the other hand, given the 
importance of protecting shareholder and investor interests, it is conceivable that 
successful derivative actions would attract public attention. In consequence, it is 
un-surprising to see that only a few reported cases appear to have been rejected by 




It is also notable that all four unsuccessful cases were rejected for essentially the 
same reason: that the plaintiff shareholders were not eligible or entitled to bring 
derivative actions. The Yueqin case was rejected because the Haile Company itself 
was able to bring an action against the wrongdoers and thus the plaintiff shareholder, 
Yueqin, lacked standing to bring such litigation.
405
 In the Honguang Shiye case, the 
judge ruled that “there is no necessary cause and effect relationship between the 
losses of the plaintiff shareholder and the misbehaviours of the accused persons”, and 
that the suit should thus be rejected.
406
 In the Chengdu Lida case, the plaintiff 
shareholder was found to be unqualified to bring a derivative action as part of his 
complaints that sought to claim for his own losses.
407
 The court went further in 
pointing out in the Sanjiu case that derivative actions would not be accepted unless 
plaintiff shareholders obtained the authorization of all the shareholders to bring such 
a suit. The Sanjiu case can be considered typical owing to its high profile and 
significant influence. It will thus be explored at length as an example of a rejected 
derivative action case. 
 
3.2.2.2.3.1 Refused Case Study: Facts of Sanjiu408 
 
Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. was one of the largest listed companies 
in China at the time of litigation. In September 2001, it was found that the company 
had allowed its majority shareholders and other affiliated parties to misappropriate 
RMB 2.5 billion in corporate funds, in violation of laws and regulations applicable to 
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 Yueqin v Rajesh Prabhakar (Shanghai Municipal Intermediate People’s Court (2003) Lu erzhong 
min wu(shang) chuzi No.100.) 
406
 The detail of Honguang Shiye case is available at: 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20010906/104276.html> (last visited 29 April 2014). 
407
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 For the full detail of this case, please see Wang Lu, Zhengquan Shichang You Chu Diyi 
An---Gudong Daibiao Gongsi Zhuanggao Dongshizhang [Another First in Stock 
Market---Shareholder Sues Chairman on Behalf of the Corporation], Shanghai Zhengquan Bao 





 This unpublished information was discovered by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (hereafter CSRC), which consequently fined Sanjiu 
Company and other related parties for the misappropriation. On 8 April 2003, Shao, 
an individual shareholder of Sanjiu Company, brought a derivative action against 
Xinxian Zhan, the chairman at that time. Three claims were lodged: (1) that Zhan 
should pay RMB 10,000 to Sanjiu Company to compensate it for the damage caused 
by the misappropriation; (2) that Zhan should also pay RMB 10,000 to Sanjiu 
Company as a compensation for the mismanagement that resulted in the CSRC fine 
for disclosure irregularities; and (3) that Zhan should pay the filing fees of the 
litigation. 
 
On 14 April 2003, the application was moved to the Intermediate People’s Court of 
Shenzhen. Here, Shao’s lawyer was informed by the Judge that the case would not be 
accepted. The Court stated over the telephone that “Shao has to obtain authorization 
from all the shareholders of Sanjiu before bringing such a lawsuit if he wants to 




3.2.2.2.3.2 Comments on Sanjiu case 
 
In this case, the court rejected the application because it considered that the 
unanimous authorisation of all shareholders should be obtained as a prerequisite to 
filing a derivative action. It appears reasonable for the court to so impose this 
prerequisite as the action initiated was in the interests of all the shareholders, and 
thus their consent should be obtained. However, it was almost impossible for Shao to 
attain such consent in reality. Before doing so, he first had to call a shareholder’s 
meeting. However, Shao alone was obviously unable to convene such a meeting as 
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 See L. Wang, ‘Shouli Gudong daibiaosusong Bubei Shouli [First Shareholder Derivative Action is 
not Accepted] Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Securities New], April 22, 2003. 
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article 104 of Company Law 1993 stipulates that only shareholders owning ten 
percent or more of the company can request an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting 
of a listed company.
411
 Indeed, even if Shao had been able to convene such a 
meeting, it would be extremely difficult to obtain authorisation from all shareholders 
for various reasons: like the fact that some shareholders might not have attended the 
meeting. 
 
In theory, the request to obtain authorization from all shareholders is largely 
outdated.
412
 The American Law Institute also shares the view that “informed 
collective [shareholder] consideration of a proposed litigation is not feasible [because 
the shareholders, as a body], cannot realistically discuss or evaluate the often 




On the whole, since it is almost impossible to obtain the authorisation of all 
shareholders in practice and it is outdated to have such a requirement in theory, 
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court’s reasoning in rejecting this case was in fact 
groundless and absurd. Rather, it reflected the fact that derivative actions were 
strongly discouraged and that court attitudes towards such litigation were very 
hostile.  
 
3.2.2.2.4 Analysis of the Accepted Cases 
 
Although many cases have been accepted by the courts, the reasoning behind such 
acceptance in these cases is unsystematic and chaotic in light of the existence of 
various opinions published by the High-level Courts and the absence of a clear legal 
system. In exploring these published cases, five grounds can be found to have been 
                                                             
411
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used to justify the acceptance of derivative actions. 
 
The first ground is that the Court should support the derivative action on the basis of 
a fundamental principle of company law. In the Dalian Shengdao case, Xiangzhou 
District Court ruled that the application of the plaintiff shareholder should be 
supported because “he brought an action to protect his legitimate rights and interests 
in accordance with the relevant fundamental principles of protecting shareholders’ 
rights and interests in Company Law.”
414
 This reasoning was reaffirmed in another 
case, Zhang Baorong v Yugang and Rongma Company. Here, the Court said: 
 
Yugang’s behaviour constitutes a tort against the Rongma Company. After the 
infringement upon the Company, Zhang Baorong, as a shareholder of the Rongma 
Company, tried every available avenue to seek remedies for the Company, but failed. 
In order to prevent further infringement to the Company, he filed a lawsuit to this 





The next justification for supporting derivative actions is the protection of the 
companies and shareholders’ rights. In the case of Zhang Jianhua v Huang Jiawei, 
the Court ruled that the lawsuit brought by the plaintiff shareholders was the proper 
conduct to safeguard the interests of the corporation and shareholders and is thus not 
against the law.
416
 In Shunde Guoxin Corporation v Shunde Maocu Corporation 
case, the court states that Guoxin Corporation is a qualified plaintiff because its 
interests as a shareholder were harmed by the defendant and thus Guoxin was 
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The third ground for the courts to accept derivative actions was based on the right of 
subrogation. Lawsuits founded on the right of subrogation generally applied to cases 
of contract, where the right was conferred to creditors to raise proceedings to recover 
their debts. 
418
 However, there are some differences between lawsuits founded on 
the right of subrogation and those founded on derivative actions. For example, the 
direct purpose of derivative actions is to safeguard the interests of the company 
rather than the plaintiff shareholders themselves; by contrast, the direct intention of 
the lawsuits founded on subrogation is to recover the plaintiff creditors’ debts.
419
 
Nevertheless, the principle of subrogation was applied to derivative actions in some 
cases. In the Dalian Shengdao case, the Court found that the plaintiff shareholder 
could bring an action by exercising the right of subrogation in order to protect their 
legitimate rights and interests.
420
 In Shanghai Zhanwang Corporation and Shanghai 
Baiyulan Research Institution v Shanghai Jinshan Liangyou Company, the Court 
ruled that the plaintiff, as a shareholder of the company who has suffered as a result 





Fourth, one case went so far as to indicate that the cause for allowing individual 
shareholders to bring a derivative action was the abuse of the corporation’s right of 
legal personality. In Shanghai Zilaishui Company v Shanghai Huihuang Company, 
the Court stated that: 
 
As the defendant controls the management and property of the company, the company, 
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as a factual legal entity, is not able to exercise its right to bring an action. In this 
situation, the corporate veil should be lifted as the defendant was abusing its legal 
personality and the interests of the plaintiff shareholders were thus indirectly 





Fifth, although no institution for derivative actions was enacted in Company Law 
1993, it was clearly expressed and adopted in several cases. In Linyi Foreign Trade 
Company v Shandong Import and Export Company, the Court simply stated that 
 
Although derivative action is not adopted currently in Company Law, it is accepted 
in practice. […] It is worthwhile emphasising that a derivative action should be 
commenced under certain circumstances and shareholders cannot abuse this right. 
In this case, when Linyi Company was prevented from bringing a lawsuit, Linyi 





This view was subsequently reaffirmed in Hong Kong Youxian Company v 
Guangzhou Suihang Company where the court ruled that where the company itself 
was not able to bring an action, the plaintiff shareholder was entitled to claim rights 
from the defendant. Therefore, “this litigation is in accordance with the conditions of 
derivative actions”.
424
 In Shanghai Yaoguo Company v Gaobaoquan, the Court 
plainly held that shareholder’ derivative action is an important judicial tool for 
protecting the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders, and thus individual 
shareholders are allowed to bring derivative actions where a company is prevented 
from bringing such litigation. 
 
It is interesting to conclude from the above that the courts had started to use the 
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terminology of derivative actions despite the fact that this terminology had not been 
adopted in Company Law 1993. It is surprising to find that the courts have even 
stated that derivative actions should only be brought under certain circumstances or 
conditions, when there seems to be only one condition in which such a claim might 
be brought: namely, when the company is not able to bring an action against 
wrongdoers itself. However, one case did not use the terminology of derivative 
actions, nor did it even cite any regulation relevant to derivative actions.
425
 Here, the 
Court arguably seems to deliberately avoid touching upon the topic of derivative 
actions, basing its decision directly on the facts of the case. This approach was 





3.2.2.2.5 Other Findings 
Besides the above analysis of successful and unsuccessful derivative actions, several 
other common findings were revealed by these 23 cases. First, there is almost a 
complete absence of derivative actions involving listed companies. The only listed 
company-related case prior to the implementation of Company Law 2005 uncovered 
by the author is Sanjiu, which was rejected by the court. Most of the cases brought to 
the court concerned limited liability companies.
427
 This may be because the courts 
do not accept listed company-related shareholder litigation for fear that it might lead 
to numerous securities cases, which could have a negative social impact considering 
the prevalence of the exploitation of minority shareholder interests in listed 
companies. Secondly, most cases were occasioned by conflicts between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. As professional managers are unpopular in 
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 For the full detail of this case, please see: J. Zhao and G. Wu, Derivative actions (Series of Cases 
Recording, Beijing: Law Press 2007). 
426
 J. Zhao and G. Wu, Derivative actions (Series of Cases Recording, Beijing: Law Press 2007) 274. 
427
 Even after Company Law 2005 entered into force, derivative actions involving listed companies 
are still completely absent. See D. C. Clarke and N. C. Howson, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder 
Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s republic of China’ In D. Puchniak et al.(eds.), The 




China and managing directors are therefore normally the same persons as majority 
shareholders, it is not strange that most of the defendants in the cases uncovered were 
majority shareholders. Thirdly, the courts were willing to accept derivative actions if 
the plaintiff shareholders’ claims were justified, though the reasons for supporting 




Although it is argued that Company Law 1993 implicitly conferred a right on 
shareholders to bring derivative actions, this paper demonstrates that derivative 
action was not established until Chinese Company Law was revised in 2005. 
However, derivative actions did exist before 2005. Various departments and courts 
therefore had to issue several rules and interpretations regulating such derivative 
litigation as lack of clear legislation meant that the law could not accommodate 
practical needs. In order to explore these practical cases prior to the implementation 
of Company Law 2005, this thesis has collected as many cases as possible from 
various sources, finding 23 cases relating to derivative actions. In examining these 
cases, this part has revealed several findings. First, the rejected cases were all 
founded on the same reasoning that plaintiff shareholders were not eligible to bring 
derivative actions on behalf of companies. Second, although 70% of the cases 
uncovered were accepted by the courts, the reasons behind this acceptance were 
various; this is understandable given the absence of any law regulating derivative 
actions. Last, there was an almost complete absence of derivative actions taken in 
relation to listed companies, though the courts were not reluctant to accept the 
actions brought by plaintiff shareholders in limited liability companies if their claims 








After significant consideration, derivative actions were finally introduced and 
enacted in China for the very first time in 2005. This was warmly welcomed by 
many scholars. Krause and Qin describe this introduction as a milestone in Chinese 
company law reform.
428
 Frinerman and Guo also shared the same view that this 
adoption would significantly improve company law and predicted that it would 
contribute to good corporate governance.
429
 There is no doubt that this enactment 
was a huge step towards protecting the interests of minority shareholders and 
reflected the desire of legislators to achieve a balance of power between controlling 
and minority shareholders. It was expected that this legal framework would not only 
constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers and majority shareholders, but 
also improve the corporate governance structure and thus establish an 
investor-friendly legal regime.
430
 In this sense, the introduction of derivative actions 
was a big step forward for Chinese company law. However, like other Chinese laws, 
this new statutory procedure was established by transplanting from other countries 
and such a mixture from various jurisdictions has many drawbacks upon closer 
examination. This part will first explore the legal framework of derivative actions in 
the Chinese Company Law 2005 and then the obstacles for initiating such litigation 
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will be identified. This part will conclude that China’s mechanism for derivative 
actions remains inadequate to provide strong protection for minority shareholders 
and support accountability for managers and majority shareholders, though it ought 
to play a key role in corporate governance owing to the ineffectiveness of other 
mechanisms. 
 
3.3.2 Legal Framework of Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law 
2005 
 
Derivative action is now enacted in article 152 of Company Law 2005, which 
provides as follows: 
 
Where a director or senior manager has committed a violation as specified in article 
150 hereof, the shareholder(s) of a limited liability company or (a) shareholder(s) of 
a joint stock limited company who separately or aggregately holding at least 1% of 
the total shares of the company for 180 consecutive days or more may make a request 
in writing to the board of supervisors, or the supervisor(s) of the limited liability 
company without the establishment of the board of supervisors to initiate a lawsuit in 
a people’s court. If a supervisor has committed a violation as specified in article 150 
hereof, the aforementioned shareholders may make a request in writing to the board 
of directors, or the executive directors of a limited liability company that has not 
established a board of directors to institute a legal proceeding in the people’s court. 
 
If the board of supervisors, or supervisor of a limited liability company without the 
establishment of the board of supervisors, or board of directors or executive director 
refuses to institute a lawsuit after receiving a written request as mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, or if they fail to initiate a lawsuit within 30 days after 
receiving the request, or under urgent circumstances where failure to promptly 
institute lawsuits could cause possibly irreparable damage to the interests of the 
company, the shareholders mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall have the 
right, in the interests of the company, to directly lodge a lawsuit in a people’s court in 
their own name. 
 
If another person infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of a company, 
causing the company to incur a loss, the shareholders mentioned in the first 
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paragraph may initiate a lawsuit in the people’s court in accordance with the 




As noted above, all the aspects of derivative actions are included in one provision 
and thus the provision itself is not easy to understand. The below paragraphs will 
explore these aspects, including issues of substance and procedure, in detail.  
 
3.3.2.1 The Standing Requirement 
 
The standing requirement plays a key part in striking a balance between the 
management of a company and the protection of minority shareholders. If a 
shareholder is entitled to bring a derivative action without any restrictions, malicious 
suits would arise and the normal management of a company would be affected. 
However, if the standing requirement is too strict, the goal of derivative actions 
would not be achieved. The current legislation divides the standing requirement of 
plaintiffs into two types: there is no special requirement for the shareholders of 
limited liability companies, while an eligible plaintiff in a joint stock company (JSC) 
is required to hold one percent or more of the total shares separately or aggregately 
for at least 180 consecutive days. This differentiated treatment seems to be unique to 
Chinese derivative actions, as few other countries adopt such approaches.
432
 
However, there are some justifications that account for this standing rule. First, 
shareholders in limited liability companies generally bear a much greater risk than in 
those in JSCs because it is not easy for them to leave the company by selling their 
shares.
433
 Secondly, the risk of abuse in JSCs is relatively higher than in limited 
liability companies without the standing requirements. This is because investors or 
outsiders can easily buy shares to become members of a company for the purpose of 
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obtaining the right to initiate a derivative litigation.
434
 Thirdly, it is also argued that 
listed companies are monitored closely by a variety of regulations which provide 
various protective mechanisms for minority shareholders while limited liability 
companies are less regulated and are thus in greater need of the protections provided 
by derivative actions. This has been proven in an empirical study finding that 





However, this standing requirement has also been criticised for its high standard, 
especially the requirement of a one percent holding. It is highly unlikely that an 
individual shareholder will bring such litigation if he or she is required to hold one 
percent of the shares because most minority shareholders hold far less than that. 
Indeed, one percent is equal to RMB 0.3 million, which is still an extremely large 
amount of money for many Chinese investors.
436
 In addition, it is argued that this 
requirement is unfair for shareholders in the companies of different sizes. In small 
companies, a one percent holding might represent thousands or hundreds of shares 
whereas in large corporations, it could represent hundreds of millions of shares – 
thus making it more difficult for shareholders in large companies to initiate 
derivative litigation. Thirdly, the idea of such a minimum shareholding requirement 
for JSCs makes little sense in China considering the current ownership structure in 
Chinese listed companies. As mentioned above, there are two types of shares in 
Chinese listed companies: tradable and non-tradable. Non-tradable shares are 
normally owned by the state and legal entities and cannot be bought or sold in the 
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market as they are “non-tradable”. Tradable shares are widely held among numerous 
investors and the percentage of these is relatively low in the whole market.
437
 As a 
consequence, it would be very difficult to require tradable shareholders to hold 1% of 
the outstanding shares of a company in order to be qualified to bring derivative 
actions. Fourthly, it is also argued that this high threshold figure seems to be tied to 
the notion that a derivative action is in fact a “representative” action and thus 
requires a minimum shareholding to “represent” the interests of all or most of the 
other shareholders.
438
 This was confirmed by a senior Justice of the SPC, who stated 
that the minimum shareholder percentage was adopted to “ensure that the plaintiff is 
sufficiently representative”.
439
 Indeed, a derivative action is similar to a 
representative action to some extent as any compensation from the successful claim 
will accrue to the company instead of the plaintiff shareholder. Thus all the 
shareholders would benefit from the litigation. In addition, it is also universally 
recognized that a derivative action is brought by a plaintiff shareholder who is acting 
on behalf of the company. However, this notion is a radical misunderstanding of the 
derivative action as this kind of lawsuit is in essence a corporate claim. The reason 
why it is initiated by shareholders is merely because the company is unable or 
unwilling to bring such litigation. Therefore, it is wholly incorrect to make derivative 
actions reflect representative actions by imposing a high threshold such as the 
minimum shareholding requirement. Lastly, the minimum shareholding requirement 
was set to prevent vexatious suits. However, it should also not be high enough to 
inhibit meritorious suits. Therefore, the critical question is how to strike a balance 
between preventing frivolous suits and allowing meritorious actions. Indeed, it is 
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difficult to find such a balance. Nevertheless, setting a fixed threshold figure seems 
to be an irrational means of achieving this balance as such a strategy risk either 
setting a threshold that is too high or too low.
440
 In addition, although the 1% 
shareholding requirement is much lower compared to the 10% requirement adopted 





The second standing requirement for shareholders in joint stock limited companies is 
that they must have held their shares for at least 180 consecutive days. This aims to 
prevent investors from purchasing shares with the purpose of initiating trivial or 
malicious suits. Nevertheless, this requirement seems to be another barrier for 
individual shareholders as the average shareholding period is usually shorter than 
180 days.
442
 This is also supported by Xin’s study that the average shareholding 
period on the securities market is less than 120 days.
443
 Therefore it is criticised that 
the shareholding period prescribed by this standing requirement is too long and thus 
needs to be shortened to protect minority shareholders. Furthermore, it would be 
unfair if a shareholder found out that a director of a company had done something 
wrong the day after they had purchased their shares owing to their inability to meet 
this standing requirement. It would be ridiculous for a shareholder to have to wait for 
179 days during which they can do nothing. Liu recognises this flaw but also points 
out that during this period the shareholder could appeal to the board of supervisors as 
a member of the company to investigate the matter or use mass media to put 
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 However, it is highly likely that an appeal to conduct 
an investigation would simply be neglected by management considering the little 
influence a new shareholder would have. Also, not every shareholder is able to use 
public opinion to bring pressure bear on management. If one can exercise this 
influence on the company, one is probably able to resolve the problem within the 
company rather than using outside powers. 
 
Besides the above problems, there are several issues that need to be clarified in the 
future.  
 
Firstly, article 152 does not clearly stipulate that those shareholders who initiate a 
lawsuit must be the (1) shareholders who make the demand, or (2) the same 
shareholders for the whole period of the litigation. For the former issue, it is obvious 
that those shareholders who have met the demand requirement are eligible to bring 
derivative actions. What is not clear is whether other shareholders could be entitled 
to initiate a derivative action where those shareholders who have made the demand 
fail to bring such litigation.
445
 From the wording of article 152, it seems that a 
shareholder must make the demand in order to be qualified to bring derivative 
actions; but this needs to be clarified. For the latter concern, it is apparent that those 
initiating a lawsuit must be shareholders when they raise the proceedings according 
to the article 108 of Civil Procedural law of the People’s Republic of China (CPL)
446
 
and article 4 of Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court about Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
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 However, it is unclear whether the litigation should be continued if a plaintiff 
shareholder transfers his or her shares and thus loses their qualification as a 
shareholder. Liu argues that the litigation should be terminated in this situation unless 
other qualified shareholders inherit him or her.
448
 However, this approach might be 
abused by wrongdoers, particularly controlling shareholders, as they may cut the 
shareholding connection between the plaintiff shareholder and the company by 
reorganising the company. 
 
Secondly, it is also unclear whether so-called hidden shareholders (yinmin gudong) 
449
could be eligible to bring derivative actions. To answer this question, it is essential 
to examine whether Company Law 2005 recognises the hidden shareholders. If 
hidden shareholders are recognised, then it is beyond question that they are entitled 
to raise such proceedings. Unfortunately, this is even a more disputed question. Some 
scholars argue that the concept of hidden shareholders is not legal terminology and is 
also not mentioned in Company Law 2005, and that is can thereby be concluded that 
the Law does not recognise hidden shareholders.
450
 On the other hand, admitting that 
hidden shareholders are not explicitly stipulated in the Company Law, some 
commentaries nevertheless maintain that they are the factual shareholders and are 
thus entitled to exercise shareholders’ rights within the company.
451
 The 
promulgation of the third set of provisions published by the SPC has confirmed the 
legal status of hidden shareholders to some extent though whether they are eligible to 
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Lastly, there is no requirement that a plaintiff shareholder should have clean hands to 
raise proceedings. This means that even those shareholders who harbour malicious 
intentions are not prevented from bringing litigation in this situation. It is said that 
the absence of such a requirement was probably transplanted from or at least affected 
by Japanese law, which does not require an eligible plaintiff shareholder to be able to 




3.3.2.2 Defendants and the Causes of Action 
 
3.3.2.2.1 The Scope of Defendants 
 
The scope of defendants in derivative actions was extended from the beginning of the 
draft to the final legislation. In 2004, the Amendment of Company Law (manuscript) 
regulated that the defendants of the derivative actions were limited to directors, 
supervisors and senior managers.
454
 Other persons including majority shareholders 
were thus excluded from being sued by shareholders for their wrongdoings to the 
company. This would be unfair and unrealistic in view of the severe horizontal 
agency cost prevailing in China. Later in 2005, many scholars advocated that the 
scope of defendants should be enlarged in order to protect the interests of the 
minority shareholders effectively.
455
 In the end, Company Law 2005 extended the 
scope of potential defendants beyond directors, senior managers and supervisors to 
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cover other persons (taren).  
 
Some scholars divide potential defendants into two classes: insiders (directors, senior 
managers, and supervisors) and outsiders (e.g. a related party who injured the 
company). From this classification, it seems that controlling shareholders are not 
included. For the first group, if only directors, supervisors and senior managers can 
be sued then this excludes controlling shareholders. The second group of defendants 
is very broad and basically contains any person who has done something wrong and 
causes loss to the company - thus at first glance a controlling shareholder seems to be 
eligible to be a defendant in this group. However, it is argued that the second group 
of defendants must be outsiders to the company and controlling shareholders are 
insiders.
456
 As a result, a controlling shareholder cannot be categorized as falling 
within the second group of defendants. On the other hand, it seems ridiculous that 
controlling shareholders could not be sued while any other person could be a 
defendant. To address this issue, the second group should not necessarily be 
categorized as outsiders. On the face of the law, it is clear that a controlling 
shareholder who infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of a company, and 
causes a loss to the company may be subject to a derivative action. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 The Causes of Action 
 
As mentioned above, potential defendants are divided into two groups. This brings 
up the question of whether the causes of these two types of potential defendants are 
the same. According to article 152, the first group defendants may be sued when they 
have caused losses to the company by breaches of law, administrative regulations or 
the articles of association in the course of performing company duties. For the 
second group, “others” may fall into the scope of defendants when they have 
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damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and interests. From the wording 
of the above, it seems that the causes for these two groups are not unified. However, 
it is difficult to justify this separate approach, particularly where the cause of the 
second group reaches acts not covered by the cause of the first group. Here, there is a 
possibility that when the misbehaviour of an “outsider” causes a derivative action, an 
“insider” can be exempted from being sued regarding the same misbehaviour.  
 
The second issue is that the basis for suing directors, senior managers or supervisors 
is narrow. According to the article 152, an aforementioned person should not be held 
liable if he/she violates the law, administrative regulations or the articles of 
association causing losses to the company while acting under other circumstances 
than in the course of performing their company duties. However, this restriction is 
unreasonable as they may engage in misconduct and cause losses to the company 
even when they are not performing their duties. In order to extend the basis for 
bringing derivative actions, Li argues that the circumstances under which they 
committed the wrong is not relevant to whether they could be sued as long as they 
violate the related laws and damage the interests of the company.
457
 Indeed, in view 
of the other existing procedural obstacles, narrowing the basis for initiating 
derivative actions does not provide a good mechanism to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders. 
 
3.3.2.3 Demand Requirement 
 
Another mechanism to strike the balance between preventing frivolous suits and 
allowing meritorious actions is the demand requirement. The Company Law 2005 
requires the qualified shareholders to make a demand in writing to the appropriate 
body before raising proceedings. To be specific, demand should be made to the board 
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of supervisors, or the supervisors of a limited liability company without the board of 
supervisors in the circumstances where a lawsuit is brought against the directors or 
senior managers. On the other hand, where an action is taken against the supervisors, 
the demand should be made upon the board of directors or the executive directors of 
the limited liability companies without the establishment of the board of directors. 
Only when the relevant body refuses this demand or fails to response within 30 days 
after receiving such a demand, can the shareholders commence a derivative action. 
This demand requirement actually is a nod to the principle of exhaustion of intra 
corporate remedies and it is justified by the reason that opportunity should be given 
to the company before going to the court, as it is the company itself who suffers 
directly. It would be better if the company could solve it without resorting to the 
judicial resource.
458
 Second, the demand requirement could protect the company 
from being sued by frivolous shareholders to some extent.
459
 Third, the board of 
directors or the board of supervisors have better resources, such as information and 
funding to deal with the litigation when it is necessary for a company to bring an 




At the same time, this new procedure is in need of clarification owing to its several 
loopholes. First, the content of the written demand is not specified under the current 
provision. In the US, the detailed information such as the factual basis for the 
accusation and the damage caused to the company should be included in that 
requirement, as this is very important to the company’s process of making the 
decision.
461
 Although there is no need for the law to stipulate the detail requirements 
of this written demand, it is essential to legislate that the basic facts and demand or 
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request should be included. Secondly, it is argued that the 30-day time-limit is 
unreasonable because the company may need more time to consider the request in 
some complicated circumstances. Although it is difficult to fix a specific period to 
accommodate all the situations, it is proposed that the court should be authorised to 
have the discretion to extend such time-period upon the request of the board of 
directors or the board of supervisors. Thirdly, it is ambiguous which organ should the 
demand be made to when the third party was accused for the wrongdoing. Some 
scholars propose that the board of directors should be the first organ to deal with this 
request as it is the management institution of the company.
462
 There is a 
counter-argument suggesting that such a demand should be made first upon the Legal 
representative as he or she is the “representative” of the company.
463
 This should be 
clarified in the future as a failure to do so may give an opportunity for conservative 
judicial institutions to frustrate meritorious derivative actions on a technicality.
464
 
This research argues that the demand should be made upon the board of directors for 
several reasons: first of all, the board represents a company in the daily management 
and thus the demand made to the board is in line with its legal status. Second, 
Company Law 2005 clearly stipulates that the board of directors shall be responsible 
for the shareholders’ meeting while a legal representative of the company does not 
have such responsibility. This means the board of directors should be in charge of the 
company including litigation decision. Furthermore, there is no reason not for the 
board to make the decision since the wrongdoer is a third person rather than the 
member of the board. Last, the number of the meeting for supervisory board is very 
low while it is quite often to hold the board meeting. This means additional cost 
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would be occurred if the demand is made to the supervisory board.  
 
3.3.2.3.1 The Effect of the Demand 
 
When qualified shareholders make a demand to the appropriate body, there are three 
potential outcomes: the appropriate body may (1) accept, (2) refuse or (3) simply 
ignore the demand. In the third situation, there is no doubt that an eligible 
shareholder would be entitled to bring a derivative action. However, this may be 
problematic in the first and second circumstances. 
 
In situation (1), the company may respond in two ways. First, the company may 
decide to bring an action against the wrongdoers, in which case there is obviously no 
need for the shareholders to raise the proceedings. However, the appropriate body 
may agree to accept the demand in order to block a derivative action and then fail to 
pursue litigation diligently. In such a case, the losses to the company still cannot be 
recovered while the shareholders have lost their eligibility to bring derivative actions. 
In light of this, the law should allow individual shareholders to bring derivative 
lawsuits despite the fact that the demand has been accepted. However, this should be 
established with one condition that a plaintiff shareholder could demonstrate that a 
company was intended to lose the litigation in order to protect defendants. Without 
satisfying this condition, the courts have to refuse the claim. 
 
The second way for the appropriate body to accept the demand is to address the 
matter within the company without resorting to the courts. This may happen because 
legal suits are not generally believed to be in the best interests of the company. In this 
situation, it is unclear whether an individual shareholder is still entitled to bring 
derivative actions if he or she is not satisfied with the result of the internal corrective 
measures. This thesis believes that individual shareholder would not lose the 
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qualification to sue in this situation. The rational for this argument is simple and 
straightforward: since the issue is not brought into the courts and shareholders are not 
satisfied with the result, why not allow them to commence litigation? 
 
In circumstance (2), where a written demand is refused by the relevant body, 
minority shareholders can commence derivative litigation. Indeed, it is very 
important to confer this right on shareholders in this situation as derivative action is 
normally considered to be a last resort for minority shareholders to protect their 
rights and interests. Nonetheless, it is possible that the decision to reject a demand is 
just and reasonable as the body which makes the decision has no conflict interests 
with regard to the decision, at least theoretically.
465
 As a consequence, if a refusal 
decision is just and reasonable it would be unreasonable for such a decision not to 
prevent minority shareholders from bringing derivative actions. This would also 
make the demand requirement meaningless as the shareholder could always raise 
proceedings if the company refused to do so. Two issues may arise in determining 
whether a refusal decision is to be respected or deferred to. First, one must ask which 
standard should be applied to evaluate the effect of the decision made by the 
appropriate body. It seems impossible that all the decisions of the demand 
requirement should be deferred to as many of those decisions may discriminate 
against minority shareholders. Therefore, a standard or guidelines to evaluate 
whether a decision should be deferred to should be introduced or issued. Second, it 
must be asked who has a final say on whether the decision should have a binding 
effect. If it is left for the court to decide, then what if the courts are not capable of 
doing this? If it is not decided by the court, then should a new independent body be 
created? 
 
3.3.2.3.2 Demand Excused or Waiting Period Waived? 
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According to article 152 of Company Law 2005, eligible shareholders have the right 
to bring derivative actions in urgent circumstances where failure to bring a lawsuit 
immediately could result in irreparable damage to the company’s interests. This 
regulation obviously provides more flexible protection for the company and its 
minority shareholders as the period of waiting for the decision may leave a gap for 
wrongdoers to gain further. Furthermore, potential irreparable damage requires 
shareholders or the company to take immediate action to prevent such misbehaviour 
as such damage is difficult to remedy. Therefore, this exception is essential and 
important. 
 
Nonetheless, there are mixed views concerning the nature of this exception. Some 
argue that this is a demand excused and thus the shareholders do not need to make a 
demand to the appropriate body if it satisfies the conditions specified above.
466
 The 
counter-argument is that this exception only waives the waiting period although the 
demand requirement is still in place.
467
 That means even in an urgent situation, a 
demand must still be made to an appropriate body; what the rule permits is the 
waiting period. However, this strict interpretation seems to be groundless as the 
shareholders can bring an action immediately after making a demand regardless of 
the decision made by an appropriate body. In order to identify the nature of this 
exception, the thesis considers that it is first important to explore when the urgent 
circumstance occurs. There are mainly two possible situations in which this 
exception may have a role to play: first, if the urgent circumstance happens prior to 
making the demand, then shareholders can bring derivative actions without making a 
demand. Second, if the emergency happens after making the demand, then 
shareholders can ignore the waiting period and commence the derivative lawsuit. As 
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a result, the nature of this exception depends on which situation can be applied. If the 
legislation can be interpreted and applied in the former situation, then it is a demand 
excused. Otherwise, it is only a waiting period waived. From the wording of article 
152, it is difficult to justify which situation can be applied to this exception. In 
practice, it seems that the courts are inclined to the former situation as they regularly 




Besides the above disputes, two concerns have also been raised. First, it seems that 
the legislative concept is self-contradictory. On the one hand, it requires the 
shareholders of a JSC to hold shares for at least 180 days consecutively in order to 
initiate derivative actions. On the other hand, it confers on shareholders a right to 
raise proceedings without the waiting period where the company would suffer 
irreparable damage if a suit could not proceed immediately. A contradiction would 
thus arise if a shareholder had to initiate a lawsuit immediately when an urgent 
circumstance emerges though is not eligible to bring such an action as their holding 
period is less than 180 days. In such a case, the purpose or intention of the demand 
excused or waiting period waived rule cannot be achieved if the holding period 
requirement has to be obeyed. 
 
The second issue is about the concept of urgent circumstances. The definition of 
urgent circumstances is not provided in the Company Law 2005. The lack of clarity 
around the meaning of this concept may lead to various interpretations and create 
unsystematic practices. Failure to clarify this concept in the future may provide an 
opportunity for conservative judicial institutions to reject applications as various 
courts can have different interpretations. Indeed, it undeniably difficult to clarify this 
concept precisely, though it is possible to set some guidelines for applying this 
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principle. For example, the law could establish two tests for clarifying this concept: 
the first test is that if the damage to the company results in the loss of a certain 
amount of money or a prescribed percentage of the total assets of the company, then 
it constitutes urgent circumstance. The second test is that if the damage may lead to a 
malfunction of the management in a company, shareholders could bring derivative 
actions without making the demand. 
 
3.3.2.4 Other issues 
 
Several other aspects of Chinese derivative actions are also worthy of discussion. 
First of all, considering the special nature of derivative actions, the funding rules for 
these lawsuits should be different from other types of action. Unfortunately, all 
litigation in China, including derivative actions, are subject to the same rules. 
However, it is recommended that plaintiff shareholders be entitled to be rewarded if 
litigation is successful, as it is unfair for plaintiff shareholders to bear all the costs 
and risks while the benefits ascribe to the company. A shareholder would be 
discouraged from bringing a derivative action against wrongdoers without this 
incentive.
469
 Second, the status of the company is uncertain under the current 
Company Law. Some argue that the company should be treated as a nominal plaintiff, 
as it is the de facto plaintiff and beneficiary, while others claim that it should be 
treated as a nominal defendant as in the UK and the US.
470
 However, none of these 
fall within the scope of Chinese derivative actions because the company is treated as 
a third party without an independent claim under the Civil Procedural Law.
471
 This is 
criticized by Liu who argues that the fundamental basis for a derivative action would 
be lost without the independent claim of the company because the claims of 
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shareholder plaintiffs stem from the company.
472
 Furthermore, any settlement 
reached by both parties does not need to be published or approved by the courts 
according to Company Law 2005. However, this might create the issue that both the 
defendant and plaintiff shareholder can reach a confidential settlement at the cost of 
the interests of the company and other shareholders. Therefore, it is suggested that 
any settlement should become effective only after being notified to other 
shareholders and receiving permission from the courts.  
3.3.3 The Judicial Application of Derivative Actions under the Company 
Law 2005 
 
After Company Law 2005 became effective on 1 January 2006, the new statutory 
derivative actions system was also implemented. It is essential to examine the 
judicial application of derivative lawsuits in order to understand how this new system 
works in practice. Similar to the research methodology used in the previous part,
473
 
this thesis conducted a comprehensive empirical study collecting all the derivative 
actions as many as possible and the result of this is examined as follows. 
 
3.3.3.1 Cases concerning Joint Stock Companies 
 
Strikingly, there are almost no cases involving derivative actions in JSCs, listed or 
unlisted. This is a tragedy because, as Clarke and Howson point out, 
474
the new 
derivative actions system was adopted in Company Law 2005 to entitle minority 
shareholders to raise proceedings against directors, senior managers or other persons 
who have done something harmful to a company. As far as this research can find, the 
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Sanlian Shangshe case is the only case involving a JSC following the coming into 
force of the Company Law 2005.
475
 In this case the plaintiff shareholders brought an 
action on behalf of the Sanlian Shangshe Company against the former controlling 
shareholder, the Sanlian Group. The result of this case is unknown as it is still sub 
judice. 
 
According to Clarke and Howson’s research, several factors may account for this 
unfortunate underutilisation.
476
 One explanation is that corporate governance in 
JSCs on the whole is relatively good and thus managers and majority shareholders 
rarely have any opportunity to benefit at the cost of the company and its minority 
shareholders. Here, minority shareholders do not need to bring derivative actions to 
protect their rights and interests. However, this explanation is weak and hardly 
plausible given that the severe agency cost in China.
477
 Even if it is true that JSC 
mechanisms constrain managers and majority shareholders extremely effectively, this 
cannot explain the almost complete absence of derivative actions being brought 
within JSCs. A second explanation is that there are many obstacles hindering the 
application of derivative actions in such companies. As described above, the 
requirements that must be met for shareholders to commence derivative lawsuits are 
various and depend on company type. For JSCs, the law imposes higher threshold 
conditions on shareholders to raise proceedings as they are required to individually 
or jointly hold at least one percent of shares for 180 or more consecutive days.
478
 In 
addition, funding rules may also strongly discourage shareholders from bringing such 
actions because they lack incentives to do so. These obstacles may contribute to this 
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near absence of JSC-related cases. Another possible explanation is that minority 
shareholders may settle with wrongdoers secretly before filing suits in the courts. If 
the issue is settled within the company, an agreement may be reached to say that the 
dispute should not be made public. Indeed, if disputes are resolved within the 
company, potential derivative actions would be avoided and thus no case would be 
reported. However, this explanation seems unconvincing as it is hard to imagine that 
almost all cases involving JSCs are settled invisibly in a manner that is so 
disproportionate when compared with cases involving limited liability companies. 
Furthermore, even though more disputes are settled within the company than brought 
to the courts, it is much easier for shareholders in limited liability companies to reach 
a settlement with wrongdoers as both parties in the company have better information. 
A fourth explanation may be the attitude of the courts. Prior to Company Law 2005, 
attitudes towards derivative actions varied as described above. Some courts rejected 
derivative lawsuits because no derivative action system had been enacted into 
company law, whilst others accepted derivative lawsuits for a diverse range of 
reasons. After Company Law 2005 entered into force and with the new derivative 
action system in place, the attitude of the Chinese courts played a key role in the 
application of this new institution. In view of the near-total absence of derivative 
lawsuits in JSCs, it is reasonable to believe that Chinese courts are not willing to 
accept JSC-related derivative lawsuits. Research conducted by Howson confirms this 
speculation. Howson examined judicial autonomy in the Shanghai People’s Courts 
from 1992-2008, and found that the Chinese courts will essentially not accept 
politically or technically complex cases. As JSC-related cases normally involve large 
numbers of plaintiffs and have a significant impact on listed companies, various local 
courts are instructed not to accept such cases.
479
 This could therefore be the main 
plausible reason why there are almost no cases involving derivative actions in JSCs. 
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In contrast to the near absence of JSC-related cases, derivative actions have been 
found in cases relating to limited liability companies. This research collected all the 
available cases since the implementation of the Company Law 2005 – covering the 
dates 1 January 2006 to 30 August 2013 and 77 cases were identified as the table 
below shows. 
Table 5 
Number of Derivative Actions in China from 2006-2013 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number 12 6 15 11 14 9 8 2 
Percentage 15.6% 7.8% 19.5% 14.3% 18.2% 11.7% 10.4% 2.6% 
 
It seems that derivative actions have been effectively utilised in China, as 77 cases is 
a good take-up figure in comparison to other countries. For example, when Japan 
adopted derivative actions in 1950, this mechanism lay dormant for the first 35 years 
when not a single derivative action was taken in the five years following its 
enactment and there was less than one case per year on average from 1950 to 
1985.
480
 By the end of 1992, there were only 31 derivative actions pending before 
Japanese courts.
481
 In the UK where derivative action was legislated into the 
Companies Act 2006, there were less than 20 cases brought before courts after its 
implementation.
482
 From this comparative perspective, it appears that derivative 
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However, many other factors should be noted as they may affect findings when 
comparing raw data on the number of cases brought in different countries. Indeed, a 
closer examination reveals that China’s derivative action system is ineffective: first, 
although there were very few cases in the first 40 years after derivative action was 
enacted in Japan, one should not neglect the fact that the number of derivative 
actions skyrocketed from the early 1990s onwards. In 1993, there were 86 cases 
pending before Japanese courts. This number continued to rise, peaking in 1999 with 
95 new cases filed and a total of 222 cases pending.
484
 Comparing this figure to the 
77 cases over an eight-year period in China, makes the latter seem less impressive. 
Second, one of the main reasons that few derivative actions have been brought in the 
UK is that other strong remedies are available for minority shareholders to protect 
themselves. For example, unfair prejudice has proved to be a very popular 
mechanism in protecting minority shareholders owing to the wide range of conduct 
covered by this rule and the flexibility of relief it offers.
485
 The dominant role of this 
remedy means that derivative action plays an insignificant role in disciplining 
corporate management in the UK. However, no such mechanism like unfair prejudice 
exists in China and derivative actions therefore ought to play a key role in corporate 
governance. Third, the exercise of other methods which were enacted to protect 
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shareholders is much more than the use of derivative actions. For example, this thesis 
examined the cases involving the infringement of the right to know and 122 cases 
were found. Last, considering the severe double agency costs and the huge number of 
companies in China, 77 cases is not a large figure and Cases involving derivative 
actions could have been at least double had it had been effectively use. In addition to 
the above discussion, the procedural and substantial aspects of derivative actions are 
unclear in practice. 
 
3.3.3.2.2 Procedural Aspect: Demand Requirement 
 
Several loopholes have been identified above concerning the demand requirement 
where minority shareholders wish to bring derivative actions. These legislative 
drawbacks undoubtedly create unsystematic and problematic judicial application in 
practice. Some courts may use these shortcomings to avoid the implementation of 
derivative lawsuits, while other courts have taken bold action to welcome these 
lawsuits regardless of the unclear procedures involved. 
 
In the Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware case, the complaining shareholder, who was also 
the legal representative for the company, brought a derivative lawsuit without 
making the necessary demand to the appropriate body as they believed that they had 
the power to act for the company in raising proceedings. The application was 
permitted at the first-instance court, but it was later rejected by the intermediate-level 
court on appeal for the reason that it did not strictly follow the demand requirement 
in accordance with Article 152.
486
 In the Beijing Dingyu Cable case, the court even 
refused a claim for failure to make a proper demand while there was no corporate 
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organ or actor in existence at that time that could have received the demand.
487
 This 





Despite the above cases in which the courts have tried to avoid the application of 
derivative actions by using loopholes in the law, some other courts have taken a 
positive attitude towards this new system. For example, in the Beijing Aeronautical 
case where the company had already entered into liquidation, the court accepted the 
derivative action even though the plaintiff shareholder did not make a demand as 
there was no appropriate body that could receive the demand at that time.
489
 This 
decision which obviously contrasted with the case of Beijing Dingyu Cable was 
followed in some other cases.
490
 As prescribed above, it is unclear in the law which 
company body the demand should be made upon where the defendant is a “third” 
person, and the courts may use this ambiguous provision to deny a claim if they wish 
to do so. However, in the Tonghe Investment case where the defendant was not an 
insider, the court allowed the derivative action to continue when the demand was 
made to the board of directors rather than the supervisory board.
491
 In the Beijing 
Puren Hospital case which concerned complex related-party borrowing, the court 
even stepped further and permitted the lawsuit to proceed where the demand was 
made to the legal representative.
492
 In the Henan Golden Mango Property case, the 
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court gave a new explanation of the demand requirement. In this case, the court 
authorized proceedings to continue even though the plaintiff shareholder did not 
formally make a demand to the company that he wanted to sue a construction 
contractor. The demand was “excused” because both the first- and second - instance 
courts recognised the fact that the company had initially sued the defendant, but later 
had withdrawn its claim. This was interpreted by the courts as a signal to refuse to 
bring an action against the wrongdoer.
493
 In such circumstances, the complaining 
shareholder thus does not need to make the demand to the appropriate body. 
 
3.3.3.2.3 Substantive Aspects: Unclear Standard 
 
As analysed above, the law stipulates some rules about how to bring a derivative 
actions against wrongdoers procedurally. However, the standard for the courts to 
adjudicate the cases in substance is not clear. This absence of clear rules inevitably 
creates chaos in practice. For example, Article 152 stipulates that the cause of the 
action against insiders is that they violate the law, administrative regulations or the 
articles of association in the course of performing company duties, incurring the 
damage to the company. However, it is not clear whether the violation of fiduciary 
duty can cause the suits in practice. In the Beijing Xiaokou Food and Beverage case, 
the defendant, who was also a legal representative, had misappropriated corporate 
revenue and was found to have violated the “duty to properly use the company 
assets”.
494
 The court deemed this violation to be a part of Article 148 and thus 
supported the shareholder’s claim. However, in the case of Nanchuan Chemical 
Industry, the court denied that a violation of the duty of care could lead to derivative 
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actions as “the breach of that duty and resulting liability to the company [for 
damages] is a separate legal relationship”.
495
 This un-unified practice not only 
makes the law unstable, but also misleads shareholders and management. 
 
In deciding whether a derivative action would be permitted or not, mere internal 
management is one of the standards to reject a claim in western countries. Although 
it is not introduced to Company Law 2005, it seems that the courts embrace this 
principle in practice as one of the criterions to refuse an application. In the Weihai 
Yinghai case, an action was allowed to proceed while it was later rejected for the 
reason that the dispute “belonged to the issues of the company’s internal 
administration”.
496
 This decision was upheld in another case of Huangshan Fenghua 
Real Estate where an application was permitted at the first-stance, but was then 
dismissed by the Anhui provincial-level court, which supported the argument of the 
defendant that the issues “merely pertain to internal shareholder disputes”.
497
 Indeed, 
it is widely accepted that the principle of “merely internal management” could be one 
of the reasons for rejecting derivative actions in the UK or other western countries. 
The embracement of this principle can be regarded as a further step in the process of 
modernisation of company law in China. 
 
3.3.4 The Role of Derivative Actions in China 
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Before exploring the role of derivative actions in China, it is necessary to answer the 
question of whether derivative actions should play a key role in constraining agency 
costs in China. If derivative action has a weak function in monitoring management, 
then it would be meaningless to investigate the role of derivative actions in China. 
Theoretically, it is generally believed that derivative action is neither the initial nor 
the primary protection for minority shareholders against the misconduct of 
management or controlling shareholders. Indeed, if other mechanisms could have an 
effective role in preventing wrongdoing or punishing wrongdoers, it seems 
unnecessary to confer the right on shareholders to initiate lawsuits against 
wrongdoers on behalf of the company. However, it is demonstrated that even though 
other methods such as market forces can be used to hold managers or controlling 
shareholders accountable, the role of derivative action cannot be neglected as other 
mechanisms alone may not constitute an effective functional substitute for litigation. 
This is particularly true when there are defects affecting the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. In China, it is even more urgent and necessary to adopt the derivative 
action system considering the status quo in law and practice. First of all, Chinese 
minority shareholders are faced with the increasingly severe agency costs. Unlike 
other countries which either have vertical or horizontal agency cost, Chinese 
minority shareholders are confronted with double agency costs. Thus, they risk being 
exploited by both majority shareholders and managers. In order to address these 
problems, market forces and legal mechanisms are in place. Unfortunately, it has 
been shown that these non-legal and legal methods cannot effectively constrain 
agency costs in China. With regard to market forces, it is widely thought that the 
capital market in China is actually a policy market and thus the function that a capital 
market ought to have is generally not applicable or at least reduced in China.
498
 With 
respect to laws protecting the interests of minority shareholders, various flaws have 
been identified in these legal methods which prevent them from reducing agency 
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 Overall, increasingly severe double agency costs with the 
ineffectiveness of market forces and legal mechanisms in China reveals the fact that 
derivative action is strongly needed to provide protection for Chinese minority 
shareholders. 
 
Since it is now clear that derivative action should play an important role in 
constraining managers and controlling shareholders, another question arises as to 
whether the new statutory derivative action has functionally worked. It cannot be 
denied that the adoption of a derivative action system is a step forward in the 
development of China’s company law, but the built-in defects in this new institution 
may discourage shareholders from initiating litigation to protect themselves; they 
may also provide an excuse for the courts to evade hearing derivative actions. The 
near absence of cases in JSCs has shown that the system of derivative actions is 
simply not working, regardless of the reasons behind this absence, speculated on 
above. Furthermore, various cases in limited liability companies also demonstrate the 
fact that the vagueness and defects of the law lead to the chaos and unsystematic 
judicial practice. In sum, China’s mechanism for derivative actions, which ought to 
play a key role in reducing agency costs, remains insufficient to support 
accountability for managers and controlling shareholders. In view of this, it is 
necessary to examine derivative actions in the UK and US. Suggestions from these 
two jurisdictions may possibly be borrowed to improve the system of derivative 
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Chapter 4 Comparative Analysis 
 
4.1 Why Derivative Actions can be Encouraged 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, there are double agency costs in China and thus 
minority shareholders risk exploitation by both majority shareholders and managers. 
To reduce these agency costs, legal mechanisms and market forces have been 
examined and found to be ineffective in constraining the misbehaviour of majority 
shareholders and managers for a number of reasons. Derivative actions, as one legal 
mechanism for protecting the interests of minority shareholders, should therefore 
have a key role to play. In light of the inherent defects in the new statutory derivative 
actions regime in China, it is submitted that restrictions on derivative actions should 
be relaxed and shareholders are encouraged to raise proceedings. However, the 
foregoing discussion only addresses why derivative actions should play a significant 
role in monitoring management; it does not address why shareholders can be 
encouraged to exercise this right.  
 
In fact, this touches the stone of legal transplant theory. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
there are basically two arguments for legal transplant: voluntary transplant and 
contextualist or culturalist theory. The former theory generally believes that legal 
transplant is socially easy while the latter recognises that the social context of the 
recipient country should be noted that. In addition to the demonstration of why legal 
transplant is possible in China which has been discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis 
argues that the social context is not unimportant for legal transplant. With regard to 
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derivative action, there are two factors which should be noted when attempting to 
improve derivative actions. As such, this part will examine why litigation can be 
developed on Chinese soil, mainly from the perspective of culture and the judiciary. 
4.1.1. Culture 
 
It is recognised that culture can deeply affect the means of resolving disputes.
500
 
Indeed, choice of means for dispute resolution is strongly influenced by the 
peculiarities of traditional culture. As Chen argues, the means adopted by a society to 
resolve disputes depends on its available resources, cultural inclinations and 
philosophic leanings.
501
 From this theoretical perspective, it is argued that Chinese 
culture is not suited to encouraging litigation. It is well-known that Confucian ethics 
are strongly rooted in Chinese culture and that the core principle of these ethics is the 
belief that harmony among persons must be achieved.
502
 Five cardinal relationships 
that must be honoured to achieve a stable social order are identified in Confucian 
ethics: father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, 
and friend and friend. Confucianism believes that although such relationships can be 
achieved by resorting to the law, their stability cannot last for a long time as the law 
cannot deliver kindness, humanity, compassion and benevolence. In the Analects of 
Confucius, it is clearly stated that: 
 
I can hear a court case as well as anyone. But we need to make a world where there 
is no reason for a court case. If you use government to show them the way and 
punishment to keep them true, the people will grow evasive and lose all remorse. But 
if you use integrity to show them the way and ritual to keep them true, they will 
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The influence of this Confucian culture means that Chinese people are not willing to 
resolve their disputes in courts. Instead, they might choose a means of settling 
disputes privately. In light of this, it is argued that court-based dispute resolution 
would not be popular in China and thus shareholder litigation would not be 
aggressively used. 
 
However, this thesis opposes the above arguments for the following reasons:  
 
First, while Confucian culture is widely known in traditional China, another school 
of Chinese thought, the Legalists, has been intentionally or unintentionally neglected 
in the debate. This school of thought believes that a nation’s cohesion can be secured 
by the application of strict legislation as well as harsh and draconian punishment.
504
 
The application of this school of thought was exemplified by the first emperor of 
unified China, Qin Shi Huang, who organised the construction of the Great Wall and 
who also emphasized the necessity of using cruel punishment for those who dared to 
show even the slightest resistance. Throughout the history of China, the Legalist 
school has been accompanied by the Confucian school. Its main belief of adopting 
strict laws to secure social stability has undoubtedly had an influence on Chinese 
dispute resolution. Therefore, Confucianism is not the only traditional culture to 
affect methods for resolving disputes; another traditional counter-culture has 
encouraged people to use law to resolve disputes.  
 
Secondly, even though Confucianism has had much more influence than the Legalist 
school on Chinese culture, its ability to play a significant role in litigation is highly 
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doubtful given China’s increasing economic and social development. Unlike China’s 
ancient society, the country is now experiencing a fast economic miracle, leading to 
transformation in almost every aspect of the nation’s being. Consequently, a 
commercial culture is gradually becoming established. One of the core principles in 
commercial culture is that everyone should be held accountable for his or her 
behaviour. For example, anyone who fails to perform obligations under a contract 
should be held responsible for that failure and thus be prepared to be sued if they do 
not redress the damage caused by their non-compliance. Therefore, in commercial 
culture it is normal, or at least not unusual, to resolve disputes by bringing litigation. 
Another factor that encourages litigation as a result of commercial culture is that 
people are not afraid to do business with strangers. This inevitably leads to the 
phenomenon that one party would not hesitate to initiate an action against another if 
they have violated an agreement. This is particularly true in China as Chinese people 







Thirdly, empirical studies have shown that Confucianism may not have any bearing 
on private shareholder litigation. For example, in Japan, which was and still is 
dominated by Confucian culture, only twenty derivative lawsuits were raised in the 
first thirty-five years after the introduction of derivative actions. It was argued that 
Japanese shareholders would forgo bringing derivative suits for financial gains 
owing to the cultural obsession with maintaining social harmony.
507
 However, this 
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argument lost its ground as the number of derivative actions being raised started to 
rise in 1980s. After litigation cost reforms in 1993, the number of derivative actions 
being brought rose rapidly, peaking in 1999 with ninety-five new actions filed and a 
total of 222 actions pending.
508
 This fact strongly refutes the argument that Japan’s 
culture was solely responsible for low litigation rates. Mark Ramseyer has even 
claimed that the cultural theory was little more than a tautology.
509
 In China, the 
increasing amount of litigation being engaged in also shows that Confucian culture 
may have less influence on private litigation than expected. After the Cultural 
Revolution, litigation actions rose significantly from 613,272 cases in 1979 to 
7,462,488 cases in 2009. Civil litigation constituted 51.9% of these actions in 1979, 
rising to 86.2% in 2009.
510
 In the first half of 2012, the number of private lending 
cases alone was 376,000, an increase of 24.78% compared with the same period for 
2011.
511
 The boom in commercial suits reveals that the influence of Confucian 
culture, which discourages litigation, is declining. 
 
The influence of culture on litigation is not unilateral. Instead, there is an interaction 
between culture and derivative action. As discussed above, commercial culture, 
which has been promoted by China’s economic development, indicates that people 
would not hesitate to bring an action against others if it is necessary to do so. As such, 
the establishment of this culture would encourage the use of derivative actions. On 
the other hand, the strengthening of derivative actions has the capacity to assist in the 
evolution of commercial culture in China. The main purpose of derivative actions is 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders and the company from being 
exploited by directors or controlling shareholders. It can thus be regarded as a means 
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of tackling corporate corruption and wrongdoing. From this perspective, derivative 
actions harbour the transformative potential of fostering a particular conception of a 
free commercial culture. As a result, the active use of derivative actions can have a 
positive impact on promoting commercial culture, which would be beneficial to 
derivative actions themselves in return. 
 
4.1.2. The Judiciary 
 
Another argument seeks to posit that China’s current judiciary may not be able to 
deal with the increasing volume of litigation, especially derivative actions needing 
specialist securities knowledge. This is true to some extent as the competence of 
Chinese judges has been criticised for a long time owing to an earlier policy 
permitting retired military officers to work as judicial authorities. As a result of this 
policy, many judges lacked legal knowledge as they had little or no legal education. 
However, the situation has been changing in recent years making the judiciary 
capable of dealing with derivative action cases for the reasons outlined below.  
 
First, Chinese judges are becoming increasingly competent. A new Judges Law
512
 
has replaced the previous policy and stipulates the need for qualifications for 
becoming a judge. For example, it requires an academic degree and work experience. 
Furthermore, entry-level judges are to be selected from individuals who not only 
meet the basic requirements,
513
 but have also passed a National Judicial Examination 
(Bar Exam).
514
 The bar exam in China is known to be “the most difficult exam in the 
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world” because of its low pass rate. With these strict requirements, it is believed that 
Chinese judges will become increasingly competent. 
 
Second, it is argued that if shareholders are encouraged to raise litigation, the courts 
will be heavily burdened in light of the prevailing exploitation of minority 
shareholder interests. Indeed, derivative actions may rise sharply if unnecessary 
restrictions are removed and shareholders are given strong incentives to exercise 
their right to take derivative action. However, there are sufficient judicial resources 
to deal with this increase in shareholder litigation as judges have risen in number 
from 130,000 in 1991 to 250,000 in 2010. This has created the availability of 
approximately one judge to every 48,000 people – a ratio that is much higher than in 
other jurisdictions. Although it is argued that some judges do not engage in the 
business of rendering judgment as they are responsible for administrative affairs, one 
of the tendencies of modern judicial reform in China is a reduction in the number of 
administrative judges. In addition, every year courts are recruiting increasingly 
qualified people to engage in judgment business with the retirement of 
non-competent judges who have no or little legal training. As a consequence, it can 
be expected that the judiciary would have little difficulty in dealing with the increase 
in such cases. 
 
Third, the courts are now more willing to accept shareholder litigation. Traditionally, 
courts have been unfriendly to private securities litigation. As early as 1996, 
shareholders repeatedly attempted to file suits with the courts, without one case being 
accepted.
515
 One example can vividly illustrate the unfortunate situation at that time. 
A company shareholder brought an action after the company’s chairman was 
sentenced to prison for committing financial fraud. However, the shareholder’s 
application was refused by the court despite the clear evidence of wrongdoing, 
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demonstrated by the chairman’s criminal conviction.
516
 This position continued even 
after the enactment of China’s securities law in 1998. In the face of this situation, the 
SPC surprisingly issued a report in 2001 stating that all lower courts should refuse to 
hear private securities litigation cases. However, this prohibition was suddenly 
changed in 2002 as the SPC lifted the restriction on accepting cases, though the only 
available cause of action was limited to false disclosure. After specific rules for 
handling private securities cases were issued by the SPC, the courts started to accept 
such litigations. Although the limited availability of civil remedies continues to be 
criticised, it is apparent that the attitude of the courts towards shareholder litigation 
has changed in a direction that is increasingly friendly towards shareholders. With 
the increasing awareness of the need to protect investors, Chinese courts can be 




The previous chapters attempt to demonstrate that derivative actions should be 
actively used and shareholders should be strongly encouraged to bring litigation. 
However, there is a concern that the traditional culture of unwillingness to raise 
proceedings and the lack of competent judiciary may hinder the improvement of 
derivative actions. Indeed, the Confucianism encouraging people to resolve disputes 
without going to the courts and the old policy permitting retired military officers to 
work as judicial authorities seem to provide obstacles for establishing effective 
derivative action system. Nevertheless, this part demonstrates that this worry is 
groundless owing to the co-existent culture of Legalist school and the enactment of 
the Judges Law. 
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4.2 Improving China’s Derivative Actions 
 
The previous chapter identified some loopholes in and problems with derivative 
actions in China. Although some possible solutions were provided in the process of 
analysis, some issues are not resolved. As such, this part will focus on tackling these 
unsolved loopholes and thus improve the system by looking to UK and US 
jurisdictions. In light of the importance of funding rules in providing incentives for 
shareholders to initiate derivative litigation, the funding issue will be examined 
separately in the next chapter. 
 
4.2.1 Who Can Sue? 
 
The standing requirement for individual shareholders to bring derivative actions in 
China is criticised for having too high a standard. This is because as an eligible 
plaintiff shareholder in joint stock companies (JSC) is required to hold one percent or 
more of the total shares separately or aggregately for at least 180 consecutive days. It 
is argued that this standing requirement should be relaxed in order to provide 
stronger protection for minority shareholders. Moreover, there may be some other 
factors that could be borrowed from standing requirements in the UK and the US. 
 
4.2.1.1 The Standing Requirement in the UK 
 
The scope of locus standi for shareholders in the UK to bring derivative actions has 
been widened. According to section 260(5)(C), a derivative action can now be 
initiated either by a shareholder or by a person who is not a member of the company 





 In addition, a shareholder ownership threshold does not need to be met, 
which means that it is theoretically possible for a claimant to purchase one share with 
the view to commencing derivative litigation. The new statutory rule also retains the 
common law position that a shareholder is entitled to initiate litigation even where 
the cause of litigation arose before he or she became a member of the company. This 
is different from the standing requirements in the US. 
 
4.2.1.2 The standing Requirement in the US 
 
Individual shareholders must meet certain requirements in order to initiate derivative 
actions in the US. There are currently four general standing requirements. First, the 
plaintiff must be a member of the company when the action is initiated regardless of 
a record owner of shares or have some beneficial interest in an equity security. 
Secondly, so-called “contemporaneous ownership” is required. This means that the 
plaintiff has to have been a shareholder when the alleged conduct took place. They 
may also meet this requirement if they acquired their shares by operation of law from 
a former holder who owned the shares at the time that the conduct complained of 
occurred. Thirdly, “continuing ownership” is also required. This means that the 
plaintiff must continuously be the member of the company during the period of the 
action. Lastly, the plaintiff must be able to represent the interests of the shareholders 
fairly and adequately.  
 
4.2.1.3 Suggestions for China 
 
Clearly, standing requirements in the UK and the US are quite different from one 
another. It seems that the scope of plaintiff shareholders in the UK is much wider 
than in the US, which may create the perception that derivative actions are stronger 
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and more frequently utilised and favoured in the UK as compared to the US. 
However, this is not the case as there are a number of other factors that affect the 
function of derivative actions in these two countries. Standing in these two countries 
is analysed further below. 
 
4.2.1.3.1 Is the Principle of Contemporaneous Ownership Needed?  
 
In the UK, contemporaneous ownership is not necessary to bring a derivative action 
as such actions are intended to benefit the corporate entity as opposed to any 
individual shareholder. It has therefore been found that “it never can be held that the 
acquiescence of the original holder of stock in illegal acts of the directors of a 
company will bind a subsequent holder of that stock to submission to all future acts 
of the same character”.
518
 However, this lack of restriction on the standing of 
plaintiffs may provide opportunities for malicious shareholders to bring frivolous 
litigation. 
 
In the US the answer to this question differs as contemporaneous ownership is 
required. It was originally established to prevent collusion in manipulating cases to 
create federal jurisdiction.
519
 The requirement has now been developed to prevent 
unjust enrichment on the part of those who acquired their shares with knowledge of 
an alleged wrong to discourage the litigation of purchased grievances. However, the 
justification for this rule has been strongly contested by scholars as the requirement 
goes well beyond these legitimate policy objectives. Two problems have been 
identified with the rule: first, it is argued that preventing the purchase of suits is not 
the true concern of this rule. Thus, the rule may be relaxed to allow a shareholder 
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who bought shares before discovering an alleged wrongdoing to initiate a derivative 
action despite not being a member of the company when the wrongdoing occurred. 
Second, the prevention of unjust enrichment cannot act as a true justification as any 
recovery will go to the company and thus all current shareholders would benefit no 
matter when he or she became the member of the company. A windfall for some 
shareholders is therefore inevitable. In fact, some shareholders who purchased shares 
after the alleged wrong may sustain injury under the rule as they are highly unlikely 
to have paid a discounted price for the shares if the wrongdoing was not publicly 
disclosed. 
 
The above concerns have been recognised resulting in the adoption of a corrective 
doctrine of “continuing wrong exception” in some jurisdictions. Under this doctrine, 
a shareholder is entitled to initiate a derivative action if the alleged wrong was still 
“continuing” at the time when they bought the company’s shares. However, it is 
argued that this exception makes the contemporaneous ownership requirement more 
complicated, as the standards to define “continuing wrong” have been applied 
differently.
520
 For example, one court stated that a wrong is a continuing one when 
“it spans the plaintiff’s ownership, or if new elements in a pattern of wrongful 
conduct occur after acquisition.”
521
 By contrast, another court has framed this 
continuing wrong exception as occurring when the conduct forming the basis for the 
cause of action was legally complete.
522
 Furthermore, some courts have been very 
conservative towards this doctrine as it might swallow the contemporaneous 
ownership rule. 
 
The above discussion suggests that the contemporaneous ownership rule may be 
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appropriate for adoption in China. In addition to the general aforementioned 
rationales behind this principle, there are some other circumstances that justify the 
adoption of this rule. First, the absence of contemporaneous ownership may create a 
market for claims. If an investor knows of wrongful behaviours taking place in a 
company in which he does not hold any shares, he may seek to purchase a 
shareholding of that company to bring an action. It may at first sight seem to be good 
for the company’s shareholders as the initiation of such proceedings could protect 
their interests from being exploited. However, it fails to be advantageous for the 
capital market in the long run as buying claims is not only morally wrong but also 
against the capital market’s aims. Generally, buying a company’s shares implies that 
you value that company or at least believe that its shares price will increase sooner or 
later. However, if the purpose of buying those shares is to bring an action rather than 
make a profit, the objective of the capital market is affected or hampered. Secondly, a 
market for claims is not only conducive to investors and harmful to the entire market, 
but also hurts a company’s development. A company can easily be rendered 
vulnerable to unmeritorious litigation as a result of such a market and its daily 
management would be inevitably affected. This is particularly serious in China in 
light of the short time that its capital market has been established and the 
imperfections of the country’s legal system. Therefore, the contemporaneous 
ownership rule should be transplanted into China. 
 
However, this rule must be relaxed to cater for the problems which have been 
identified above. The strict implementation of this principle may bring unfairness to 
shareholders, particularly when they buy shares without the knowledge of 
wrongdoing. As such, it is suggested that an individual shareholder should have 
standing to commence and maintain a derivative action even if he or she acquired the 
shares after the occurrence of alleged wrong provided that the alleged wrongdoing 
was not disclosed or specifically communicated to that shareholder. This approach 
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emphasises the importance of the public disclosure of alleged wrongs and it is 
believed that it can overcome the negative aspects of contemporaneous ownership 
rule. 
 
4.2.1.3.2 Is the Continuing Ownership Rule Needed? 
 
It is unclear in China whether a derivative action should be terminated if a plaintiff 
shareholder losses his or her qualification as a member of the company. It is also not 
clear in the UK whether a former shareholder is permitted to continue a claim as a 
derivative claim. In the US, plaintiff shareholders are required to continue to hold the 
relevant shares until the time of judgment. The rationale for this requirement is the 
prevention of the abuse of derivative actions, as a former shareholder, who would not 
benefit from the recovery, may be willing to accept an improper or inadequate 
settlement.
523
 However, whilst understandable, this rule should not be overextended 
as it might cause problems in certain special situations, like during mergers. Indeed, 
the State of Delaware has established two exceptions to the application of this rule: 
(1) a former shareholder might be entitled to initiate a derivative action when the 
merger itself is for the purpose of depriving shareholders’ standing to sue or is the 
subject of a claim of fraud; (2) a shareholder is also allowed to sue when 
shareholders receive different securities due to a merger but effectively remain the 




It is submitted that the Delaware’s approach could be adopted in China. Although the 
continuing ownership rule is not favourable for plaintiff shareholders as litigation 
would be terminated if they are no longer a member of the company, there are two 
reasons for adopting the US approach. First, former shareholders are unlikely to act 
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in a company’s interests; rather, they would probably act in their own interests as 
they have no direct relationship with the company. Second, even where a former 
shareholder is allowed to continue litigation, his or her claim would be rejected by 
the court because of their lack of direct interest in the outcome of the action.
525
 
Although it is argued that a failure to be a qualified shareholder may result from the 
manipulation of controlling shareholders or directors, this argument is addressed by 
Delaware’s introduction of two exceptions aimed at protecting the interests of 
plaintiff shareholders under these circumstances.
526
 These two exceptions should 
also be borrowed by China as a plaintiff shareholder could lose their qualification as 
a company member as a result of a manipulated merger. In view of the severe agency 
costs in China,
527
 it is highly possible for controlling shareholders to disqualify 
plaintiff shareholders using mergers. 
 
4.2.1.3.3 Is Fair and Adequate Representation Needed? 
 
In the US, fair and adequate representation is needed to qualify shareholders to 
initiate derivative actions. This requirement, which derives from Rule 23.1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reflects the recognition that a derivative action is 
above all a representative action and is thus subject to many of the same abuses and 
problems as are class actions. Traditionally, the law of fiduciary duties provides 
broad standing for shareholders to contest corporate practice. As a consequence, 
individual shareholders may take advantage of this and gain leverage to advance 
those of their interests that are not shared by such holders as a class. Where such 
conflicts have been identified by the courts, shareholder standing to initiate 
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derivative actions is denied. In deciding whether plaintiff shareholders are fair and 
adequate representatives for the interests of the company’s shareholders, the primary 
concern is how to define “adequacy”. Three aspects have been identified in this 
regard: (1) the existence of any conflict of interest that would compromise the 
plaintiff’s ability to serve as a representative of other shareholders; (2) the 
competence of the lawyer representing the plaintiff; and (3) any other evidence 




There is no such requirement in China or the UK. This standing requirement is good 
for the company as a whole, because the interests of the company could be harmed if 
a plaintiff shareholder cannot fairly and adequately represent the other shareholders. 
However, this requirement is not suitable for wholesale transplantation into the 
Chinese system as the interpretation and application of the principle are too vague 
and difficult for China’s courts in practice. In order to ensure that litigation interests 
are adequately represented and the application is clear, two matters can be considered 
by the courts in determining that litigation is not adequately represented. These 
pertain to the following situation: (1) where the purpose of the plaintiff shareholder 
to bring a derivative action is to gain personal benefit. For example, the shareholder 
may use the action as a tool to threaten a company’s managers in order to obtain 
compensation privately. In such a situation, a plaintiff shareholder loses their 
standing to bring a derivative action; and (2) where the plaintiff shareholder has 
authorised or acquiesced to the claimed wrongdoings. As a shareholder cannot come 
to court with clean hands and is actually a co-defendant in such a situation, they are 
surely disqualified from raising proceedings.  
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that the fair and adequate representation 
rule is not suitable for adoption in China. Instead, the court should assume that the 
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claimant shareholder adequately and fairly represents the body of shareholders unless 
the two circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraph apply. 
 
4.2.2 Who Can be Sued? 
 
The scope of the defendants in derivative actions in China has been extended from 
directors or managers to include “other persons”. That means that a third person who 
is neither a company member nor a director could also be sued where they infringe 
the legitimate rights and interests of a company, and cause a loss. This approach is 
the same as that of the US where any person who damages the interests of a company 
may be subject to a derivative action. 
 
In the UK, a new statutory rule has provided that a cause of action may be brought 
against a third party other than a director.
529
 Unlike in China or the US, this 
provision does not mean that any third party who is not relevant to the directors 
could be a defendant. It only applies to those persons who have assisted directors in 
the breach of their duties.
530
 Although the scope of defendants in the UK has been 
broadened, there are still some restrictions on a third party being sued, when 
compared to China and the US.  
 
The current scope of potential defendants in China, particularly the scope of third 
parties, should be maintained for two reasons: first, “other persons” should be 
interpreted liberally to include shareholders or controlling shareholders under the 
Chinese Company Law. Restrictions on this would inevitably create a risk that some 
shareholders be excluded from being sued in derivative actions. Second, an empirical 
study has shown that about 45 percent of all defendants in China fall into the 
                                                             
529
 S260(3) of the Companies Act 2006. 
530
 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text & Materials (Oxford University Press 2009) 556. 
 
 206 
category of “other persons”.
531
 If the scope of third persons were confined to those 
who have assisted directors in the breach of their duties, some wrongdoers could not 
be disciplined.  
 
There may be a counter-argument asserting that this broad scope of defendants could 
put a third person at risk, especially when they are doing the business with managers 
or directors in good faith. Furthermore, this wide scope could be harmful to 
commercial certainty, which is significantly important to economic development. 
Indeed, it would be unfair to third persons if they were to become a potential 
defendant because of a good faith transaction in which they had not colluded with 
directors or acts. However, the law does recognise this situation and thus provides a 
mechanism to protect such third parties. This is stipulated in China’s Property Law
532
 
rather than its Company Law. Article 106 of the Property Law stipulates that an 
assignee should be entitled to obtain the ownership of real property or movable 
property even if the assignor has no right to dispose of such property, as long as the 
following circumstances are met: (1) the assignee has accepted the real or movable 
property in good faith; (2) the property is transferred at a reasonable price; and (3) 
the property has been delivered to the assignee or registered, if that is required.
533
 As 
such, concerns about the validity of transactions and commercial certainty are 
unnecessary if a third person acts in good faith.  
 
4.2.3 The Status of the Company 
 
One of the features of derivative actions is that they are initiated by individual 
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shareholders on behalf of the company owing to the fact that the company itself has 
failed to raise civil proceedings against the wrongdoers. It therefore seems that the 
company does not need to participate in this litigation as it has a plaintiff shareholder, 
and a director or third person as a defendant. However, as the results of the litigation 
will have a direct impact on the company, it should surely be involved in the 
derivative action in some capacity. Unfortunately, the Company Law does not 
stipulate what the legal status of the company is in China. 
 
In the US, a company has a dual status in derivative actions. On the one hand, it can 
only serve as a nominal party defendant, as the company refuses to bring an action 
against wrongdoers on its behalf. On the other hand, it is the real party plaintiff as 
any compensation from the litigation will be ascribed to the company instead of the 
plaintiff shareholder.
534
 In the UK, a company is also the nominal party defendant as 
the organ (general meeting or board of directors) of the company does not permit the 
initiation of an action and is thus disqualified from being a party plaintiff. 
 
So what should the legal status of the company in China’s derivative suit be? 
Obviously, it cannot be positioned as a party plaintiff for the following reasons: first, 
the Company Law specifically stipulates that the plaintiff must be a shareholder, 
which would be violated if the company is regarded as a party plaintiff. Second, a 
shareholder as the plaintiff in derivative litigation is widely accepted in various 
jurisdictions. Third, since the company refuses to bring a suit, it is inappropriate to 
treat it as a party plaintiff. Fourth, there are no cases indicating that the company 
should be positioned as a party plaintiff (see the table below). In light of this, can the 
company be treated as a nominal party defendant, like in the UK and US? The 
answer is negative for two reasons: first, there is no such concept of nominal party 
defendant in the Chinese legal system. Therefore, the civil procedural law would 
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have to be revised in order to accommodate this concept if it were adopted. Second, 
since there is a fundamental conflict of interests between wrongdoers and the 
company, a nominal defendant position would confuse or ignore this difference.  
 
As a company is neither suitable to be regarded as a party plaintiff nor a nominal 
party defendant, naturally it falls within the scope of a third party without an 
independent claim in the litigation. According to article 56 of the Civil Procedural 
Law, a third party without an independent claim refers to a party who has no 
independent claim to the object of the litigation, but who has a legal interest in the 
outcome of the case.
535
 Some commentators argue that a company is not qualified to 
be a third party without an independent claim as in actuality it actually does have 
such an independent claim.
536
 Indeed, a company whose interests have been 
damaged by a wrongdoer is supposed to have an independent claim. However, that 
claim is transferred to the plaintiff shareholders after the company refuses to bring an 
action. Therefore, a company does not have an independent claim at least in the 
process of a derivative action.  
 
Moreover, the position of a third party is recognised both in regulation and practice. 
In 2007, the Shanghai High People’s Court issued the Several Opinions on the Cases 
of Shareholder Derivative Actions, in which article 2 stipulates that a company 
should be positioned as a third party when the People’s Court is hearing shareholder 
derivative action case. Although these Opinions do not have any binding effect 
throughout the country as a whole, they do impact courts in other provinces. This has 
been proved by an empirical study conducted by Huang, in which the companies 
were treated as third parties in an overwhelming majority of cases between 2006 and 
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Status of Company in Derivative Actions from 2006 to 2013 
Position of Company in the suit Number of Cases Percentage 
Defendant 4 5% 
Third Party 49 64% 
Not Specified 24 31% 
Total 77 100% 
 
4.2.4 The Cause of the Action 
 
Potential defendants in derivative actions can be divided into two groups and the 
Company Law 2005 sets different causes for these two types of defendants. The first 
group, which is limited to directors, supervisors and senior managers, can be sued 
when they have caused losses to the company by breaching a law, administrative 
regulation or the company’s articles of association, in the course of performing their 
company duties. The second group, which is referred as “others”, may become 
defendants when they have damaged the company by violating its lawful rights and 
interests.
538
 The wording of the above indicates that the causes for these two groups 
of defendants are not unified as the basis to sue the first group is narrow. According 
to article 152 of Chinese Company Law 2005, directors, supervisors or senior 
managers should not be held liable if they have violated the law, administrative 
regulations and articles of association causing losses to the company while acting in 
circumstances other than in the course of performing their company duties. However, 
this restriction is obviously unreasonable as such persons may engage in misconduct 
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and cause losses to the company even when they are not acting in the course of 
performing their duties. 
 
In the UK, the cause of a derivative action is confined under section 260(3) of the 
Companies Act 2006 to the enforcement of director’s duties. This is specified as 
being ‘only in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or 
omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director 
of the company’. From the wording of this section, it is clear that a derivative claim 
is no longer barred by common law requirements under the Foss rule. Furthermore, 
the types of breach under which a derivative action may be brought have also been 
extended. Under this new statutory rule, any breach of the general duties of directors 
stipulated in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the Act, including the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence could form the basis for a derivative claim. The 
inclusion of negligence further broadens the scope of this basis as any instance of a 
breach of duty could lead to an action.  
 
In the US, there are no express causes of action for which a derivative claim is to be 
initiated. Instead, the distinctions between direct actions and derivative actions 
outline such causes. In determining whether a particular claim is derivative or 
personal, the major test employed is the application of the injury and the right 
criteria.
539
 Specifically, as stated in one case: 
 
Where the injury is personalized to a shareholder and flows from a violation of rights 
inherent in the ownership of stock, suit may be brought by the shareholder. On the 
other hand, where the injury is to the corporation and only affects the shareholders 
incidentally, the action is derivative.
540
 
                                                             
539
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As such, an individual shareholder could bring a derivative action against such a 
corporate injury. Since directors, senior managers and controlling shareholders are 
generally considered to owe fiduciary duties to the company rather than to individual 
shareholders, the breach of these duties occasioning “claims of gross negligence, 
mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive compensation, and usurpation of corporate 




In view of the above discussion, it seems that the basis to form a derivative claim in 
China is narrower than in the US, and even much narrower than in the UK. As noted 
above, directors or senior managers can only become defendants if they are acting in 
the course of performing their company duties. In other words, if they are acting 
under any other circumstances than performing those duties, they cannot be sued 
even where they engage in misconduct and cause loss to the company. This 
unreasonable basis should be changed and extended. However, such an extension 
should notably not be as broad as that under the new UK regime.
542
 Indeed, allowing 
a broader range of claims to be brought might be beneficial in terms of general 
corporate accountability, but a wide basis may increase the already heightened fears 
of directors regarding potential litigation and could thus reduce the number of 
talented individuals willing to take directorships. Moreover, the essence of designing 
a derivative action system is to strike a balance between protecting the interests of 
the company and minority shareholders, and respecting the company’s management. 
Widening the application of derivative actions without restriction cannot achieve this 
balance. Third, although it is submitted in this thesis that derivative actions should be 
effectively encouraged, this does not mean that every aspect of derivative actions 
should be substantially widened or lessened. In fact, considering that this thesis 
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suggests lowering the rules regarding funding issue and the standing requirement, it 
is not necessary to widen the basis for a derivative claim to be brought without limit. 
Fourth, even in the UK where a wide basis has been adopted, this has not been 
without controversy during the legislative process.
543
 Arguably, this change in the 
UK did not constitute any major change of principle to derivative actions as such 
actions remain under tight judicial control under the new procedure.
544
 As a 
consequence, it is submitted that the circumstances under which a wrong is 
committed is not relevant to whether a defendant can be sued. As long as the 
defendant violates the related laws and damages the interests of the company, they 
should be eligible to become defendants in a derivative action regardless of whether 




It is generally acknowledged that the judicial control of settlement or withdrawal of 
claims acts as an important check on derivative actions for the following two reasons: 
first, there is a potential risk that plaintiff shareholders may secretly reach a 
settlement with the defendants on terms advantageous to both parties while not in the 
interests of the company. Second, there is a disparity of interest between plaintiff 
shareholders and their lawyers in derivative actions as lawyers may find a smaller but 
speedier settlement more profitable and less risky than going to trial. This is 
particularly the case in the US owing to the contingency arrangement fees funding 
rule.
545
 In such circumstances, lawyers have an incentive to settle with defendants 
although this may only have a minimal per share return on the plaintiff shareholders. 
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Under UK law, the Civil Procedure Rules R19.9F also requires that a settlement 
should be approved by the courts where the court has given permission to continue a 
derivative claim. Regrettably, the law did not provide any specific rules for the court 




However, the Chinese Company Law 2005 is silent on this important issue, while 
article 51 of Chinese Procedural Law merely states that the two parties may reach a 
settlement on their own accord without obtaining consent from the court. As there is 
no specific provision regulating derivative actions in the area of settlement, this 
inevitably leads to the assumption that the settlement of derivative claims is not 
subject to judicial controls. Nevertheless, the aim of redressing corporate wrong and 
recovering corporate losses cannot be achieved without a requirement for the courts’ 
approval. 
 
In the US, in order to prevent any possibility of abuse by the company or minority 
shareholders, a derivative action should not be settled, discontinued, compromised, 
or voluntarily dismissed by agreement between the plaintiff and a defendant, except 
with the approval of the court. In the absence of circumstances leading the court to 
find that the interests of the other shareholders will not be substantially affected by 
the settlement or other disposition, a notice of the terms of the settlement agreement 
must be sent to all the shareholders on an individual basis to the extent practicable. If 
some shareholders object to the settlements, then a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
for the settlement hearing is provided to allow them to contest the adequacy of the 
settlement.
547
 It is argued that this approach should be adopted in China so that any 
settlement or withdrawal of a derivative action is reviewed by the courts in order to 
prevent abuse by other shareholders and the company. However, regarding the rights 
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of dissident shareholders, the US approach of opening a hearing may not be suitable 
for China, as it would cost money and time. More importantly, there is no law 
regulating the court hearings in China and thus there is a risk that such a hearing 
might become a virtual trial. In light of this, it is recommended that dissident 
shareholders be allowed to submit a report stating why they object to the settlement 
within a reasonable period. Failure to submit such a statement should be deemed to 
constitute consent to such a settlement. 
 
If a settlement must obtain consent from the courts, then the issue of how the courts 
review the settlement must be determined. In other words, what are the criteria or 
standards that must be applied by courts to approve or reject a settlement? In the US, 
the standard applied by the federal courts in deciding whether a settlement should be 
accepted is whether it is “fair and reasonable and in the best interests of all those who 
will be affected by it.”
548
 While the concept of fair and reasonable is ambiguous, the 
courts have developed a flexible test to consider the amount of the settlement in light 
of all the circumstances, this includes the following factors: (1) the complexity, 
expense, and probable duration of continued litigation; (2) the best possible recovery; 
(3) the likely recovery if the claims were fully litigated; (4) the risk of establishing 
damages; (5) the risk of maintaining the class action throughout trail; (6) the reaction 
of the class to the settlement; (7) the stage of the proceedings; and (8) the ability of 
the defendants to withstand a greater judgment.
549
 When it comes specifically to 
China’s courts in evaluating whether to approve a settlement, the above factors can 
be adopted for consideration. However, China’s courts should also pay attention to 
two additional issues: (1) the legitimacy of the settlement. Besides fairness and 
reasonableness, the legitimacy of the settlement should also be emphasised;
550
 and 
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(2) whether the plaintiff shareholder is acting in good faith in reaching such a 
settlement. 
 
4.2.6 Procedural Restrictions 
 
4.2.6.1 Different Approach 
 
In order to weed out frivolous, dishonest, vexatious or abusive claims at an early 
stage in the process before the actual substance of a claim is addressed, various 
procedural restrictions have been adopted in different jurisdictions. In China, the 
Company Law 2005 sets a demand requirement in derivative action procedures. This 
requires the qualified shareholders to make a demand in writing to the appropriate 
body before raising proceedings. This rule is actually a nod to the principle of the 
exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies and is justified because the company should 
be offered the opportunity to remedy the wrong before going to court, as it is the 
company itself who suffers directly. This is the same in the US where all States have 
a generalized requirement for a demand from the board before a derivative action can 
be brought. 
 
Nevertheless, the UK adopts a different approach. The Companies Act 2006 
incorporates a two-stage test to be met by claimants before permitting a case to 
proceed to the merits stage. Previously under the Foss rule, individual shareholders 
had to demonstrate that a claim fell within an exception in order to bring a derivative 
action. Now, whilst individual shareholders can readily initiate such litigation against 
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Before examining which approach is the most suitable one for China, it is essential to 
ask whether such procedural restrictions are necessary in China. As discussed above, 
a procedural restriction is established to screen out unmeritorious suits. Without this 
restriction, companies might easily be distracted by unnecessarily lawsuits and the 
court would have to hear numerous trivial and abusive claims. Indeed, it is submitted 
that derivative actions in China should be encouraged and thus unnecessary 
restrictions should be removed. However, there is a balance that should be pursued in 
this procedure. Considering the fact that reform of the funding rule and the lower 
standards for the standing requirement would improve this system, it is essential to 
retain this procedural restriction in order to strike a balance between preventing 
frivolous suits and allowing meritorious actions. 
 
The next question then, is to discuss whether China should continue to adopt this 
demand requirement or transplant the UK approach. This thesis argues that the 
current procedural rule should remain because the two-stage approach is ambiguous 
and demand requirements have notable advantages. 
 
4.2.6.2 The Ambiguousness of the UK Approach 
 
At the first stage in the UK approach, claimants must satisfy the court that the 
evidence filed in support of their claim discloses a prima facie case. If so, the court 
may require that evidence should be provided by the company. If the court is 
satisfied that the evidence submitted discloses no prima facie case, it is obliged to 
dismiss the claim and may make any consequential order it considers appropriate.552 
If the court decides not to dismiss the claim at the first stage, at the second stage the  
court is required to take account of the matters specified in s 263 in deciding whether 
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to grant permission. 
 
Initially, the first stage which requires the applicant to disclose a prima facie case 
was not recommended by the Law Commission as they had a concern that this could 
easily result in an expensive mini-trial.
553
 However, this was adopted by Parliament 
because it was expected that a front-line safeguard for derivative actions could 
“avoid opening a Pandora’s Box to every disenchanted individual in the country.”
554
 
It was also thought that the removal of particular elements of the Foss rule such as 
the requirement to establish “wrongdoer control” and “fraud on the minority” could 
open the floodgates to derivative actions. As such, establishing the first stage would 
enable the court to dismiss frivolous actions without the involvement of companies at 
the earliest phase. 
 
However, there are several problems with this approach. First of all, the type of 
documentation required for submission to the court at this stage remains unclear as 
the Act fails to make any explicit stipulation. Secondly, the test of ‘no prima facie 
case’ is also unclear. The concept of prima facie might be familiar to lawyers as it 
has been the primary test applicable in interim injunction applications.
555
 However, 
there is little guidance on how to establish the probability of success in the context of 
the new statutory derivative action. Gibbs suggested that if an applicant could 
establish that there is more than a 0 percent chance of success, the prima facie case 
ought to be satisfied.
556
 This approach was derived from the decision in Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd,
557
 which in turn is taken 
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from the case of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd.
558
 However, there is no 
mention of 0 percent chance of success in these two cases. Instead, the latter case 
established a principle that the courts must be satisfied if there is a serious question 
to be tried. This means that the merits of the derivative actions should not be 
examined at this stage in order to avoid a drawn out process.
559
 In Iesini v Westrip 
Holdings Ltd, Lewsion J noted that the judge at first instance had considered there 
was a prima facie case on paper and thus moved on to the second stage. He explained 
that: 
 
At the first stage, the applicant is required to make a prima facie case for permission 
to continue a derivative claim, and the court considers the question on the basis of 
the evidence filed by the applicant only, without requiring evidence from the 
defendant or the company. The court must dismiss the application if the applicant 




Here, although Lewsion J did not point out the specific criterion for demonstrating a 
prima facie case, he made it clear that the prima facie case should not turn into a 
mini-trial of sorts. In the Scottish case of Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd, Lord 
Reed also shared the above view and stated that: 
 
The question is not whether the application and supporting evidence disclose a 
prima facie case against the defenders to the proposed derivative proceedings, but 
whether there is no prima facie case disclosed for granting the application for 
leave…It is to be noted that no onus is placed on the applicant to satisfy the court 
that there is a prima facie case: rather, the court is to refuse the application if it is 




This statement suggests that the court imposes a low threshold at the first stage, an 
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approach that would be advantageous for claimants.
562
 However, in Stimpson v 
Southern Landlords Association, the court held that the factors set out in Section 
263(2), (3) and (4) should be considered in determining an application at the initial 
stage.
563
 Consideration of such factors would naturally have implications regarding 
the filing burden on plaintiffs in raising a suit. This was certainly never Parliament’s 
intention. 
 
Furthermore, it has even been suggested in some cases that the first stage 
proceedings may be merged into the second stage, as occurred in Franbar Holdings 
Ltd v Patel.
564
 Here, the judge explained this approach as follows: 
 
Franbar has not so far sought to establish a prima facie case for permission to 
continue its derivative claim […and thus] it would be appropriate for me to deal with 




In Mission Capital plc v Sinclair, the parties agreed to merge two stages into one 
process and the judge regarded this as “sensible”.
566
 According to this case, it seems 
that it would not be sensible to separate these two stages. However, this conflation 
would inevitably undermine the valid legislative purpose behind the adoption of a 
two-stage procedure in such actions. Also, this approach was not followed in Langley 
Ward Limited v Gareth Wynn Trevor, Seven Holdings Limited.
567
 In this case, the 
judge clearly expressed his disappointment that the preliminary screen of a prima 
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4.2.6.3 The Strengths of the Demand Requirement 
 
Although there are loopholes in the current procedure surrounding the demand rule, 
the rule has nevertheless been recognised as serving distinct purposes that are 
additional to the general justifications discussed above. This is particularly so in light 
of the modern-day backdrop in China. 
 
First, the demand rule provides the board with an opportunity to determine whether 
to take appropriate corrective action or pursue other remedies, such as dismissal or 
demotion of a defendant employee. The modern enterprise system has been 
established for only fifteen years in China and there are inevitably some problems 
that persist in Chinese companies including director misbehaviours. Once a 
wrongdoing is identified, it is essential that the company is informed first, offering it 
a chance to resolve the matter within the corporation. This is not only good for the 
corporation in allowing it to protect its reputation, but is also beneficial to building 
the modern corporate system, as it allows companies to learn how to address issues 
internally.  
 
Secondly, the demand rule could protect the court from unnecessarily hearing a case 
that is not ripe for decision. Although Chinese judges are capable of dealing with the 
increasing volume of cases given the significant rise in the appointment of judges in 
the past few years, it is obviously not wise for all cases to flow into the courts. 
Judicial resources would be wasted, and other meritorious cases may be affected and 
thus not properly dealt with. The implementation of the demand rule may allow some 
potential disputes to be resolved within companies without resorting to the courts. 
 
Thirdly, the demand rule may induce a board to consider the disputes or issues and 
crystallise policies that otherwise might not be given attention. For example, they 
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may revise corporate policy statements, introduce new accounting controls or simply 
make a change in personnel or remuneration.
569
 This means the demand rule can be 
efficient in improving corporate governance even where a board refuses a demand 
and the court ultimately permits the plaintiff shareholder to sue. This is particularly 
important for Chinese companies considering the short-period that the modern 
enterprise system has been established in China and the urgent need to improve 




The foregoing discussion focuses on how to improve China’s derivative action 
system by looking to UK and US jurisdictions. Although it is argued that legal 
transplant in the area of commercial law for China is not only inevitably but also 
necessary,
570
 not every rule of derivative actions in the UK or US is suitable for 
China as demonstrated above. Under the existing derivative action rule, Chinese 
shareholders have raised proceedings to protect the interests of company and 
themselves from being exploited, though the number of such cases is quite rare. If 
the problems of this institution are resolved and the gaps are filled as discussed 
above, it is expected that this right would be much more friendly used and minority 
shareholders’ interests would be better safeguarded. 
4.3 Who is Responsible for Assessing Derivative Actions? 
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It may seem strange to ask where responsibility lies for assessing derivative actions 
given that this role is usually assigned to courts. Indeed, in Commonwealth 
countries where derivative actions have been enacted, courts assume a paternalistic 
role and are assigned significant flexibility and discretion in deciding whether 
derivative actions should be permitted.
571
 Nevertheless, courts are not the only 
entities assessing derivative actions; other entities may also be entrusted with that 
role. For example, special litigation committee (SLC) is assigned with this role in 
the US where the courts normally only review the suitability of decision makers and 
the propriety of the decision-making process. 
 
As such, there are two approaches to determining responsibility for assessing 
derivative actions: the SLC approach, adopted in the US; and the court approach, 
adopted in most Commonwealth countries, like the UK. This part will examine 
these two approaches and discuss suggestions that might be drawn from this 
examination for use in China. 
4.3.2 Two Different Approaches 
 
4.3.2.1 The US Approach: the Special Litigation Committee 
 
In the US, plaintiff shareholders must make a demand on the board of directors 
prior to initiating a derivative action.
572
 If their demand is rejected, then the 
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plaintiff shareholder can continue to bring litigation, though they cannot challenge 
the board’s dismissal unless they demonstrate that the refusal was wrongful.
573
 This 
so-called “wrongful refusal rule” is founded on the presumption that a corporate 
litigation decision is a business decision and should thus be decided by the board of 
directors. Indeed, were a board’s decision not respected by the court, then the 
demand requirement would be merely tokenistic and deprived of any substantive 
meaning. 
 
Likewise, where a board is controlled by the wrongdoer and is thus unlikely to 
render a sound decision in response to a demand, it would be futile for a plaintiff 
shareholder to make such a demand. Here, failure to secure permission may be 
excused in certain circumstances and the plaintiff shareholder can bring an action 
directly to the court. However, this does not mean that the company is no longer of 
any importance; the company still has a significant role to play in these situations. 
Recognising board disqualifications in deciding whether litigation should be 
allowed in demand-excused cases, a special litigation committee was established in 
the 1970s as an independent and appropriate body for making litigation decisions in 
place of boards where impartiality is questioned.
574
 The SLC must decide, subject 
to judicial approval, whether the litigation is in the best interests of the company 
and thus litigate or dismiss the action accordingly. In order to be qualified to play 
this role, a special litigation committee is comprised of independent and 
disinterested directors who are appointed by the board of directors.
575
 Now the 
question “how the court reacts to the decision of SLC” arises. If a court choose to 
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defer to the decision of SLC, then it is fair to say that the essence of the SLC 
approach is to assign the role of assessing derivative actions to a company. The 
reason is that special litigation committee is established by the board of directors 
while the board is acting on behalf of a company. 
 
4.3.2.1.1 The Special Litigation Committee Approach: Company 
Approach 
 
When the decision is made by SLC, how the courts react to that? From the 
perspective of legislation, although different states in the US adopt different 
standards in reviewing this decision, they are inclined to defer to the SLC’s decision. 
For example, in New York where the standard is liberal, the court held in Auerbach 
v. Bennett that there were two aspects in SLC’s decision: substantial and 
procedural.
576
 Substantially, the court adopted the business judgment rule in 
reviewing the decision of SLC. Procedurally, the court would only review the 
process as well as the independence of the committee. This standard reveals the fact 
that if the process of the committee is fair and the members of the SLC are 
independent, the SLC’s decision would normally be deferred by the court owing to 
the business judgment rule unless the plaintiff shareholder is able to overturn it. 




In Delaware, the Supreme Court set a two-step test in the famous case of Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado in reviewing the decision of SLC: first: the court “must inquire 
into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its 
conclusions”
578
 and a company “should have the burden of proving independence, 
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good faith and a reasonable investigation”.
579
 Unlike the application of business 
judgment rule, a company has to demonstrate the independence, good faith and 
reasonable as they cannot be presumed. Second, the court can still determine 
whether the suit should be dismissed by “its own business judgment” even if the 
first-step test is passed. When applying its own judgement, the court should give 
“special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the 
corporation’s best interest”.
580
 However, this approach is criticised in several 
respects. For example, it is argued that the application of the court’s own business 




In practice, as Demott points out, the court normally reaches a decision by 
reviewing the SLCs motion rather than by making an assessment by itself on 
whether an action is in the best interests of the company.
582
 As such, the SLC’s 
decision will generally be deferred to unless the members of the SLCs are proved to 
be not independent or disinterested. In light of this, it is clear that courts in the US 
take a hands-off attitude in evaluating whether derivative actions are in the best 
interests of a company.
583
 Rather, a SLC itself is primarily assigned to this role. 
Given the fact that the members of SLCs are appointed by the board of directors, it 
is sensible to say that company is entrusted with the role for assessing derivative 
actions. 
 
4.3.2.2 The UK Approach: the Courts 
 
Unlike the US approach, most Commonwealth countries where derivative actions 
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have been enacted have entrusted national courts to assume a more active role in 
deciding whether derivative actions should be permitted.
584
 For example, in Canada 
and New Zealand, company law requires courts to assess whether a derivative 
action is in the best interests of a company before permitting or rejecting it.
585
 Here, 
the courts are actually assigned with the role of assessing the appropriateness of an 




With the enactment of derivative actions in the Companies Act 2006, a similar 
approach was adopted in the UK. Here, courts have broad discretion in deciding the 
admissibility of applications for derivative actions. For example, whether a plaintiff 
shareholder acts in good faith may affect the result of litigation, though courts are 
not bound to refuse an application even if a member is not acting in good faith in 
pursuing a claim.
587
 The precise meaning of good faith depends on the courts’ 
interpretation.
588
 Secondly, although courts must refuse the shareholder permission 
to proceed with a derivative action under Section 263(2) of the Companies Act 2006 
in certain prescribed circumstances, they retain some discretion in this respect. For 
example, if the court is satisfied that a person acting in accordance with section 172 
(duty to promote the success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim, 
the court must terminate the application for derivative action. However, the term 
“success” still relies on the court’s interpretation. Finally, and most importantly, 
while an effective ratification or authorisation constitutes an absolute bar to 
derivative actions, a company’s decision not to pursue a claim cannot have a 
binding effect on the courts.
589
 Thus, courts can still permit an application for 
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permission for a derivative action even if a company has decided that the litigation 
should not be instituted or be terminated.  
 
In Lesini, Lewison J. said that “the weighing of these considerations is essentially a 
commercial decision, which the court is ill-equipped to take, except in a clear 
case”.
590
 Under this case, it suggests that the courts will defer to the decisions of 
the directors and thus the UK jurisdiction belongs to the company approach rather 
than the court approach. However, these remarks of his Lordship were criticised for 
the reasons that they are in the same vein as those of judges of the past who have 
resolutely refrained from passing judgment on what directors have done, on the 
basis that judges are not qualified to second guess the business decisions made by 
directors.
591
 Furthermore, the judge can certainly have his or her own view about 
the business decision as this does not require him or her to become an expert on 
such matters. The judge can make an independent judgement by hearing evidence 
from those who are conversant with the business. If the approach in lesini is widely 
applied, namely refusing to make a judgment with regard to commercial decisions 
made by directors, the permission will be rarely given which would make the 
statutory derivative actions regime become virtually redundant.
592
 As such, the 
courts are essentially bound to make a commercial judgment about the merits of the 
shareholder’s case against the director. 
 
In view of the above discussion, it demonstrates that under English law, the courts 
are endowed with greater powers and discretion in deciding derivative actions. 
4.3.3 Evaluating the Two Approaches 
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There has been a long debate about who is eligible to assess litigation. Both the 
company approach and the court approach have their own justifications. This part 
evaluates each approach and examines which is better for deciding whether an 
action is in a company’s best interests. 
 
4.3.3.1 The Company Approach 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Rationales  
 
One strong justification for the company approach is that a company is recognised 
as being an independent legal entity, and is thus entitled to decide whether or not to 
bring an action to redress a wrong done to it. As the decision to initiate a derivative 
action is no different from the decision to pursue an ordinary business transaction, 
companies undoubtedly have a prerogative to decide whether a derivative action 
should be commenced. Indeed, the decision to undertake a derivative action is 
similar to decisions on business matters, as both involve the application of a 
“company’s resources to run a risk against an expected return”.
593
 However, it is 
argued that a company’s autonomy is eradicated in a derivative action scenario as 
wrongdoers might have used the company as a tool for their own benefits. In such 
situations, a company cannot function effectively as an independent organisation. 
Where a company fails to sustain its independent personality, this approach 
becomes contrived and it is thus necessary for outsiders to intervene to decide 
whether litigation is in the best interests of the company. 
 
The second rationale behind this approach is that it saves time and expense if the 
company is given the authority to make the decision itself. Without resorting to 
outsiders, considerable judicial resources and expenditures can be saved.  
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Furthermore, directors would be overcautious in managing a corporation if a 
company is not entrusted with making final litigation decisions. The over 
cautiousness in management may not only affect the company’s returns, but could 
also hamper the economic development of society as a whole. 
 
4.3.3.1.2 Counter-arguments  
 
Despite the above justifications, it is still inappropriate to assign companies this role 
if wrongdoers might be in control of the company. Indeed, there are other reasons 
why a company is not an appropriate body to assess whether a derivative action is in 
its own best interests in these cases. 
 
First, it is universally recognised that a company lacks an authentic decision-making 
body in circumstances where derivative actions are brought.
594
 Where the majority 
of the directors are the defendants in the litigation, the board of directors obviously 
loses its standing as an appropriate decision-making body. Even where only a small 
number of directors have wronged the company, most of the other directors may be 
accused of having approved, acquiesced in, or at least failed to rectify the alleged 
misbehaviours. Although current US legislation does not exempt shareholders from 
making their initial demand for derivative litigation to the company because of 
inactivity or acquiescence on the part of directors, this does not mean that 
defendants who have not directly participated in or profited from the alleged 
wrongdoing are allowed to engage in deciding the fate of the suit.
595
 Furthermore, 
even where most directors have not directly or indirectly profited from or engaged 
in the alleged wrongdoing, the board may be tainted as a result of inherent or 
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Current practice in the US provides a vivid example to illustrate this point. As 
outlined above, a special litigation committee will be established if a demand is 
excused in certain circumstances. SLCs are comprised of independent or 
disinterested directors who assume the role of determining whether a derivative 
action is in the interests of the company. This independent committee seems to be 
the best organ to assess a derivative action because of its independence and access 
to information. However, practical studies have cast some doubts over the use of 
these committees. Cox has conducted a survey of 30 cases involving SLCs and 
found that no committee recommended prosecution against claimed directors.
597
 
Another study also revealed a similar result where no committee had ever suggested 
that a derivative action is in the best interests of the company.
598
 This data 
demonstrates that disinterested directors may be compromised for a variety of 
reasons, including what some commentators refer to as a structural bias.
599
 Indeed, 
it is argued that “if the involved directors expected any result other than a 
recommendation of termination at least as to them, they would probably never 
establish the committee”.
600
 From this perspective, it is correct to consider SLCs as 
tolling a death knell for derivative actions.
601
 Above all, as reliance upon SLCs 
composed of independent directors is called into question, it is clear that companies 
lack an authentic decision-making body for determining whether a derivative action 
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is in their best interests. 
 
Secondly, allowing a company to make litigation decisions may widen the gap 
between shareholders and directors, with unethical consequences. While a company 
is entrusted to decide whether or not litigation is in its best interests, a derivative 
action that is originally taken against a defendant director may turn into a lawsuit 
between the plaintiff shareholder and the company. The divide generated by the 
vertical agency cost would be deepened as a result of this approach and the 
antagonism between the two parties may have a negative impact on the company’s 
performance. Moreover, one of the functions of derivative actions is to enforce 
directors’ duties, which may be comprised or rendered unachievable when the 
company is involved. Moreover, it is argued that the conversion of a dispute from 
one between an individual shareholder and a director to a clash between 
shareholders and the company, would change the focus of the judicial effort. 
Originally, judicial resources are supposed to resolve the disputes. However, after 
such a conversion, courts have to concentrate on the issue of the independence of 
those recommending the rejection of the litigation and the propriety of their 
decision-making procedure.
602
 As a result of this loss of focus, judicial efforts to 
solve disputes could be misapplied, with the time and expense involved in rendering 




Thirdly, assigning a company the responsibility to assess a derivative action may 
increase time and cost and create the problem of duplicated effort. To begin with, a 
company must investigate a dispute in order to ascertain whether an action is in the 
best interests of the company. This inevitably incurs cost, which could be 
substantial if the investigation is conducted diligently. For instance, in the 
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investigation phase of one US case, the special litigation committee interviewed 70 
witnesses and produced a 1,100 page report.
604
 The conduct of such an 
investigation is likely to have incurred considerable cost. It is argued that judicial 
resources can be saved if a company is assigned to make the litigation decision. 
However, this is not the true, as a judicial review of a recommendation is not 
necessarily easier than the direct assessment of the merits of a case. Gevurtz points 
out that the judicial review of a decision made by a company can be “as difficult as 
the issues raised by the underlying claims and could easily require the 
development and presentation of extensive evidence”.
605
 In addition, the costs 
incurred during investigation and judicial review could be wasted if the 
recommendation made by the company is rejected by the court. In such a situation, 
duplication of work is created and thus the cost reduction aim sought to be 
achieved by the company approach becomes unattainable. 
 
4.3.3.2 The Court Approach 
 
In light of the previous discussion, it could be argued that the courts are better 
qualified to assume this role. Indeed, allowing courts to replace companies in this 
function would overcome the drawbacks of the company approach. For example, 
the objectivity and neutrality of a court avoids the fact that the company lacks an 
authentic decision-making body in derivative action scenarios. Furthermore, the 
court approach can also avoid the duplication of work and expense. 
 
However, there are counter-arguments. Some question whether courts are the best 
organs to determine the merits of proposed litigations. First of all, it is argued that 
directors are in a much better position than courts to assess alleged wrongdoings as 
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they have easier access to information and a better knowledge of the company’s 
affairs.
606
 It is further suggested that the courts may not be capable of reviewing 
business decisions as they lack the requisite business experience and expertise. As 
a consequence, they may not understand decision-making processes in the business 
world and thus sometimes fail to recognise that even a decision to dismiss a 
meritorious action might be justified. Last but not least, there is a concern that 
enabling courts to judge business decisions may intrude upon managerial authority 
and shift final commercial decision-making from the board room to the Bench.
607
 
In short, over-reliance on courts can be problematic. 
 
However, these criticisms about the company approach are groundless. First of all, 
it is argued that decisions concerning whether a derivative action should be 
commenced are legal rather than business decisions. Such decisions are “not 
managerial decisions and do not require business specialists or those with an 
intimate knowledge of the company.”
608
 Therefore, the “talents that a court is 
generally thought to lack – business intuition, a feel for the market place, and the 
ability to trade off risk for return – are not here called for to the same degree”.
609
 
Even if the decision can be regarded as a business decision, it cannot neglect the 
fact that this is a litigation decision. Given that the determination hinges on an 
appraisal of the merits of the action, it is suggested that “the court’s perspective 
and expertise are superior to the boards.”
610
 Secondly, considering the objectivity 
and neutrality of courts, there is no reason not to allow such an independent organ 
to assess the merits of litigation. Thirdly, courts have a long history of determining 
cases involving breaches of duty, giving them significant expertise and knowledge 
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in this area of business.
611
 Lastly, even if courts lack expertise in some specialist 
areas of business, this does not render them incapable of making decisions. 
Independent experts can be appointed by courts to investigate actions and their 
advice be adopted. 
 
4.3.4. Suggestion for China 
 
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that both the company and court 
approaches to derivative action determination have their own advantages and 
problems in deciding whether a derivative action is in the best interests of a 
company. This part will examine whether these approaches can assist in 
determining responsibility for assessing derivative actions in China. Other possible 
approaches will also be discussed for improving China’s derivative action process. 
 
4.3.4.1 The US Approach: the Adoption of Special Litigation 
Committees? 
 
Although it is argued that company autonomy can be respected by the company 
approach, this argument is eradicated in derivative action scenarios where 
wrongdoers may have used the company as a tool for their own benefit. Moreover, 
time and judicial resources-saving advantages are also put into doubt as discussed 
above. Furthermore, lack of independence and unethical consequences of the 
shareholder/board divide also make this approach less favourable for transplantation 
to China. Besides these inherent deficiencies, there are some other reasons why this 
approach is not suitable for China. 
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First, China’s failure to adopt truly independent directors may provide a lesson to 
learn. In order to oversee senior managers and protect the interests of minority 
shareholders, the institution of independent directors was transplanted from 
common law jurisdictions (particularly US law) into the Chinese regime. It was 
expected to play an effective role in checking and balancing management, but has 
failed to achieve this target partly because of a lack of true independence amongst 
such directors.
612
 Given that special litigation committees are similar to 
independent directors with regard to their independence and objective judgement, it 
is difficult to see that the adoption of SLCs would make a positive contribution to 
determining derivative actions; rather, it could repeat the same mistakes of the 
independent director institution.  
 
Secondly, the establishment of an SLC could impose financial burdens on 
companies. Whilst the investigation of an allegation could create duplication of 
work and wasted costs, the establishment of an SLC per se would induce 
unnecessary costs for companies. For example, the costs of the external SLC 
members must be paid by the company and could be substantial. In the US, these 
costs cannot be recovered from a plaintiff shareholder even if an action is dismissed 
by the court in accordance with the company’s recommendation.
613
 That means the 
costs of establishing an SLC have to be covered by the company alone regardless of 
the result of litigation. This generates two negative consequences: first, it creates 
unnecessary costs for small companies. For large companies, such costs may be tiny 
or insignificant, but for small companies, they could be a heavy burden. Secondly, it 
is not difficult to imagine that such a committee would normally recommend the 
dismissal of an action given that its funding comes from the company. This is 
particularly so in China where there it is said that “if you get something from 
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Lastly, the establishment of SLCs may weaken the influence or effectiveness of the 
supervisory board (SB) in China.
615
 In order to monitor internal management, the 
SB system was adopted and consists of shareholder representatives, employee 
representatives and outsiders.
616
 One of the legitimate roles of the SB is to bring 
lawsuits against directors and senior managers when they have done something 
harmful to the company.
617
 As such, Chinese legislation formally recognises the 
SB’s right to decide on litigation. Although the commencement of a derivative 
action implies that an SB has rejected or simply ignored a demand to bring an action, 
it does not mean the SB permanently lose its legitimate right to bring litigations in 
order to protect the interests of the company. However, the establishment of the 
SLCs may undermine the authority of the SB by making SLCs litigation 
decision-makers. In light of the ineffectiveness of the SB in China, its reputation 
might be damaged and its function might further deteriorate as a result of the 
establishment of the SLCs. Furthermore, the SB system was borrowed from 
Germany while there is no such an institution in the US. In view of this, the 
establishment of SLC in the US would counter no institutional obstacle while this is 
not the case in China. If the SLC is borrowed from the US, it would create a 
problem of how to deal with the relation between SLC and SB. Therefore, SLC is 
not suitable for China. 
 
4.3.4.2 The General Meeting: A Say for Shareholders? 
 
As boards of directors and special litigation committees are not suitable entities for 
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deciding whether an action is in the best interests of a company, such a decision 
could be reserved to shareholders in a general meeting even though boards are 
generally granted exclusive management powers in a company’s articles. As 
shareholders are the residual interest holders of the company, they can naturally be 
assigned the responsibility of making a final litigation decision. Furthermore, 
although the board is granted wide discretion and powers to run a company, such 
powers are authorised by the general meeting. As a consequence, shifting the final 
litigation decision from the board to the shareholders does not constitute an 
“infringement” upon the rights of management. In fact, the general meeting is 
exercising its legal rights over its legal status.
618
 Last but not least, giving 
shareholders an effective voice on this issue is conducive to building an 
investor-friendly system. Liu, an authoritative Chinese company law expert, has 
appealed for the construction of an investor-friendly legal system in China.
619
 One 
of the key components of such a system is the conferring of more rights to 
shareholders. Assigning to the general meeting the role of assessing whether a 
derivative action is in the best interests of a company is a good enactment of an 
investor-friendly legal system. 
 
However, reliance on the collective body of shareholders is problematic for several 
reasons. First, the general meeting may also be controlled by the alleged 
wrongdoers, which might make it function in a subservient manner. In English law, 
there is a well-established concept that shareholders hold their vote as a proprietary 
interest.
620
 As such, a shareholder can ratify a wrong he or she has committed in 
another capacity, like a breach of duty as a director. Here, if a director who has 
committed a wrong is also the majority shareholder of the company, the resolution 
passed by the general meeting is likely always to dismiss the litigation. Although 
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the Companies Act 2006 has now prohibited self-interested members from 
participating in ratification votes,
621
 they may still attend, be counted towards the 
quorum and take part in the proceedings of the meeting where the litigation decision 
is considered. This might have an impact on how other shareholders cast their votes 
at the meeting.  
 
Secondly, it is argued that it would in itself be a Herculean task to garner the 
support required to initiate such lawsuits.
622
 Not every individual shareholder is 
eligible to summon a meeting of the shareholders. Shareholders representing ten 
percent or more of the voting rights can convene and preside over such meetings on 
their own initiative under the Chinese Company Law.
623
 Moreover, even if such a 
meeting were easier to convene, shareholders may be unwilling to participate and 
vote in the general meeting because of rational apathy.
624
 This well-known 
phenomenon identifies the problem of collective action for minority shareholders in 
general meetings, recognising that their voting rights tend to be a less potent force, 
particularly in large companies. This is because firstly, participation requires the 
investment of time. Such expenditure may be justified where shareholders have 
control over decision or their voices are decisive. However, shareholders tend to 
believe that their vote has only minimal impact on proposals. Furthermore, even 
where their voices are decisive they may still be reluctant to vote because even if 
the action they support is successful, the gain or compensation will go to the 
company rather than the individual shareholders themselves. The benefit that 
shareholders can receive is a pro rata share of the gains from such an action. This 
lack of incentive undoubtedly has a negative impact on shareholders’ willingness to 
exercise their voting rights.
625
 Moreover, some shareholders may seek to take a free 
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ride on other shareholders’ efforts. If many individual shareholders share this view, 
the determination of whether litigation is in the best interests of the company cannot 
reflect the true thoughts of the shareholders as a whole. 
 
Thirdly, there are two other issues to be addressed in addition to costs and perverse 
incentives if litigation decisions are entrusted to the general meeting. The first issue 
is that of access to information. Information is critically important in litigation. As 
Grundfest and Huang point out, lawsuits are all about the process and cost of 
securing information, and the optimal response to such information.
626
 In this sense, 
it is no exaggeration to assert that information is the lifeblood of litigation. In 
derivative actions, shareholders must gather the facts in order to evaluate accurately 
whether an action should be commenced or to assess the strength of any potential 
action.
627
 However, derivative lawsuits are characterised by information asymmetry: 
shareholders have little information about the frequency and amount of harm caused 
by managerial misconduct, while managers have all such information. Even where 
shareholders become aware of possible internal irregularities through other channels, 
like news reports, they still face the difficulty in obtaining more detailed 
information and gathering sufficient evidence to evaluate the merits of litigation. 
This is extremely important as the majority information may be controlled by 
wrongdoers. Although the right to know has been established in the Chinese 
Company Law 2005, there are still some defects in this institution.
628
 
Disadvantages concerning access to information seriously affect a shareholders’ 
ability in accurately assessing the merits of litigation. Moreover, shareholders may 
lack the expertise and related knowledge needed to assess the merits of litigation. 
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As such, they may be incompetent to determine which management decisions run 
against the maximum benefits of the company even where they do have access to 
relevant information. Indeed, as shareholders do not run the company directly, what 
appears to them to be a rushed decision may simply reflect a company managers’ 




4.3.4.3 The Court Approach 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that the shareholders’ meeting is not an 
appropriate body to assess the merits of the litigation in derivative actions. This 
conclusion, however, leaves a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, leaving 
the decision to sue with any individual shareholder runs the risk that he or she might 
pursue litigation for personal interests rather than to protect the interests of the 
company as a whole. On the other hand, conferring an unfettered right in favour of a 
general meeting to decide such matters, even if interested shareholders are 
prohibited from voting, encounters the collective problem which may create a less 
optimal amount of litigation.
630
 As a result, the courts are naturally brought in to 
adjudicate. In fact, some unclear rules could be resolved if the courts are entrusted 
with this role. For example, the concept of “urgent circumstances” is not easy to be 
defined and it would encounter less difficulty if it is left to be clarified by the courts. 
 
However, entrusting courts with the function of deciding such matters may 
encounter a risk of unfair judgement in China as it is recognised that there is 
currently no true judicial independence in the country. Indeed, the lack of 
meaningful judicial independence casts some doubt over adopting the court 
approach. Nevertheless, some evidence has shown that the courts are less prone to 
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interference from outside vested interests in private litigation than other types of 
lawsuits. As such, this part will first examine the sources of judicial interference and 
will then demonstrate why private litigations face less interference. In light of the 
conclusions from this analysis, it will be concluded that the court approach is 
suitable for China regardless of the lack of meaningful judicial independence in the 
country. 
 
4.3.4.3.1 Lack of Judicial Independence 
 
In every jurisdiction, judicial independence is not an absolute concept as some 
mechanisms must be adopted to hold to judges to account. China is not an exception 
in this regard as it has established many forms of intervention to prevent potential 
judicial corruption. Ironically, it is precisely some of these mechanisms that have 
been criticised for leading to a lack of judicial independence.  
 
There are generally five sources which have a greater or lesser impact on judicial 
independence:
631
 (1) party organs. This includes the Party Committee, 
Political-Legal Committee and the Disciplinary Committee. Although there is no 
explicit constitutional or legal basis for the Party to intervene in specific cases, the 
Communist Party has tightly controlled judicial organisations in order to further its 
rule. The implementation of the “Three Supremes”,
632
 proposed by the Supreme 
People’s Court, has even attempted to emphasise the key role of the Party in 
adjudicating cases. (2) The judiciary itself. For example, the adjudicative committee 
has a final say on almost every case even if some members of the committee have 
not heard the case before making their decision. The president of the court may also 
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intervene in cases via informal directives or instructions. (3) Local governments and 
administrative departments. Government officials have formal and informal powers 
to affect the independence of the judiciary. Formally, they are able to pass 
regulations to direct the courts on how to adjudicate where statutes are unclear. 
Informally, courts may refer certain issues to them and their opinions will normally 
be deferred to. This power is strengthened by the fact that courts are funded by this 
level of government. The ability to determine a court’s budget undoubtedly confers 
on local governments’ substantial power to influence the judiciary. (4) Media, 
public and/or academic opinions. Although news coverage or public opinions have 
no formal power to interfere in a court’s adjudication, their comments on specific 
cases may influence judges. Similarly, academics may be asked to provide opinions 
in some cases. (5) The parties or their lawyers may try to influence a case through 
social acquaintances, such as relatives, friends or classmates. 
 
 
4.3.4.3.2 Less Interference in Commercial Cases 
 
Although as mentioned above, China currently lacks meaningful judicial 
independence, this does not mean that every type of case is interfered with by 
outside sources. In fact, only some types of case are seriously affected by formal 
organisations such as the Party and government agencies: namely political and 
politically-sensitive cases.
633
 It is regarded that the former type of case is a direct 
threat to the authority of the ruling regime, and includes, for example, cases 
involving national security, the Falun Gong, and high-level corruption. When the 
courts hear such cases, they normally refer to the Political-Legal Committee and 
adjudicate them in accordance with the Committee’s opinion. The latter type of case 
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consists mainly of socio-economic cases, which include environmental and labour 
disputes, land seizures and some entitlement claims, such as pension or 
unemployment cases. This kind of lawsuit may pose a less direct threat to the 
regime, but could affect socio-political stability, economic growth and China’s 
international reputation. Therefore, these cases too can be subject to direct 
interference. 
 
The above types of case may take the form of criminal, administrative and civil 
lawsuits. Apart from these, there is little systemic interference in other kinds of case. 
Derivative actions, as private shareholder litigations, do not normally raise the 
interest of Party organs. Where there is any interference, it comes from local 
government and/or social acquaintances. However, their impact on shareholder 
litigation is declining.  
 
This is because, firstly, local protectionism is decreasing because of the changing 
nature of the economy. With the development of economic reform, the economy in 
many cities is now changing from a single to diversified system. In the past, under 
the influence of the planned economy policy, many urban areas had a simple 
economic mix with a higher percent of the economy being constituted by the public 
sector. Now, the private sector is playing an increasingly dominant role. As such, a 
local government is unlikely to intervene in a specific derivative action because a 
single company is less important to its local area. Furthermore, less interference in 
private litigation could protect that locality’s reputation and thus attract more 
investment. In light of this, local governments have little incentive to intervene in 
private shareholder litigation. 
 
This is demonstrated by the empirical research. Ying and Gechlik conducted a study 
of over twenty thousand cases in Shanghai and found that less than 0.4% involved 
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attempts to use outside powers or connections to intervene in court decisions.
634
 
Another empirical study focusing on the adjudication of corporate law also revealed 
a similar conclusion. Howson examined more than 200 reported cases in Shanghai 
from 1992 to 2008 and found that Shanghai courts supported non-state/party 




Secondly, although it is possible for particular individuals to intervene in a case, it is 
not easy for them to influence the outcome of that case. Their ability to affect the 
result depends on various factors, such as the nature of the case, the amount at stake, 
the parties involved and the level of the court. Generally, a case will be handled by 
three judges. If the case is too complex or those judges are in dispute, it may be 
referred to the adjudicative committee. This means that a party would have to 
influence at least two judges on the panel and key members of the adjudicative 
committee; it would be very difficult for an individual party to have such 
connections. Furthermore, if the case is appealed to a higher-level court, the 
successful party, who won the lawsuit using their influence, would have to exercise 
that same influence again over another group judges and committee members. This 
obviously increases the difficulty for individuals seeking to interfere with the results 
of a case. 
 
4.3.4.4 The Arbitration Approach 
 
4.3.4.4.1 Arguments for the Arbitration Approach 
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Besides the above approaches, there is another possible approach which may be a 
better mechanism for resolving disputes: arbitration. It is argued that arbitration is 
much more adversarial than litigation. First of all, parties are judged by an arbitrator 
who is often a peer of their trade or an experienced professor, which may ensure a 
fair judgement to some extent. Secondly, parties are less fettered by procedures in 
arbitration. In litigation, there are many strict procedures that have to be followed 
by the parties. Nevertheless, procedures are more flexible and are thus more 
accommodating of the parties in arbitration. Thirdly, an arbitration decision is final 
and binding, allowing for quick dispute resolution. 
 
Indeed, arbitration is becoming increasingly used by business persons, not only 
because of China’s desire to participate in world trade, but also because of the 
suspicions of party-dominated legal institutions. China has witnessed significant 
change after its reform and opening, resulting in an increasing volume of trade with 
and investment in China. Accession to the World Trade Organization has further 
enhanced this phenomenon and led to China’s emergence as a major economic 
power. Accompanying ever-increasing globalisation is a corresponding growth in 
the number of commercial disputes. As such, arbitration is used as the means to 
settle some of these disputes. In addition, one of the fundamental differences 
between arbitration and litigation is that the parties in arbitration can choose the 
applicable substantive law. Although China’s legal system is becoming increasingly 
sound and robust, it is argued that it is unstable and easily changeable mainly 
because of the short-time in which the rule of law has been implemented. In 
addition, some parties are uncomfortable with the unreliability of the nation’s courts. 
Therefore, arbitration enables them to bypass the Chinese legal system and courts in 
resolving disputes. Ideally, as Lauchli asserts, “arbitration is suited to the resolution 
of a dispute in a friendly personal and business relationship; in some circles 







4.3.4.4.2 Arguments Against the Arbitration Approach 
 
However, the above arguments are untenable in the context of derivative actions in 
China. 
 
First, although arbitration is a fast way of resolving disputes, it is not a cheaper 
method of doing so. In fact, it is much more expensive than litigation as a result of 
several factors. For example, unlike the courts, an arbitration commission is not a 
governmental agency. It is a revenue-producing organisation aiming to make profit. 
Moreover, disputes are judged by an arbitrator who is professional in the specific 
area. As such, it is obvious that the parties have to pay higher arbitration fees for 
resolving such a dispute. 
 
Secondly, although it is argued that arbitration can bypass the courts in resolving a 
dispute, the courts still have a role to play in the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Obtaining a favourable arbitral result is only the first step in the process as the 
enforcement of such an award still relies on the court.
637
 Without the cooperation of 
the courts, an arbitral award is only a piece of paper indicating little more than who 
won the dispute. 
 
Thirdly, arbitration is mainly used in international business disputes rather than 
domestic disputes. As mentioned above, arbitration is a growing area of dispute 
resolution mainly because of the increasing development of international trade and 
                                                             
636
 U. M. Lauchli, ‘Cross-Cultural Negotiations, With A Special Focus on ADR with the Chinese’ 
(2000) 26 William Mitchell Law Review 1045, 1067. 
637
 Article 62 of Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that “the parties 
concerned shall execute the arbitral award. If one of the parties refuses to execute the award, the other 
party may apply for enforcement with the people’s court according to the relevant provisions of the 
Civil Procedure Law.” 
 
 247 
investment. Foreign investors may be uncomfortable with relying on China’s legal 
system and thus many would choose to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than 
litigation. However, for disputes between domestic parties, these parties normally 
first try to resolve the conflict among themselves, failing which, resort is made to 
the courts. 
 
Fourthly, there are a number of reasons why Chinese people not to choose 
arbitration. Besides being expensive, it is generally believed that Chinese people are 
inclined to surrender to power and thus respect the decisions made by the courts 
because behind these decisions there lays a strong state power. By contrast, 
arbitration is undertaken through a non-governmental organisation without the 
direct support of state power. Chinese people may fear state power more owing to 
China’s history. Since Emperor Qin unified the Country in 221 BC, there has been 
and continues to be one central government irrespective of China’s existence as an 
empire or a Republic. In order to keep this country unified, the central government 
has tried every means available, including educating people to obey the country and 
its central government. For example, children are taught from a very young age that 
“subjects must obey their emperor absolutely even if he orders them to die; son 
must obey his father absolutely even if his father orders him to die”. Even now as 
western culture spreads in China, Chinese people still respect state power and are 




Lastly, the arbitration of the disputes within the context of derivative actions is 
highly unlikely. Not every dispute can be arbitrated. For example, disputes arising 
from marriage, adoption, guardianship, bringing up of children and inheritance 
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cannot be put to arbitration.
639
 Under article 1 of the Chinese Arbitration Law, 
disputes can go to arbitration if the following requirements are met: (1) if the 
disputes arises from contract or property rights; (2) both the parties are equal; and (3) 
the plaintiff has the right of disposition.
640
 Under derivative actions, a company’s 
interests have been damaged by alleged wrongdoers and thus it meets the first 
requirement. Also, there is no doubt that an alleged wrongdoer is equal to a plaintiff 
shareholder. However, there is a problem with regard to the last prerequisite. 
Individual shareholders are required to have the right of disposition in order to make 
the dispute one capable of arbitration. However, first of all, although an eligible 
shareholder could raise a dispute against wrongdoers and drop the case if he or she 
wishes to do so, this does not mean that the dispute is settled when it is dropped; 
other eligible shareholders are still entitled to raise such concerns. Furthermore, 
arbitration requires both parties to reach an agreement for arbitration. Without this 
agreement, the arbitration commission will refuse to accept the application for 
arbitration by any one single party.
641
 However, individual shareholders are not 
eligible to reach such an agreement for arbitration as this is entrusted on the 
company. Here, a problem is created: if a company is determined to put the dispute 
to arbitration, then it becomes a dispute between the company and the alleged 
wrongdoers. If a company is controlled by such wrongdoers, the arbitration is 
impossible without the participation of the company. In light of this, if a dispute 
arising from the causes of derivative actions is to be settled through arbitration, a 
company has to participate as one single party. However, it is very rare that a 
company is willing to refer a dispute to arbitration. This is demonstrated by 
empirical studies showing that there has not been a single arbitration case taken 
since the adoption of derivative actions in the Company Law 2005. 
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In view of the above discussion, there are several approaches to determining 
responsibility for assessing derivative actions. The SLCs approach which is adopted 
in the US is not suitable for transmission to China as it lacks an authentic 
decision-making body where derivative actions are brought. Although the detailed 
rules of statutory derivative actions in the Companies Act 2006 may not be 
appropriate for China to borrow as discussed in the previous part, the UK’s court 
approach is the most suitable approach for adoption in China considering its 












Litigation is not free and can be expensive.
642
 Generally, prospective plaintiffs 
consider the amount at stake, legal costs and the probability of success in deciding 
whether an action should be brought.
643
 Litigation is rational where sums 
recoverable and the chances of success exceed the cost of legal expenses and the 
probability of losing the action.
644
 However, the unique nature of derivative action 
makes the incentive for shareholder litigation different from that of other types of 
action. As discussed above, shareholders are not entitled to initiate litigation against 
wrongdoer directors or majority shareholders on behalf of the company as the 
company itself is considered to have suffered the wrongdoing rather than the 
shareholders. A derivative action allows company claims to be raised by shareholders, 
making those shareholders nominal claimants while the company is the actual 
claimant in terms of the underlying interest. In recognition of the unique economic 
nature of the derivative lawsuit, the conclusion can be drawn that any recovery from 
the litigation would be accrued by the company rather plaintiff shareholders. This 
obviously has a considerable impact on the latters’ decision to raise proceedings as 
they would need to consider the gains and losses before doing so. In derivative 
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actions shareholders have to pay lawyers’ fees or/and the legal costs of the defendant 
if an action is unsuccessful.
645
 On the other hand, they are not eligible for 
compensation directly from the defendant if they win the case. In consequence, a 
rational shareholder might not choose to bring derivative litigation. Instead, they 
might prefer to sell their shares and leave the company. Furthermore, bearing in mind 
that any compensation or other relief obtained from the defendants flows directly to 
the company, the phenomenon of the “free-ride” problem is also brought into 
operation. Here, individual shareholders would be strongly discouraged from 
bringing derivative actions as each shareholder would expect others to raise such 
proceedings. However, if all shareholders share the same view, then no derivative 
action is likely to be initiated even if such litigation may bring substantial benefits to 
the company. 
 
Although it is argued that a plaintiff shareholder can benefit indirectly from recovery, 
the average value of any expected award that such a shareholder could receive 
pursuant to a successful claim is low.
646
 The value of a plaintiff’s shareholding 
would probably be increased if recoveries accrue to the company and thus augment 
its asset base; however, this is a somewhat hypothetical benefit and far less certain as 
the value of a company’s shares are determined by a large number of factors beyond 
underlying asset value.
647
 In fact, the value of a company’s shares may be reduced if 
the company’s reputation is damaged or the public loses confidence in its 
management as a result of the litigation. Even if an action is successful and thus 
increases the value of a company’s shares, what shareholders will receive is a pro 
rata share of the gains from such an action. In light of the small amount of shares 
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that plaintiff shareholders as minority shareholders hold, one would imagine that 
they will gain insignificant or even negligible benefits indirectly from any successful 
litigation. This is particularly true in the case of listed companies which are very big 
and have highly dispersed share ownership. 
 
In view of the unique economic nature of the derivative action, shareholders would 
be strongly discouraged from raising proceedings without other sources of funding. 
If funding rules were appropriately established and effectively used, the hurdles 
hindering the operation of derivative actions would be largely removed, and the 
interests of the company and minority shareholders better protected. In China, there 
is no special funding rule for derivative actions, which partly explains why they are 
rarely used by Chinese shareholders. In order to address the economic disincentives 
for prospective plaintiffs of derivative lawsuits, some general costs rules applicable 
in derivative actions should be changed and other financial resources to fund such 
lawsuits introduced. This chapter will first introduce the current legal costs regime in 
China before going on to discuss and evaluate funding rules in English and the US 
law.  This chapter will conclude with an examination of which model would be 
suitable China. 
 
5.2 Legal Costs in China 
 
As discussed above, a plaintiff shareholder who has brought a derivative action has 
to pay the same legal costs that he or she would have had to pay in a general lawsuit. 
Under the Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs (hereafter MPLC),
648
 
shareholders who wish to bring actions to the People’s Court have to pay court fees 
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and lawyers’ fees. 
 
5.2.1 Court Fees 
Court fees consist of filing fees, application fees and court expenses.
649
 Filing fees, 
also called case acceptance fees,
650
 are the fees that any person who files a suit 
counterclaim or appeal has to pay to the court within seven days upon a notification 
made by the court on the payment for such court fees. If a plaintiff fails to submit 
such fees to the court without justification,
651
 the case will be treated as withdrawn 
by the litigant. Application fees include the costs of applying for security over 
property, order of payment, public notice, etc.
652
 Court expenses are the fees that are 
incurred during the hearing of the case, including the costs of travelling, 





Application fees and court expenses are charged according to the amounts that are 
actually incurred and covered by the initiating party. Generally, the amount of such 
fees is low in practice and thus they would not constitute an obstacle to a shareholder 
wishing to bring a derivative action. On the other hand, filing fees follow the 
principle of “loser pays”. This means if a plaintiff wins the case, he or she could 
recover these fees from the defendant. If an action is unsuccessful, then the plaintiff 
has to bear this cost. This could be a real problem for a prospective shareholder as 
the amount of such a fee could be huge and thus unaffordable. According to article 
13 of the MPLC, court fees can basically be calculated in two ways. Where the 
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nature of a case is monetary, the court will charge the case by a percentage of the 
claimed amount. Where the filing is non-monetary, the court fees are fixed, 
derivative actions are regarded as being of a monetary nature. As such, a plaintiff 
shareholder has to pay the filing fees calculated on a percentage of the value of the 
claim before continuing to the trial stage. According to article 13(1) of MPLC, the 
standards of the amount of filing fees in respect of monetary cases are as follows:  
Table 7 
The standard of the amount of filing fees in monetary cases 
Disputed amount (yuan) Filing fee 
< 10,000 50 (yuan) 
10,001 - 100,000 2.5% 
100,001 – 200,000 2% 
200,001 – 500,000 1.5% 
500,001 – 1,000,000 1% 
1,000,001 - 2,000,000 0.9% 
2,000,001 - 5,000,000 0.8% 
5,000,001 - 10,000,000 0.7% 
10,000,001 - 20,000,000 0.6% 
>20,000,000 0.5% 
 
If a plaintiff shareholder decides to withdraw an action, he or she still has to pay half 




A derivative action is regarded as being monetary in nature and thus the filing fees 
could be very high under the above standard. For example, if a plaintiff shareholder 
wishes to raise proceeding in court claiming damages of twenty million yuan, he or 
she would have to pay 120,000 yuan in filing fees. If he or she is lucky enough to 
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win the case at the first instance and no appeal is raised by the defendant, he or she 
can recover those fees. However, this would not be the end of the matter as the 
plaintiff may have to apply for the enforcement of the judgment and thus have to pay 
an additional 20,000 yuan in application fees.
655
 If a plaintiff loses a case at the first 
instance and decides to appeal, he or she would have to pay the same amount of 
filing fees again, which would be a total of 240,000 yuan. Although this is a 
hypothetical example, some plaintiffs have even had to pay more than this amount in 
practice. For example, in the case of Xin Jiangnan, the plaintiff had to pay 152,573 
yuan in filing fees. In the Zhongqi Qihuo case, the filing fee was approximately 
830,000 yuan; here as the lawyers in that case pointed out, the plaintiff could not 
afford such a large sum if they were not financially sound and strong.
656
 Some 
plaintiffs therefore have to reduce the disputed amount so as to pay lower filing fees. 
For instance, in Hongshi Shiye case, three plaintiff shareholders claimed only 100 
million yuan while the actual damage caused have been over one billion. Even here, 
it was still difficult for the plaintiffs to pay 500,000 yuan for the filing fees - one can 
only imagine how hard it would be for the plaintiff shareholders to pay 5 million 
yuan if they claimed for the true disputed amount.
657
 Although filing fees can be 
recovered from the defendant if the plaintiff wins the case, the prospects for this are 
far from certain. Furthermore, few plaintiffs as minority shareholders are likely to be 
able to afford this filing fee as they are unlikely to have such large amounts of money. 
However, if this practice were to be widely followed by other prospective plaintiffs, 
two issues would emerge: first, the company’s damages would not be fully recovered 
and thus the compensation function of derivative action would not function properly. 
Secondly, directors or controlling shareholders are unlikely to be deterred by a 
derivative action if prospective plaintiff shareholders are compelled to reduce the 
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disputed amount in order to pay lower filing fees. If the deterrent function of 
derivative actions is compromised in such a severe way, they would be reduced to a 
glamorous-looking mechanism that lacks effectiveness in constraining misconduct. 
 
5.2.2 Lawyer’s Fees 
 
There is currently no law regulating lawyer’s fee as this is regarded as a private 
business matter for plaintiffs and lawyers. Therefore, a plaintiff shareholder has to 
pay his or her lawyer’s fees regardless of the outcome of the action.
658
 This means a 
plaintiff shareholder has to pay not only court fees but also lawyer’s fees if an action 
is unsuccessful. Indeed, even where a lawsuit is successful, plaintiffs must still pay 
lawyer’s fees. This is somewhat confusing, and at worst absurd, if one considers the 
economic nature of derivative actions. As stated above, any compensation recovered 
from the defendants will accrue to the company rather than plaintiff shareholders if 
they win the case. Plaintiff shareholders will only benefit indirectly from an increase 
in the value of the company's shares which is uncertain because the value of a 
company’s shares is affected by many factors. As such, it seems that a plaintiff 
shareholder “has nothing to gain, but much to lose”
 659
 under the current legal 
system. 
 
It is argued that the lawyer’s fees rule operates in a similar way to the American rule. 
This is because each party does not need to pay the counter-party’s lawyer’s fees 
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irrespective of the outcome of the lawsuit.
660
 Therefore, a plaintiff can conclude an 
agreement with his or her lawyer that the lawyer’s fees would only be charged 
contingent on the result of the action, which is similar to the American contingency 
fee arrangement.
661
 This practice is not uncommon in China as there is no law 
regulating the issue, and thus such an arrangement can be reached as long as both the 
plaintiffs and lawyers are willing to accept it. Indeed, contingency fee arrangement 
could help to reduce a plaintiff’s burden as he or she does not need to pay the 
lawyer’s fees if the action is unsuccessful. As such, the practice in China functions in 
a reverse fashion to that in the US. Unlike in the US, there is no law in China 
stipulating that lawyer’s fees must be compensated out of the sums recovered if an 
action is successful. In practice, a defendant rarely bears the burden of paying the 
plaintiff’s lawyer’s fees when he or she loses a derivative action. Therefore, under 
the Chinese so-called “contingency fees arrangement”, a plaintiff shareholder does 
not need to pay the lawyer’s fees if the case is unsuccessful, but has to pay such an 
amount if the lawsuit is successful. Another absurd issue may thus arise: a successful 
action would increase the legal costs payable by a plaintiff shareholder. In this 
situation, rational shareholders would prefer to adopt other mechanisms to protect 
their interests and those of the company. 
 
5.2.3 Other Issues 
 
Besides the above legal costs, it is also necessary to consider whether a prospective 
plaintiff should provide security prior to initiating, or pursuant to, a derivative action. 
If statutory derivative actions were designed to be an investor-friendly system and 
shareholders are strongly encouraged to use this tool, there is a risk that this legal 
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right might be abused, imposing burdens and costs on the company. In order to strike 
a good balance between encouraging meritorious lawsuits and preventing frivolous 
litigation, some scholars suggest that security should be provided when a plaintiff 
shareholder raises proceedings. However, this is not without its controversies and is 




This section is devoted to the legal costs of derivative actions in China. As discussed 
above, there is no special funding rule for such lawsuits and thus shareholders who 
wish to commence such proceedings are in a disadvantageous position in light of the 
disincentivising economic nature of the derivative action. In the absence of proper 
and reasonable funding rules, the obstacles confronting the initiation of a derivative 
action would not be removed and its effectiveness in constraining managerial 
misconduct is highly doubtful. In order to build a new funding system that better 
encourages plaintiff shareholders to raise such proceedings, the funding rules in 
England and Wales and the US will be examined and evaluated in the next section. 
English and US law regarding the provision of security for such actions will also be 
addressed. 
 
5.3 Funding Derivative Actions in English Law: The Indemnification 
Order 
 
In most Commonwealth jurisdictions, the obstacle of funding derivative actions is 
addressed by recognising that claimant shareholders have a right to be indemnified 
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for costs incurred by litigation.
662
 This rule is established in the well-known case of 
Wallersteiner v Moir (No2).
663
 In this case, Dr Wallersteiner, the defendant who was 
a director of the company at issue, had successfully prolonged the case for over 10 
years. In spite of exhausting all his financial resources in obtaining judgment against 
Dr Wallersteiner, Mr Moir had been unable to enforce and recover compensation for 
the company. 
 
Considering the plight of Mr Moir, the Court of Appeal held that although a plaintiff 
in a derivative action was not entitled to apply for legal aid and the contingency fee 
arrangement was beyond the court’s mandate, the shareholder should be indemnified 
by the company for the costs incurred, and to be incurred, in proceedings. The 
rationale behind this judgment is that the court established a rule based on trust law 
in which a plaintiff shareholder is like a trustee and the company is analogous to a 
beneficiary. As such, a plaintiff shareholder is entitled to be indemnified by the 
company in the proceedings. The test for the plaintiff shareholder to obtain the 
indemnity order is that he or she is acting in good faith and it would be reasonable 
for an independent board of directors to initiate such a litigation in the company’s 
name.
664
 The Court also ruled that a plaintiff shareholder is still entitled to indemnity 
regardless of the result of the action. This means that a plaintiff is eligible to apply 
for an indemnity order even if an action is unsuccessful. This is justified on the 
ground that the company who receiving the benefit of a venture also ought to bear 
the risk of losing the case. 
 
It was further held that an indemnity order should be applied at the stage when the 
plaintiff applies for leave to initiate the action, but that an exception should be 
allowed if the court thinks it is appropriate to grant such order by the end of the 
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 The Court further held that such an application should be made ex 
parte and the procedures should be “simple and inexpensive”.
666
 However, this rule 
eventually came to be regarded as oppressive for companies as they would have to 
pay costs without advance notice shortly after the beginning of the proceedings. In 
Smith v Croft (No.1), Walton J recognised that the Wallersteiner rule was unfair to 
the company and thus held that the company should participate in the application so 
that the indemnity order could be made on the basis of sufficient evidence.
667
 He 
also held that a plaintiff shareholder should pass a financial need test, so that an 
indemnity order is available only if a plaintiff is genuinely in need. Although this 
narrow approach has been followed by courts in other Commonwealth countries,
668
 




In order to simplify the procedure, the Civil Procedure Rule (Amendment) (hereafter 
CPR) r 19.9 stipulated that a court is authorised to grant an indemnity order to the 
claimant in respect of costs incurred in the proceeding as it thinks appropriate.
670
 
This provision remains unchanged as the Companies Act 2006 does not mention 
legal costs in derivative actions. However, the provision in the CPR is simple and 
does not lay down any specific procedure that the party or the court must follow. The 
problems this creates will be examined below. 
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5.4 Funding Derivative Actions in the US: The Contingency Fee 
Arrangement 
 
The position in the US is quite unique in comparison to English law. The general rule 
is that each party is responsible for his own lawyer’s fees regardless of the result of 
litigation. This is called the “American rule” and is also applicable to derivative 
actions. In addition, it is very common for a plaintiff shareholder to have a 
contingency fee arrangement with his lawyer in derivative litigation. This means that 
a claimant does not need to pay his lawyer’s fees if the litigation is lost. However, a 
plaintiff shareholder has to pay the lawyer’s fees if an action is successful. Two 
questions arise in relation to this ‘no win no fee’ principle: first, considering the fact 
that any recovery from litigation will accrue to the company rather than the plaintiff 
shareholder, it seems that such shareholders are still strongly discouraged from 
bringing such litigation as they have to pay lawyer’s fees. Second, the question arises 
as to what makes a lawyer take on a derivative action under the contingency fee 
arrangement? 
 
Two approaches have been adopted in order to address the above concerns: the 
‘common fund’ and the ‘substantial benefit’ tests. First of all, if a lawsuit is 
successful and thus creates a fund for the company, then the plaintiff shareholder is 
entitled to be compensated out of the fund for his lawyer’s fees. This principle is 
based on the theory of unjust enrichment. According to this doctrine, legal costs can 
be treated as a first charge against the fund if this benefits a class of shareholders 
beyond the nominal plaintiff.
671
 During the early application of this doctrine, the 
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common fund was confined to a monetary fund: this was obviously unfair for the 
plaintiff in the situation where an action was successful and brought non-pecuniary 
recovery to the company. Recognising the shortcomings of this restrictive approach, 
the judiciary established a substantial benefit test: This requires determining whether 
litigation has achieved “a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be 
prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or 
protection of an essential right to the stockholders’ interest”.
672
 Under this test, a 
monetary relief apparently constitutes a substantial benefit, but non-pecuniary relief 
may also meet this test and thus lawyer fees can be paid out of the fund. For example, 
it was held that an action resulting in a judicial declaration of the defects of proxy 
statements soliciting votes for a corporate merger conferred benefits upon the 
company.
673
 Nevertheless, although the test has been established as entitling a 
plaintiff to payment even if an action brings non-pecuniary relief, it is still unclear 
under which precise circumstances the plaintiff would be qualified for fee awards. It 





Under the contingency fee arrangement, lawyers may gain nothing if a case is lost. 
Derivative actions can be made attractive for lawyer via two ways of deciding how 
much a plaintiff’s lawyer can be paid. The first method is the percentage scale, which 
rewards lawyers with a percentage of the total recovery. This is normally applicable 
when the case generates a tangible monetary relief.
675
 Historically, lawyers can be 
paid in the range of 20% to 30% when the total recovery is below one million dollars 
and 15% to 20% when it is over that amount.
676
 The other method of calculating 
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lawyer’s fees in derivative actions is known as the “lodestar method”. Here, lawyers’ 
fees are determined by their work including the reasonable time they spent in 





5.5 Which Model is most suitable for China? A Critical Evaluation of 
English and US Rules 
 
5.5.1 The Solution in English Law: Indemnity Costs Orders 
 
As discussed above, the common law recognises the special economic nature of 
derivative actions and thus confers the right on a plaintiff shareholder to apply for an 
indemnity order. Although this attempt to deal with the funding problem was 
regarded as imaginative at that time,
678
 its inherent deficiencies have become evident 
with the passage of time. This part of this thesis will demonstrate the major flaws of 
the indemnity costs order approach and how the funding rule applicable in English 
law may not be suitable for China. 
 
First of all, it remains unclear in what circumstances an indemnity cost order can be 
granted. Although the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000 stipulate that a 
                                                             
677
 The lodestar method was formally recognised in Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co 396 US 375, 392 
(1970), in which the US Supreme Court held that the lodestar method is based on the time the lawyers 
reasonably spent on their work and their applicable hours rate. However, this does not mean the 
lawyers can charge without any restrictions as the final figure is subject to the court’s scrutiny. The 
court can adjust the figure considering several factors, such as the complexity of issues and the quality 
or the risk of representation. 
678
 A. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 232. 
 
 264 
court may order a company to indemnify a claimant, they do not detail the conditions 
in which a claimant would be allowed to obtain such an order. As such, the court has 
to examine each case as it thinks fit. However, this substantial discretion may create 
uncertainty and cause great concern for shareholders.  
 
Indeed, case law itself is also vague in many respects. The financial test provides a 
good example to explain this. In Smith v Croft, Walton J approached the funding 
issue cautiously and added a financial needs test for the application of indemnity 
orders. He found that a company should not have to bear the cost of indemnity if a 
claimant has sufficient resources to fund the action.
679
 In other words, a plaintiff 
shareholder has to demonstrate that they genuinely require funding support; 
otherwise they will not be granted an indemnity order. This narrow approach has 
been criticised on the grounds of both principle and practicality.
680
 In principle, the 
rationale in favour of allowing an indemnity is that the plaintiff brings an action as a 
“representative” of the company. As such, the financial status of the claimant should 
be an irrelevant consideration in deciding whether an indemnity order should be 
granted. Thus, the court in a Canadian case pointed out that a test based on the 
financial means of the claimant offended against the principle that the claimant is 
acting as the agent of the company.
681
 Practically, this financial need test could be 
easily evaded by a shareholder whose financial status precludes them from obtaining 
an indemnity order. For example, if the aforementioned shareholder wishes to bring a 
derivative action against wrongdoers, he or she can ask a shareholder who meets the 
financial need test and who is also willing to act as a nominal claimant. In this 
situation, the financial need test seems useless in considering whether an indemnity 
cost order should be granted. 
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In addition to the above drawback, the procedure to grant an indemnity cost order is 
also ambiguous. Two problems have been identified in this regard: first, the court 
emphasized in Wallersteiner that an application for an indemnity costs order should 
be kept “simple and inexpensive” and thus should not be allowed to “escalate into a 
minor trial”.
682
 The simple and inexpensive procedure requires the court not to 
spend much time on the application. However, it is argued that it would be “palpably 
unjust” for a court to grant an indemnity costs order without a full investigation.
683
 
The second problem is the peculiar relationship between granting an order for 
indemnification and permitting an action to continue which is related to the first 
problem. In Smith v Croft, the procedure for the application of an indemnity order 
was separated from the procedure for the evaluation of the locus standi to bring an 
action. This separate approach may create a paradoxical situation wherein an 
indemnity order has been granted while the action is dismissed at a later stage. In this 
situation, a company would have to indemnify the claimant even if the action is 
unsuccessful. With these procedural obstacles, the court would be very cautious in 
awarding an indemnity order to a plaintiff shareholder. 
 
Thirdly, it is argued that one of the fundamental problems of an indemnity order is 
that it fails to provide incentives for shareholders. An indemnity order can be granted 
to a plaintiff shareholder after he or she has initiated proceedings, which presupposes 
that an individual shareholder is willing to commence the derivative action in the 
first place. In other words, an indemnity order does not provide the shareholder with 
any incentive to raise proceedings, but rather, once he or she has decided to bring an 
action, permits him or her to be indemnified for costs incurred in this decision.
684
 
Although the deterrent to the initiation of derivative actions is removed as the 
claimant shareholder may be indemnified for costs involved in the proceedings, it 
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does not mean these orders provide a “significant incentive” for shareholders to use 
derivative actions.
685
 As Reisberg points out, removing a deterrent is simply not the 
same as providing an incentive.
686
 In fact, it has been confirmed in the case law that 
the indemnity order is not a direct incentive given to a claimant shareholder to 
facilitate the use of a derivative claim, but rather a reflection of the rights being 




In addition to the fact that indemnity orders do not provide direct incentives for 
shareholders, other disincentivising factors may discourage the use of derivative 
actions. A claimant shareholder will only receive a percentage of the recovery that 
reflects the shareholding that this person holds if the litigation is successful. This 
might not be a real or immediate cash return for shareholders as the recovery may be 
invested in some venture instead of being paid by way of dividend. Furthermore, not 
all successful litigation leads to tangible relief: the relief might take the form of a 
tracing order against, and a charge over, the assets that wrongdoers misappropriated 
from the company.
688
 These factors, which discourage the use of derivative actions 
cannot be dislodged by an indemnity order. 
 
A further drawback that is often overlooked is that a claimant shareholder will not be 
recompensed if the company is found to be insolvent even if an indemnity order is 
granted.
689
 This is obviously another disincentive for shareholders. Under the 
                                                             
685
 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility---Issues in the Theory of Company Law 
(Clarendon Press 1993) 241. 
686
 Reisberg argues that a reward given directly to shareholders can be regarded as a form of an 
incentive. For example, according to the s201 of the Israeli Companies Act 1999, the court has 
discretion to grant part of the proceeds of a successful action to plaintiff shareholders beyond their 
indirect recovery. In such situation, a plaintiff shareholder can benefit directly from the litigation. This 
may increase the accessibility of the remedy for the potential plaintiffs as it sends a clear message to 
prospective shareholders that the derivative actions are strongly encouraged by legislators. See, A. 
Reiberg, ‘Promoting the Use of Derivative Actions’ (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 250, 251. 
687
 Smith v Croft [1986] 1 All ER 551, 565. 
688
 One example is Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810. 
689
 D. D. Prentice, ‘Wallersteiner v Moir: The Demise of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle?’ (1976) 40 
Conveyancer 51, 59. 
 
 267 
funding rule in English law, a shareholder has to make a decision on whether they 
will pursue litigation where they do not know if an indemnity order would be granted. 
Moreover, even if an indemnity order is granted and the action is successful, a 
claimant shareholder may still not be compensated if the company is insolvent. This 
is because an indemnity order does not confer any security in the nature of a lien on 
the company’s assets.
690
 This would strongly discourage shareholders from bringing 
derivative actions as they may feel that they are “going to throw away good money 




In sum, as discussed above, there are several serious flaws in the operation of 
indemnity orders. First, it is still unclear on what basis an indemnity order will be 
granted. Secondly, the interrelationship between the application for an indemnity and 
the application for leave to continue is problematic. Thirdly, such orders do not 
provide a direct incentive for shareholders to litigate: a claimant shareholder will 
have little or nothing to gain if the result of the litigation is successful. Finally, a 
shareholder will not be recompensed if it transpires that the company is insolvent. In 
view of these factors, English law does not provide an adequate response to the 
formidable funding problem inherent in derivative claims. In China, considering the 
severe double agency costs and the infrequent use of derivative actions, it is 
necessary to establish a funding mechanism that offers a strong incentive for 
shareholders to initiate derivative actions for the purpose of protecting their interests. 
As such, the indemnity order regime found in English law is not suitable for China, 
not only because of its uncertainty, but also its under-incentivising problems. 
Although indemnity orders recognise that a claimant should be indemnified for costs 
involved in litigation at the courts’ discretion, the deterrent effect is not fully 
addressed. Therefore, the transplantation of this method does not offer shareholders 
any significant benefit in raising proceedings. 
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5.5.2 The Recent Development of the UK Funding Rule: Conditional Fee 
Arrangements 
 
Recognising the problems associated with the indemnity order, a new system of 
conditional fee arrangement was developed in England.
692
 Under the Access to 
Justice Act 1999, parties to litigation other than criminal and family proceedings can 
now have a conditional fee arrangement with their lawyers.
693
 This opens up new 
possibilities in derivative actions as claimant shareholders can use this new 
arrangement to fund their claims. 
 
Generally, a conditional fee arrangement is a ‘no-win-no-fee’ system, which allows a 
lawyer to charge his client only if the case is won. Under this system, claimant 
shareholders are relieved from paying their lawyers for work that has been done 
where a case is unsuccessful. If a case is won, the costs of the lawyer will be paid by 
the losing party instead of the plaintiff shareholder who wins the case. As a result, a 
plaintiff shareholder does not need to pay fees to his or her lawyer in any event under 
the conditional fee arrangement. From this perspective, it is fair to say that this new 
system has an effective function in encouraging the use of derivative actions. 
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that a conditional fee agreement provides only a partial 
solution to the funding issue in English law. Although a plaintiff shareholder does not 
need to pay his or her lawyer in any event, he or she still has to pay the winning 
opponent’s legal costs if the case is lost. This makes conditional fee agreements 
different from contingency fee arrangements and makes them impractical or 
                                                             
692
 See A. Hogan, ‘Conditional Fees: Problems Solved and Problems yet to Come’ (2006) 1 Journal 
of Personal Injury Law 40. 
693
 See Access to Justice Act 1999, s 58A(1). 
 
 269 
unsuitable for funding derivative actions. Under a conditional fee agreement, an 
economically rational shareholder may not want to bring a derivative action in light 
of the risks and benefits of the action. If a minority shareholder raises proceedings 
and is successful, he or she only receives a pro rata share of the gains from such an 
action which may be negligible. However, if a case is unsuccessful, he or she has to 
pay the defendant’s legal fees which could be substantial. Since a derivative action 
cannot be guaranteed to be successful a rational shareholder is thus highly unlikely to 
take on a derivative action in light of the potential significant risks and negligible 
benefits.  
 
As a result, whilst the deterrent effect of English indemnity orders may be mitigated 
by conditional fee agreements, the inherent disincentives against plaintiff 
shareholders remains unless some sort of mechanism is implemented in supplement. 
For example, is there a mechanism that can insulate prospective claimant 
shareholders from the risk of paying the opponent’s legal fees? In theory, one way to 
overcome the negative aspect of this new system is the insurance market.
694
 Here, 
claimant shareholders can insulate themselves from paying the defendants’ legal 
costs by buying an insurance product specifically tailored to cover the client’s 
potential liability for the legal costs. Whilst it seems that the deterrent effect under 
conditional fee agreements would be eliminated with the intervention of such 
insurance, closer examination reveals that many difficulties faced by minority 
shareholders remain. There are basically two forms of insurance available to cover 
the risk of litigation: before-the-event (BTE) and after-the-event (AFT) insurance.
695
 
It is highly unlikely that a shareholder would take out BTE insurance when investing 
in a company. It is widely recognised that minority shareholders normally do not 
enthusiastically participate in the monitoring of a company’s management owing to 
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the existence of rational apathy or free riding, particularly for those who are 
members of listed companies. In light of this, it is difficult to imagine that 
shareholders would buy this insurance to cover possible legal action in the future. 
Twenty years of experience in England shows that such legal insurance is not popular 
notwithstanding that it is relatively inexpensive in comparison with AFT insurance. It 
is anticipated that this is unlikely to change significantly,
696
 particularly in the area 
of insurance for funding derivative actions. For the AFT insurance, a plaintiff 
shareholder has to pay a significant premium up front. Many shareholders would be 
deterred by this as some of them would not be able to afford such a 
considerably-priced premium. If they are able to afford it, their willingness to do so 
is still questionable as they will not recover the cost of such a premium if the case is 
lost. As such, the disincentivising effects of conditional fee agreements cannot be 
addressed by the insurance market. 
 
There is another argument that the up-front costs or premiums could be paid by a 
plaintiff’s lawyer in advance. This suggests that a plaintiff shareholder could enter 
into a conditional fee agreement without paying any fee regardless of the outcome of 
the action as his or her lawyer would advance the expense of the premiums. However, 
it is unreasonable and unrealistic to expect lawyers to be willing to shoulder this fee 
out of their own pockets.
697
 Under traditional conditional fee agreements, lawyers 
may be willing to take on an action because here the worst case scenario is to be paid 
nothing for their work. An up-front premium arrangement however, would risk not 
only that these lawyers are not paid, but also that they bear a substantial loss for costs 
paid to the defendants. Lawyers would not be willing to bear such costs unless they 
were certain that the probability of success is very high. However, successful 
litigation cannot be guaranteed, and they are thus forced to take a risk. Moreover, 
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even where a lawyer agrees to take on a case because they are certain on the basis of 
their experience and competence that the litigation will succeed, the majority of 
potential derivative actions are unlikely to be able to generate such certainty and will 
thus be rejected by lawyers. This may constitute another barrier for shareholders to 
pursue derivative actions. 
 
In light of the above, conditional fee agreements cannot provide a comprehensive 
solution to address the funding issue. As such, they are not suitable for China. More 
importantly, conditional fee agreements are established based on the system of costs 
follow the event. However, the notion of ‘costs follow the event’ in China is only 
applied to court fees rather than lawyer’s fees. Lawyer’s fees in China are paid by 
their clients regardless of the outcome of the action. As a result, if a conditional fee 
agreement is transplanted for application to China’s lawyer costs, it would create an 
absurd phenomenon because of the fact that a plaintiff shareholder has to pay the fees 
if an action is successful while they do not if the case is lost. It might be argued that 
successful litigation could generate benefits that can cover lawyer fees. However, 
such recoveries are allocated to the company rather than the plaintiff shareholder, 
with the latter only receiving an indirect pro rata share of the gains. This would 
obviously not be sufficient to cover the lawyer’s fees. To benefit plaintiff 
shareholders would have to hope to lose the litigation to avoid paying costs out of 
their own pockets, though this runs against their initial purpose. Here, there is no 
point in raising proceedings. Otherwise, plaintiff shareholders are inviting their own 
troubles. 
 
5.5.3 The Assessment of Contingency Fees Arrangements 
 




Contingency fee arrangements are much more favourable for individual shareholders 
compared to condition fee agreements. Under this US-style system, plaintiff 
shareholders are not liable for their lawyers’ fees under any circumstance. Although 
they might have to pay some costs that are not lawyer’s fees in proceedings, it is very 
common for them to sign a contingency fee arrangement with their lawyers asking 
the latter to advance such expenditures or providing that plaintiff shareholders are not 
liable for the expenditures in any event.
698
 Even where there is no such contract and 
thus plaintiff shareholders have to pay the defendant some non-fee costs, such costs 
are very limited.
699
 As such, the costs of the litigation are shifted to the plaintiff’s 
lawyer while plaintiffs are insulated from exposure to the risk of paying litigation 
costs. For the plaintiff’s lawyers, it seems that they bear a high risk of working for 
nothing or even losing money out of their pocket if they agree to advance up-front 
expenses. However, this loss is not significant, or at least much smaller, compared to 
the situation for English plaintiffs and lawyers where one of them would have to pay 
the legal costs of the defendant under the conditional fee agreement. As a result, the 
financial disincentive against derivative actions is not an issue under the contingency 
fee arrangement. This is principally why derivative actions in the US are much more 
active than in other countries. 
 
In fact, a key role in derivative actions is thereby shifted from the plaintiff to the 
lawyer under this arrangement. There are even some lawyers who are dedicated to 
derivative actions, spending much time on monitoring companies. After detecting a 
corporate wrongdoing, they seek a nominal plaintiff shareholder to bring an action 
against the wrongdoer. Since shareholders can receive some pro rata benefits from 
the recovery and have little financial risk in doing so, they are at least not difficult to 
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5.5.3.2 Criticisms of Contingency Fee Arrangements 
 
It is argued that contingency fee arrangements have two serious problems: strike suits 
and cheap settlement. 
 
5.5.3.2.1 Strike Suits 
 
It is believed that while derivative actions are strongly encouraged under the 
contingency fee arrangement, unmeritorious lawsuits may also be brought at the 
same time. Given that litigation itself can hurt a company in damaging its reputation, 
and distracting management from focusing on business matters, unmeritorious or 
malicious lawsuits can do even worse to a company. Some empirical studies have 
demonstrated that this is the case in practice. Wood conducted a study involving 573 
derivative actions and found out that only 13 cases resulted in judgments in favour of 
plaintiffs.
701
 Another empirical study conducted by Jones also confirmed this 
research. He examined both securities actions and derivative lawsuits in 1980 and 
revealed that only about 0.6% of the total sample cases resulted in judgments in 




One fundamental explanation behind these so-called strike suits may be that a 
plaintiff shareholder does not need to bear the costs of lawsuits under contingency 
fee arrangements. Here, they have nothing to lose but something to gain for bringing 
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litigation. Furthermore, defendants are more likely to settle with plaintiff 
shareholders,
703
 thereby facilitating the use of derivative actions. Plaintiff 
shareholders know that initiation would be unlikely to proceed to trial as the costs for 
defendants to defend an action may be more than the settlement; they may thus be 
amendable to filing frivolous cases as long as the costs of filing are less than the 
value of the settlement. Bebchuk raises another opinion suggesting that an 
information asymmetry between a plaintiff and a defendant may explain also strike 
suits.
704
 In some circumstances, the total costs of litigation may exceed the expected 
judgement for a plaintiff shareholder and the initiation of this kind of suit would 
bring no good for the plaintiff. However, the defendant may not know this as a result 
of information asymmetry.
705
 Therefore, he or she might still wish to settle the case 
owing to the uncertainty of the outcome of litigation. 
 
However, the allegation that strike suits are linked to contingency fee arrangements 
is questionable. First of all, it is argued that the aforementioned empirical studies are 
not adequate to support the assertions about strike suits as the data collections are 
doubted by some scholars.
706
 Secondly, it is unconvincing to claim that strike suits 
are prevalent by demonstrating that a majority of derivative actions are not in favour 
of plaintiffs. As most derivative actions end in settlements, a favourable judgment for 
a defendant does not mean that most actions, including settled cases, are 
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unmeritorious. Furthermore, the risk of the litigation is shifted from a plaintiff 
shareholder to his or her lawyer under contingency fee agreement. As such, even if a 
plaintiff shareholder wishes to pursue an unmeritorious suit, it may be that no lawyer 
will accept such a case. Since lawyers risk not being paid for their work, they are 
more inclined to choose cases with a high probability of success. As frivolous cases 
normally have a low probability of success, lawyers are naturally unwilling to take 
on such actions, preventing cases like this from being initiated. 
 
5.5.3.2.2 Cheap Settlements 
 
The contingency fee arrangement also has the problem of cheap settlements. Most 
derivative actions are ultimately settled instead of resorting to the courts under the 
American style funding system. Settlement itself is good for the company as well as 
other participants. However, it produces unsubstantial benefits for the company while 
significant awards go to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Several empirical studies have 
demonstrated the prevalence of cheap settlements. Jones found out that only about 
one fourth of derivative actions eventually proceed to trial. The rest, which is 75% of 
such cases, are settled out of court.
707
 Another study conducted by Romano also 
confirms this phenomenon. Romano examined derivative actions from the 1970s to 
the 1980s and found that 64.8% of cases ended in settlements.
708
 Of all these settled 
cases, only half of them generated some financial recovery for shareholders.
709
 
Where non-monetary remedies were obtained, it is alleged that they were 
“inconsequential” and “cosmetic”, which is most likely used to justify the lawyers’ 
awards.
710
 By contrast, the fees paid for lawyers were significant despite the 
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minimal monetary value received by shareholders.
711
 As a consequence, derivative 
actions are criticised by some commentators. For example, one US circuit judge 
stated that “derivative actions do little to promote sound management and often hurt 
the firm by diverting the managers’ time from running the business while diverting 





This result is obviously runs against the purpose of derivative actions as they are 
expected to protect the interests of minority shareholders and the company as a 
whole. However, cheap settlements are understandable after a closer examination of 
each side. Under the contingency fee arrangement, risk is shifted from plaintiffs to 
their lawyers as discussed above. The efforts of plaintiffs’ lawyer would be made for 
nothing if they fail to win the case. If the case is successful, they would receive some 
- but limited - benefit. In light of this, rational lawyers would try their best to settle 
cases in order to gain some benefit. Although a payment from a settlement may be 
less than from a judgment, it would be a definite payment and thus lawyers do not 
have to risk losing their efforts and gaining nothing. In addition, it is argued that the 
method of calculating fees by the percentage provides another incentive for lawyers 




Defendants also have incentives to settle cases without resorting to the courts. After a 
derivative action is filed, defendants face three possible results: win, lose or settle. 
Winning a case is definitely a good result for the defendant. Even so, they have to 
defend themselves and costs might be incurred during this proceeding. Furthermore, 
litigation may damage their reputation and thus affect their business activities. By 
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contrast, if they lose the case, they have to pay litigation costs as well as damages. 
Their reputation will also be damaged. In this dilemma, it is natural and 
understandable that defendants choose to settle as a compromised way of resolving 
issues. 
 
For plaintiff shareholders, although they have some interest in the outcome of the 
litigation, any recovery from the defendants generates trivial value for them as they 
only hold minority shares in the company. As such, they do not have an economic 
incentive to monitor their lawyers. In fact, the named plaintiff in most derivative 
actions is nothing but a figurehead. Moreover, as risk has been shifted from plaintiffs 
to their lawyers under a contingency fee arrangement, plaintiff shareholders have 
much less financial stake than their lawyers in an action, creating legitimacy for 
lawyers to control decision-making.
714
 In view of the above, it is not surprising to 
see that cheap settlements are prevalent under contingency fee arrangements. 
 
5.5.4 Why Contingency Fee Arrangements are suitable for China 
 
5.5.4.1 Why the English Funding Rule is not suitable for China 
 
Before demonstrating why the US funding rule is suitable for China to adopt, it is 
essential to illustrate why the UK funding rule cannot be transplanted to China. As 
discussed above, there are many inherent drawbacks to indemnity cost orders, which 
make such orders inappropriate for China. For example, the circumstances under 
which an indemnity cost order can be granted remain unclear. As such, it would be 
difficult for Chinese courts to apply this rule fairly and systematically without clear 
clarification. Given that Chinese judges only decide cases strictly following the law, 
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it is even more essential to clarify this rule. If it were to be transplanted to China, this 
key and important issue would therefore have to be addressed. However, this 
problem still exists even in the UK from which this rule originates. Arguably, it 
would be even more difficult for Chinese legislators to clarify this rule.  
 
In addition to their ambiguousness, the disincentive that indemnity cost orders 
generate in discouraging shareholders from bringing derivative actions, constitutes 
another obstacle. As revealed above, an indemnity order presupposes that 
shareholders would want to pursue litigation on behalf of the company in the first 
place. Here they only have the possibility of being indemnified after they have made 
the decision to sue. Although it is true that a deterrent to the initiation of a derivative 
actions has been removed by this order, this does not mean that an incentive has been 
provided for shareholders. In light of this, indemnity orders are not suitable for China 
because Chinese shareholders need to be encouraged to raise proceedings against 
wrongdoers. 
 
5.5.4.2 The Grounds for Adopting the US Funding Rule 
 
The US funding rule can overcome the above shortcomings. Under contingency fee 
arrangements, plaintiff shareholders do not need to pay their lawyer’s fees if the 
action is unsuccessful. If he or she wins the litigation, the lawyer’s fees will be paid 
out of the recovery received from the defendants. As such, plaintiff shareholders are 
not liable for their lawyers’ fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation. As a 
consequence, Chinese shareholders would be encouraged to bring derivative actions 
if this rule were adopted in China. Two main factors can justify the possible 
transplantation of this rule to China.  
 
First, shareholders in China should be encouraged to bring litigation against 
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wrongdoers. As discussed in previous chapters, there are severe double agency costs 
in China that leave minority shareholders vulnerable to exploitation by majority 
shareholders and/or managers. Therefore, it is extremely important that their interests 
be safeguarded. Unfortunately, current mechanisms designed to protect their interests 
are either ineffective or cannot provide sufficient protection for minority 
shareholders upon a closer examination. If contingency fee arrangement is adopted in 
China, it can be expected that shareholders would be encouraged to bring derivative 
actions in order to protect their interests and the company. 
 
Second, the transplantation of a contingency fee arrangement is not without 
foundation in respect of lawyer’s fees in China. As mentioned above, lawyer fees are 
not regulated under Chinese law as they are considered to be a private business 
matter for plaintiffs and their lawyers. Normally, a plaintiff shareholder has to pay 
their lawyer’s fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
715
 However, it is not 
uncommon for a plaintiff to reach an agreement with his or her lawyer that the 
lawyer’s fees would only be charged contingent on the outcome of the suit. This is 
similar to the American contingency fee arrangement under which a plaintiff does not 
need to pay fees when the action is successful as they would be compensated out of 
the recovery. As such, there would be no real or substantial difficulties if the 
contingency fee arrangements were to be transplanted given the fact that there is a 
similar system for lawyer’s fees in place in China. 
 
5.5.4.3 The Potential Problems in Adopting the US Funding Rule 
 
As discussed above, contingency fee arrangements are not without drawbacks. Two 
major problems have been identified in the application of this funding rule: strike 
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suits and cheap settlements. For the former, it is argued that the incentives a 
contingency fee arrangement creates for shareholders may generate unmeritorious 
actions and thus the device of derivative action may be abused. For the latter, it is 
said that cheap settlements would prevail as lawyers prefer definite rather than 
probably substantial but uncertain payment. These two problems may hinder the 
effectiveness of derivative actions if a contingency fee arrangement is adopted in 
China. Indeed, shareholders would be encouraged to raise proceedings as the risk of 
litigation would shift from plaintiff shareholder to lawyer under the contingency fee 
arrangement. However, this does not necessarily mean that the above problems 
would be inevitably occur, or if they did, could not be tackled. Indeed, they could be 
avoided or addressed with proper mechanisms. 
 
5.5.4.3.1 Strike Suits 
 
The assertation that strike suits are generated by contingency fee arrangements is not 
without a dispute. As discussed above, empirical studies indicating that strike suits 
are increased have been met with doubt by some scholars. For example, Weiss 
demonstrated that the data collected in these empirical studies were inadequate to 
support the assertion that the funding rule resulted in a prevalence of strike suits.
716
 
Furthermore, a greater volume of litigation would be created by this funding rule; 
this does not necessarily mean that many of these suits are unmeritorious. Whether 
an action is meritorious or not cannot be simply measured by the amount of 
monetary benefit received in the settlement or outcome decided by the courts. 
 
Secondly, derivative actions cannot be initiated freely by plaintiff shareholders. In 
China, there are some restrictive procedural rules which shareholders have to meet if 
                                                             
716
 See M. I. Weiss, ‘Shareholder Litigation – Reform Proposals to Shift Fees: Limit ‘Professional 
Plaintiffs’ and Cap Punitive Damages’ in Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 
(Practicing Law Institute Westlaw Database 1994) No. B4-7068. 
 
 281 
they wish to pursue litigation. For example, not every shareholder in a joint stock 
limited company is eligible to bring a derivative action under the current law as there 
is a standing requirement entitling only those shareholders who hold at least 1% of 
the total shares of the company for 180 consecutive days or more to do so. Although 
this standing requirement is to be relaxed in the future reform, the procedural 
restriction remains in place to ensure that the balance between monitoring managers 
and protecting minority shareholders is achieved. As such, it is expected that the 
adoption of a contingency fee arrangement in China would not necessarily lead to 
groundless suits. 
 
Thirdly, the advantages brought by a contingency fee arrangement would outweigh 
its disadvantages if it is transplanted to China. There have only been a small number 
of derivative action cases in practice since their introduction through Chinese 
Company Law 2005. This caused disappointment for many scholars and lawyers as it 
was expected that the new statutory derivative action would have a key role to play 
in reducing agency costs. In light of this, the derivative action system should be 
improved and actively used. With the adoption of a contingency fee arrangement, 
shareholders are at least not hindered from bringing derivative actions and it might 
be expected that the use of this new institution would be promoted in China. There 
may inevitably be some frivolous suits among such derivative actions. However, this 
would be better than the current situation where the right of initiating derivative suits 
is rarely exercised. 
 
5.5.4.3.2 Cheap Settlements 
 
Under a contingency fee arrangement, risk shifts from plaintiff shareholders to their 
lawyers. Here, a rationale lawyer would try his or her best to settle a case because 
potential failure may mean his or her efforts are expended for no reward. Settlement 
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is regarded as an appropriate way to resolve disputes, not only by saving judicial 
resources, but also because of its unique characteristic of avoiding widening 
disagreements. In fact, the settlement of civil disputes is strongly encouraged in 
Chinese judicial culture. There is even a separate chapter in Chinese Civil Procedure 
Law stipulating rules on mediation.
717
 As a matter of fact, settlement itself is not a 
problem. Rather, the problem is that lawyers may use the settlement for their 
personal gain as they have different interests from their clients under a contingency 
fee arrangement. A common concern in this respect is that companies may receive 
little or no monetary recovery while lawyers are rewarded with substantial fees. In 
addition, a settlement may be secretly reached on terms advantageous to both parties 
while not in the interests of the company. Therefore, courts should step in and such 
settlements should need judicial approval. With the rigorous judicial control, it could 
be expected that the settlement problems can be addressed. 
 
5.5.5 Other Issues 
 
5.5.5.1 Filing Fees 
 
In addition to the lawyer’s fees, the filing fees may constitute another obstacle for the 
promotion of derivative actions. Filing fees follow the principle of “loser pays”, 
which means a plaintiff shareholder may have to bear this cost if an action is 
unsuccessful. If the amount of this fee is not much in practice, it would not be a 
problem for shareholders. However, under current legislation, the filing fee is 
charged in proportion to the claimed amount because it is calculated as a monetary 
claim.
718
 Under this calculation, filing fees can be very high, particularly in 
derivative actions, which normally involve a large disputed claim. Although filing 
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fee might be recovered from the defendants if the plaintiff wins the case, the prospect 
of this is far from certain. As a consequence, plaintiff shareholders risk paying large 
filing fees out of their own pocket when they decide to bring derivative actions. 
 
Experience in Japan has shown that the above problem is not difficult to address. In 
1950, Japanese corporate law was substantially revised under the influence of US 
corporate law and derivative action was adopted for the first time.
719
 Such actions 
were regarded as one of the most important features in this reform as they were 
expected to provide a formidable weapon to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders.
720
 However, for the first forty years after its enactment, derivative 
action was rarely used by Japanese shareholders.
721
 The situation was significantly 
changed from 1990s when the rate of derivative actions started to increase 
enormously.
722
 The vast majority of scholars believe that the explanation behind this 
is clear and simple: the rule of percentage calculation of filing fees, which was 
similar to China’s current rule, was changed. Filing fees were reduced to a small 
fixed amount in 1993 following the Tokyo High Court’s decision in the Nikko 
Securities case.
723
 Under this amendment, derivative actions were treated as 
incalculable claims and the filing fees of such cases were lowered to a nominal fixed 
                                                             
719
 It was set out in articles 267 of the Commercial Code. See S. Kawashima and S. Sakurai, 
‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms’ (1997) 33 
Stanford Journal of International Law 15. 
720
 See L. Salwin, ‘The New Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of Gradual Progress towards 
Democratic Goals’ (1962) 50 Georgetown Law Journal 478-517. 
721
 From 1950 to 1985, there was on average fewer than one derivative action per year in the whole of 
Japan. See S. Kawashima and S. Sakurai, “Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, 
and Suggested Reforms” (1997), Stanford Journal of International Law 33, p17. 
722
 In 1993, there were 84 cases pending before Japanese courts. The number rose to 174 in 1996 and 
reached a peak with 286 cases in 1999. Although the number of new actions declined slightly from 
2000-2009, it still maintained a previously unimaginably high average rate of 73.7 new actions filed 
per year. See M. D. West, ‘The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United 
States’ (1994) 88 Northwest University Law Review 1436; M. Nakahigashi and D. W. Puchniak, ‘Land 
of the rising derivative actions: Revisiting Irrationality to Understand Japan’s unreluctant Shareholder 
Litigant’ In D. W. Puchniak, H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds.), The Derivative Action in Asia: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012) 128-185. 
723
 M. Nakahigashi and D. W. Puchniak, ‘Land of the rising derivative actions: Revisiting Irrationality 
to Understand Japan’s unreluctant Shareholder Litigant’ In D. W. Puchniak, H. Baum and M. 
Ewing-Chow (eds.), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 128-185. 
 
 284 
rate of￥8.200 (about £54 ).724 The significant increase in the number of derivative 
actions since has demonstrated that filing fees can have a key role to play in 
derivative litigation and the reduction of such fees could encourage shareholders to 
raise proceedings.
725
 In light of Japan’s experience, it is clear that filing fees should 
be reduced and changed to a fixed rate if China’s shareholders are to actively use 
derivative actions as a tool for the enforcement of directors’ duties. Given the current 
classification of the court fees system in China, the filing fees for derivative actions 
can be categorized as non-monetary which would make them a lower and fixed 
amount. 
 
5.5.5.2 The Calculation of Lawyer’s Fees 
 
There are two ways of computing lawyer’s fee under a contingency fee arrangement: 
the lodestar method which basically rewards the lawyer for time reasonably spent in 
the action; and the percentage method in which the lawyer is paid on the basis of the 
percentage of the recovery. 
 
The lodestar method was established to reflect the risk assumed by the lawyer and 
the quality of the work done.
726
 However, this time-based formula may provide a 
strong incentive for lawyers to expend needless time in order to maximize their 
rewards. This unfortunate formula would not only delay the progress of an action and 
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thus impose unnecessary workload on the judiciary, but also aggravate a latent 
conflict of interest between the lawyer and the class a plaintiff shareholder represents 




By contrast, a percentage method can avoid the above problems as it is calculated in 
proportion to the recovery. In addition, it is a simple method which does not 
encounter the problem of determining the lawyer’s hourly rate and adjustment 
multiplier. However, the percentage method has its own problems. When the lawyer’ 
fee is calculated in proportion to the recovery, lawyers could encourage premature 
settlements which might not be in the best interests of the company. In addition, as 
the rewards that lawyers receive do not represent the amount of work they did, they 
may obtain windfall profits if a case is settled immediately. This would result in 
public criticism and damage to derivative actions. 
 
Both of the above methods have their advantages and disadvantages. As for which 
one is suitable for China to adopt, this thesis argues that the percentage method is 
relatively better for China. First of all, the lodestar method is rarely used in China. It 
is very uncommon for Chinese lawyers to charge on the basis of an hourly rate. 
Instead, they charge either on a percentage of the claimed amount or fixed fees. As 
such, the adoption of the percentage method in derivative actions would encounter no 
real difficulties in China. Second, the lodestar method requires the calculation of the 
time that lawyers have spent on the action. This means that lawyers have a final say 
on the amount of the fees to be paid. However, Chinese shareholders may not be 
confident about this as they may be doubtful of the actual time that lawyers have 
spent. Given the fact that China’s legal service market is still developing and the 
quality of lawyers greatly varies, such concern is not without reason. Third, the 
problem of windfall inherited in the percentage method can be addressed by setting a 
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ceiling on the maximum fee. This means a lawyer could charge in proportion to the 




In order to prevent the potential problem of abusing derivative actions, some argue 
that a requirement of security-for-expenses provided by plaintiff shareholders can be 
adopted.
728
 There is currently no law regulating security-for-expenses in derivative 
actions in China and there are three opinions available in discussing whether this 
mechanism could be introduced. The first is that plaintiff shareholders be required to 
provide security when they wish to pursue derivative actions.
729
 This option is based 
on the presumption that derivative actions may be abused for personal gain and the 
company may also be damaged by the action. Security-for-expenses would require 
plaintiff shareholders to post security, which could deter some unmeritorious suits 
and thus protect the interests of the company as a whole. The second opinion is that 
China does not adopt a security-for-expenses requirement provided by plaintiff 
shareholders.
730
 The argument for this opinion is that any recovery from the 
litigation will go to the company rather than the plaintiff shareholders. Requiring 
those shareholders who cannot benefit directly to provide security would obviously 
discourage them from using derivative actions. The last opinion is a compromise 
theory which argues that security-for-expenses should be used cautiously.
731
 This 
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approach is basically in favour of adopting the security-for-expenses requirement 
while at the same time recognises the disadvantages of this mechanism. To be 
specific, it is argued that this mechanism could be introduced and only be used in a 
situation where the defendants can prove that the litigation brought by the plaintiff 
shareholder is not in good faith. 
 
In view of the above debates, this thesis argues that a requirement of 
security-for-expenses provided by the shareholder should not be introduced in China 
for the following reasons. First of all, the adoption of such a mechanism is unfair for 
plaintiff shareholders. As mentioned above, a derivative action is a unique form of 
litigation as plaintiff shareholders would not benefit directly if they win the case. If 
this mechanism is adopted, it would mean a plaintiff shareholder will lose a certain 
amount of money which is used as security. In this situation, it is unfair to plaintiff 
shareholders as they have nothing to gain directly but something to lose. Second, 
derivative actions need to be encouraged in China. As emphasized repeatedly, the use 
of derivative actions in China should be promoted considering the severe double 
agency costs and ineffective protective mechanisms. The security method would 
discourage shareholders from raising proceedings to protect their interests and thus 
hinder the exercise of derivative actions. Third, the abuse of derivative actions could 
be avoided even without the adoption of security. Besides the procedural restriction, 
lawyers would have a key role to play in screening frivolous suits. Under the 
contingency fee arrangement, lawyers bear the risk of gaining nothing. This would 
make lawyers consider the merits of cases before taking them on. As such, those 
cases that are frivolous or unmeritorious might not be accepted by the lawyers. Last 
but not least, although the compromise approach seems to be welcomed by many 
scholars, it is not necessarily different from the first opinion. The compromise 
approach is in favour of adopting security-for-expenses while maintaining that it 
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should be used cautiously. Whether security should be provided depends on the 
merits of the case, and the courts are conferred such powers to make this decision. 
This means a plaintiff shareholder has to face the potential risk that he or she might 
be required to provide security after he initiates an action. It is this potential risk that 
might deter shareholders from undertaking derivative litigation. In addition, it is 
difficult to judge whether a derivative action is meritorious or unmeritorious as a 
successful or unsuccessful result cannot simply be the standard. The ambiguous 
criterion for judging this casts further doubts over this compromise approach. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 The Approach of This Thesis 
 
After much consideration and public consultation, derivative action was finally 
enacted by Chinese Company Law 2005. This enactment was regarded as a 
milestone in the development of company law. This was because (1) the interests of 
minority shareholders had been frequently exploited over the last twenty years and 
remedies remained limited; (2) the legal and non-legal constraints on majority 
shareholders and directors seemed ineffective; and, most importantly, (3) the 
modernization of Chinese company law requires good corporate governance in 
balancing the interests of various groups. Derivative action was recognised as a 
strong tool in protecting minority shareholders interests and establishing good 
corporate governance. As such, it was expected that this investor-friendly system 
would be actively used by shareholders to protect their interests and have a strong 
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers. In fact, it turned out that this reform effort 
seemed futile as the right to engage in such actions was rarely exercised compared to 
other mechanisms. This raises a question about the role of derivative actions in China; 
namely, should a derivative action system play a key role in protecting shareholder 
interests? If the answer is positive, the next question is how such a system could be 
improved in order to effectively discipline management. The essence of this thesis is 
to try to address these issues. 
 
This thesis argues that derivative action should and can play a key role in protecting 
the interests of minority shareholders and monitoring management and majority 




First, since the main purpose of derivative action is to protect shareholders’ interests 
and thus reduce agency cost, the first issue that needs to be addressed is the agency 
problem. The more serious an agency problem is, the more necessary derivative 
action becomes. Chapter 2 examines this problem and demonstrates that there are 
double agency costs in China: vertical agency cost between shareholders and 
managers and horizontal agency cost between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Although these two types of agency problem can coexist, they are 
usually mutually exclusive as countries generally have dispersed ownership or 
concentrated ownership structures. However, this is not the case in China owing to 
its special policy on SOEs. Reform of the modern enterprise system undoubtedly 
motivates a company’s development whilst also inducing the phenomenon of owner 
absence and thus leading to the problem of insider control. This creates vertical 
agency cost. In addition, China’s concentrated ownership structure also makes 
minority shareholders vulnerable to exploitation from blockholders. This generates 
horizontal agency cost. Thus, minority shareholders in China face double agency 
problems within the company and thus protective mechanisms must be put in place. 
 
Second, in order to reduce double agency cost, legal and non-legal mechanisms 
should be in place. Derivative action is one of the legal methods used to constrain 
agency cost and thus whether it needs to be improved depends on other mechanisms 
available. If market forces and other legal mechanisms can be demonstrated as being 
effective in reducing agency cost and protecting minority shareholders, then the 
necessity to reform statutory derivative action is weakened as both of legal and 
non-legal mechanisms have a similar function in protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders. As such, this thesis formulates its argument by demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of market forces and other legal methods. For example, the labour 
market for managers does not work effectively because of political intervention. The 
influence of the capital market is weakened because of the policy market. Incomplete 
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reform of non-tradable shares also hinders the function of the market for corporate 
control. With regard to legal methods, various mechanisms have been introduced and 
their drawbacks have also been identified in Chapter 2. As a consequence, derivative 
action ought to retain a central role in regulating the misbehaviour of controlling 
shareholders and managers and deterring them from abusing their powers.  
 
Notably, this does not mean that other protective mechanisms have only a small role 
to play in protecting minority shareholders. Indeed, they are very important in the 
sense that all these methods together can complement each other, playing a vital role 
in corporate governance. 
 
The next stage is to examine the relation between direct actions and derivative 
actions. Although there is a connection between these two forms of action, the line 
between them is quite clear as there are many different aspects to them. For example, 
one of the fundamental distinctions between these forms of action is that the purpose 
of direct action is to safeguard the personal interests of individual shareholders, while 
a derivative action aims to protect the interests of the company. More importantly, 
the causes of these two actions are different. A direct action is initiated by a 
shareholder claiming that his personal interests are injured by wrongful acts. For 
derivative actions, shareholders are only entitled to bring such actions when the 
interests of the company are damaged by wrongdoers. In other words, if the wrongful 
acts incurred an injury to the interests of the shareholder rather than the company, 
then it is a direct action that the shareholder should raise. However, even though 
shareholders can bring direct actions to protect their own interests; they still need 
derivative actions in some circumstances. 
 
After demonstrating the need to strengthen and improve derivative actions in China, 
this thesis starts to explore Chinas’ derivative actions system. Despite the absence of 
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a clear statutory basis for derivative actions in Company Law 1993, such cases have 
nevertheless appeared in the courts from time to time before the entry into force of 
Company Law 2005. Some of these cases were accepted, while some were refused. 
For those cases that were accepted, the reasons for this were various as there was no 
such statutory rule at that time.  
 
In 2005, derivative action was finally introduced into Chinese company law. After 
almost eight years of implementation, less than 80 cases were raised. Whilst this 
seems a good figure in comparison to other jurisdictions, closer examination shows 
this not to be the case for various reasons. For example, the standing requirement for 
such actions is too high for shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, which partly 
explains why there were almost no JSC cases. Also, the opacity of the demand 
requirement constitutes a further barrier for shareholders wishing to exercise this 
right.  
 
More importantly, the funding rule of derivative actions is treated as the same with 
other forms of litigation. In view of the unique economic nature of the derivative 
action, shareholders would be strongly discouraged from raising proceedings without 
other sources of funding. In order to establish a new funding rule for derivative 
actions, this thesis looks at the funding rules in English and US law and argues that 
contingency fee arrangements are suitable for China. The adoption of contingency 
fee arrangements would shift risk from plaintiff shareholders to their lawyers and 
thus encourage shareholders to initiate litigation against wrongdoers. 
 
The above discussion only addresses why derivative actions should play a significant 
role in monitoring management and how they should be improved; it does not 
address whether shareholders can and should be encouraged to exercise this right. In 
other words, even if the derivative action system is improved and thus rendered more 
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investors friendly, would shareholders be willing to take this action to protect their 
rights and interests? If the answer is positive, the next question arises as to whether 
the courts are capable of dealing with these cases. The thesis first argues that Chinese 
people are nowadays increasingly willing to resolve disputes through the courts. 
There is a concern that the traditional culture of unwillingness to raise proceedings 
may hinder the use of litigation. However, there is another traditional culture, namely 
the Legalist School, which emphasizes the notion that a nation’s cohesion can be 
secured by the application of strict legislation. This school has co-existed with 
Confucianism and its impact should not be neglected. In addition, a commercial 
culture is gradually becoming established in China owing to the rapid economic 
miracle, which inevitably leads to the phenomenon whereby one party will not 
hesitate to initiate an action against another if they have violated an agreement. 
Hence, this thesis addresses the first question from the perspective of culture. 
 
With regard to the question of whether the courts have capacity to deal with the 
increasing volume of litigation, it cannot be denied that the competence of Chinese 
judges has been criticised for a long time owing to an earlier policy permitting retired 
military officers to work as judicial authorities. However, the situation has been 
changing in recent years, rendering the judiciary more capable of dealing with 
derivative action cases because of the enactment of the Judges Law and the 
increasing recruitment of more qualified people to the judiciary. As such, the 
improvement of derivative actions and the encouragement of shareholders to raise 
more proceedings would not encounter many difficulties in China. 
 
6.2 Striking a fair balance between (a) protection for the company and 




Agency cost originating from the separation of ownership and control cannot be 
eliminated. Indeed, there will always be fraud and corporate malpractice in the real 
world. Legal and non-legal mechanisms can only diminish rather than remove this 
agency problem. Derivative action, as one means of monitoring management and 
controlling shareholders, is no exception. However, this does not mean that 
derivative action has a minor role to play in this area. In fact, its monitoring role and 
deterrent effect has been demonstrated in this thesis. As such, it is very important that 
this right can be actively exercised without hindrance so that shareholders can 
prevent the interests of the company and themselves being abused. Without the 
establishment and improvement of a derivative action system, it is hard to imagine 
that shareholders could be provided with strong and sufficient protections, 
particularly in China where mechanisms provided for shareholders are either 
ineffective or not strong enough. 
 
At the same time, shareholders cannot be allowed to bring derivative actions without 
restriction; otherwise, management would be deterred from engaging in any great 
“risk-reward” business and the corporate efficient would be affected, ultimately, 
leading the company and its members to suffer. As such, it is extremely important to 
maintain a fair balance between the corporate efficient and protection for the 
company and its members. 
 
Various approaches to derivative actions were taken towards achieving this balance. 
In the area procedure, China has borrowed the demand requirement from the US, 
which basically requires an individual shareholder to make a demand upon the board 
of directors or supervisors before bringing an action. In the area substance, 
shareholders in joint stock companies have to meet the standing requirement in order 
to be qualified to raise proceedings. These methods are intended to strike a balance 




Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, another issue in securing this 
balance is determining the appropriate body to assess whether the litigation is in the 
best interests of the company. As the comparative study shows, the US and UK have 
adopted different approaches to tackling this question. For example, the US has 
adopted an independent organ (Special Litigation Committees) to make this decision, 
though they have been criticised for enabling prejudice and lacking independence. In 
the UK, it was traditionally recognised that only the general meeting of shareholders 
had the right to make a decision on corporate litigation, as individual shareholders 
can initiate derivative claims only in exceptional cases. However, the strategy of 
conferring rights on the general meeting of shareholders has the problem of 
collective action. The Companies Act 2006 has now granted more rights to the court, 
which is given greater discretion in deciding whether a derivative action is permitted. 
In this sense, the courts play a key role in assessing whether an action is in the best 
interests of the company. In China, this issue not been considered. Although each 
organ has its own advantages and disadvantages, this thesis argues that the court 
approach is suitable for China in light of the defects of other approaches and the 
merits of the court approach. 
 
Lastly, it is worthwhile noting that the balance between protecting minority 
shareholders and monitoring management should be maintained in a fair way. This 
means that the vulnerable position of minority shareholders should be recognised and 
other factors which may hinder the use of this right should also be noted. This is why 
this thesis argues that derivative actions should be improved and could thus be more 





6.3 Derivative Actions in Corporate Governance 
 
As repeatedly mentioned in the previous chapters, derivative action is only one 
means of monitoring management and protecting minority shareholders in corporate 
governance. Its effectiveness depends not only on its own legal rules but also other 
factors and mechanisms. This is because corporate governance is a system which sets 
out the internal relations between various interests groups in a company. Therefore, it 
is fair to say that the role of derivative actions is inversely proportional to the 
effectiveness of other available mechanisms. The more effective other methods are, 
the less important the role of derivative actions is. As a result, it simply cannot be 
asserted that one country provides a better system of derivative action while the other 
one has a poor institution. For example, it cannot be said that the system for 
derivative actions in the US is much better than that in the UK where the courts are 
much more conservative towards this right. This is because unfair prejudice is 
popularly used by shareholders in the UK and thus derivative actions are less 
important. As a consequence, whether detailed rules of derivative action should be 
borrowed from a given jurisdiction does not depend on whether they are good or bad, 
but relies on their suitability for the receiving jurisdiction. 
 
6.4 Beyond This Thesis: Future Direction 
 
Although this research attempts to examine China’s derivative action system, it 
cannot explore all aspects in this area. In fact, it is hoped that the theoretical 
examination this research has developed can provide new insights on China’s 
derivative actions for future study. Several avenues of further research are identified 




First, the ineffectiveness of derivative actions may be relevant to China’s special 
corporate governance structure.
1
 There are basically two board types of structures: 
one-tier structure and two-tier structure. For one-tier jurisdictions, such as the US, 
UK and Japan, only one board manages and supervises a company. The monitoring 
role is allocated to independent directors or non-executive directors.
2
 In two-tier 
jurisdictions, such as Germany, the board of directors is mainly in charge of running 
the company, while the board of supervisors assumes the role of checking and 
supervising. Generally, both systems have their respective advantages and 
disadvantages. The one-tier system is commonly more welcomed by management as 
it facilitates the decision-making process while two-tier boards favour collective 
decision-making. On the other hand, two-tier boards encourage labour participation 
in corporate governance, which therefore mitigates potential conflicts between labour 
unions and the managers.  
 
However, it is difficult to categorise China into a one-tier or two-tier system, as it not 
only requires listed companies to establish independent directors, but also has a 
board of supervisors system for almost every large and medium sized company.
3
 
This is partly because Chinese company law has been influenced by German law 
since its inception and thus the vestigial supervisory board has been retained. At the 
same time, common law is becoming increasingly important for China within the 
area of commercial law. An independent director, a typical common law feature, was 
transplanted into Chinese law in order to keep an eye on managers and directors. For 
legislators, this special mixed board structure might be expected to curb the harmful 
behaviour of managers more effectively and thus derivative action is not deemed to 
                                                             
1
 For the details of this, please refer to S. Lin, ‘Derivative Actions in China: One Step Forward, Two 
Steps Back’ (2012) 23 International Company and Commercial Law Review 197. 
2
 See R. Kraakman, J. Armour, P. Davies, L. Enriques, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda 
and E. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 56. 
3
 See Articles 52, 118 and 123 of Chinese Company Law 2005. 
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be an urgent need since it generally has many disadvantages. This might partly 
explain why the procedure for derivative action is so vague that individual 
shareholders are hardly able to bring such litigation. However, this mixed board 
structure generates incompatibility as well as the intrinsic problem that these two 
supervisory bodies have overlapping functions. This raises questions about who is 
going to supervise whom
4
 and how the two bodies can effectively be prevented from 
engaging in possible collusion.
5
 As such, the relation between corporate governance 
structure and derivative action could be further examined. 
 
Second, although this research argues that derivative action should be improved so 
that shareholders are encouraged to bring litigation against wrongdoers, this does not 
necessarily mean that litigation is the best choice for shareholders seeing to protect 
their rights. In fact, litigation has its own disadvantages. For example, it is expensive 
and will take a long time to finish the lawsuit procedure. Moreover, it damages the 
reputation of the company and a plaintiff shareholder of the company may suffer 
from this indirectly. From this perspective, it is indeed clear that shareholder 
litigation can be neither the initial nor the principle means of protection for 
shareholders to reduce agency cost. As such, shareholders may choose other methods 
to protect their interests. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has grown in less than 
a decade from a bravely-voiced hope to an accumulation of practices aiming to 
resolve legal disputes without going to court.
6
 ADR means that disputes can be 
addressed by other methods than lawsuits. For example, it includes arbitration, 
mediation, conciliation and negotiation. It can even be expanded to include a 
mini-trial
7
 and involve certain officials and quasi-officials (such as court-appointed 
                                                             
4
 A. M. Han, ‘China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in a Transitional Economy’ (1996) 5 
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 457. 
5
 This possible collusion is similar to the collusion between the manager and the auditor. See F. 
Kofman and J. Lawarree, ‘Collusion in Hierarchical Agency’ (1993) 61 Econometrica 629. 
6
 J. K. Lieberman and J. F. Henry, ‘Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement’ 
(1986) 53 The University of Chicago Law Review 424. 
7
 See D. M. Parker and P. L. Radoff, ‘The Mini-Hearing: An Alternative to Protracted Litigation of 
Factually Complex Disputes’ (1982) 38 The Business Lawyer 35. 
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masters or neutral experts).
8
 With the implementation and expansion of ADR, the 
burden on the courts and disputants would be reduced and judicial resources would 
also be saved. As discussed in Chapter 4, the author believes that the law governing 
derivative actions concerns the right of minority shareholders and the checking of 
abuses by managers and majority shareholders, which is mandatory regulation in 
nature. As such, it seems that there is no room for ADR to be considered in the area 
of derivative actions, as matter that lead to derivative actions cannot be contractually 
waived or modified. However, ADR still has a role to play in the sense that 





A third avenue for further study is the role of the court. It is recognised that courts 
should become increasingly important in derivative actions. Indeed, the rapid 
development of business creates an unpredictable society. Companies may face 
different situations and the way to deal with business disputes should also be 
different. This requires that company law be sufficiently flexible. However, one of 
the drawbacks for civil jurisdictions is that the law is too rigid and inflexible. In 
order to overcome this difficulty, the courts should be granted greater discretion in 
deciding derivative actions on a case-by-case basis. 
 
At the same time, granting the court greater discretion requires that judges be 
competent to hear such cases. This thesis has demonstrated that Chinese judges are 
increasingly competent to hear commercial cases as a result of the adoption of Judges 
Law. However, how judges approach and decide derivative actions is not clear and 
thus it would be interesting and valuable to know more about the courts’ role in this 
form of lawsuit. 
                                                             
8
 See E. D. Green, ‘Getting Out of Court- Private Resolution of Civil Disputes’ (1984) 28 Boston Bar 
Journal 18. 
9
 Also see A. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance : Theory and Operation 
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